Senator AIKEN. It used to take a long time to get from Boston to Alaska. They could get from Maine to Alaska in a little less time I think. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I, too, would like to express my pleasure at seeing our former colleague, with his youthful and spritely approach to great public questions. I shall examine the matter he refers to with great sympathy, and I have it before us on the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. I would like to join our chairman with the ageold toast, until 120.

Mr. GRUENING. It is always pleasant to return to the scene of one's former activities.

Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator, it is a privilege to have you with us today. We miss you.

The next witness will be the Honorable George L-P Weaver. We welcome you, Mr. Weaver. I would say to the committee that Mr. Weaver is an old friend. We worked together in the Government many years ago; and, in my opinion, he is one of the ablest public servants we have today. I am not quite sure of his present position. Are you still Assistant Secretary of Labor?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE L-P WEAVER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. WEAVER. No, sir; I am in the process, Senator Symington, of a transition. I complete my tour with the Labor Department at the end of this month, and I hope to get a brief vacation and then take up the post with the International Labor Organization, beginning September 1.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have been the head of that international organization several times, have you not?

Mr. WEAVER. Yes, sir. I just completed a tour as chairman of the governing body of the ILO.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is a report in the files of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which says that the activities of the Truman administration in the early 1950's saved the Government some half billion dollars in stockpiling, mostly tin, and I know the chief reason for that accomplishment was your own activities to that end. On this whole question of trade and international relationships we welcome any comments you may have this morning.

Mr. WEAVER. Thank you, sir.

MULITILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS IN U.N. SYSTEM

Having in mind your admonition at the outset of the hearings, I will attempt to summarize the statement which has been filed before the committee. The burden of my statement, sir, deals with the multilateral organizations of which we are a part that make up the United Nations system. One notes that our contributions over the last several years have exceeded a quarter of a billion dollars to the international

organizations, and the burden of my statement is a plea for better coordination of the U.S. activities and efforts in these organizations in order that we can more effectively utilize them as an instrument for the implementation of our foreign policy.

I think it is particularly important because one notes that the giving countries that have provided aid for the new states since World War II, that there is a diminution which we share in, and an increase in appropriations as well as an increase in activity in the multilateral agencies, and I would suggest that the trend would indicate that this will be a continuing factor and, as one examines our participation, one notes a lack of coordination, one notes a lack of utilization of these organizations as effectively as is possible for the implementation of our objective as well as contributing to the self-interest of the United Nations system and our own country.

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF POLICIES URGED

I would draw your attention, sir, to specific recommendations that are found on pages 7 and 8 of the statement, and I would suggest one that is needed in order to accomplish basic improvements in the pursuit of U.S. objectives would be the effective coordination of policies of the diminuted State Department agencies having basic responsibility for our participation in various international organizations.

I would suggest an improvement of the collection and analysis of current developments of meetings of all international organizations and, three, a careful, coordinated formulation of consistent instructions for the different U.S. delegations attending United Nations organizations meetings, and we ought to pull together, I think, much better our missions at the seats of the major international organizations-for example, New York, Geneva, and Vienna. They should be kept informed on a continuing basis to enable them to carry forward the work of the delegations in pursuit of the national interest after the departure of the delegations when the meetings have concluded. And we need, finally, the establishment of machinery in the field to keep abreast of the development and administration of U.N. technical assistance projects.

GREATER USE OF MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION AS INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

As one travels throughout the world and visits our embassies, one notes a lack of knowledge and a lack of machinery in the field to keep abreast of the U.N. technical assistance projects, and we have probably the most complete and far-reaching diplomatic establishment throughout the world, but yet our representatives in the various organizations find themselves at the mercy of the bureaucracy of the organization with regard to technical assistance projects.

If I might cite from my own experience, the ILO is a favorate instrument of the United Nations Development Fund for technical assistance projects in the manpower field. They are administering now projects in excess of $100 million and, as we attended the meetings of the Operations Committee, the Committee of the ILO that has the responsibility for supervising technical assistance projects, we were victims of the papers, of the proposals, of the recommendations of the

staff. Every bureaucracy is a self-seeking instrument, and we had no way on a continuing basis of checking the efficiency and efficacy of the administration of those projects in the field. I think that this can be cured with this very large and elaborate diplomatic establishment that we have throughout the world, and I would propose on the basis of the experience of the last 8 years that we undertake at a high level the study in depth of the role of multilateral and bilateral technical assistance as the basis for determining our policy in the technical assistance field.

I think a task force should comprise not only representatives of the Government but should also include management and labor, and I believe a study of this nature would provide flexible guidelines for the decisionmaking process, and I believe the results would show the need for greater attention to the multilateral institutions as a potential instrument of U.S. policy.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL POLICYMAKING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED

I would also recommend that a small interdepartmental policymaking committee be formed, perhaps patterned after the Interagency Trade Organization created by Congress in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and this interdepartmental group should be chaired by a representative of the President with an office in the Executive Office of the President who would be able to devote the required time to working with the appropriate agencies to formulate sound, consistent policies to promote the national interest of making the specialized agencies into flexible and efficient organizations.

This committee or a smaller subcommittee of it should also be empowered by the President to assist the Department of State in working with the Congress on budgetary and other matters so that the Congress can obtain a far better view of the work, problems, and accomplishments of the multilateral organizations.

SMALL TASK FORCE RECOMMENDED

We would like to suggest also that a small working-level task force be appointed, with representatives from different executive departments, to do a study in depth of the programs of the different specialized agencies, noting especially strong and weak points, and high priority and marginal activities and meetings. This would assist us in determining the need for many of the unrelated and unnecessary meeting and program ideas that are recommended. This may also help to contain the competing pressures for the many uncoordinated activities of the past.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that this situation has grown for two reasons: One, because of the rapid escalation of the international organizations and, two, because of our pattern of representation in the organizations. Our pattern is roughly that, for example, the Department of Labor has the responsbility for representation in the ILO; the Department of HEW for representation in UNESCO; a different division of HEW and WHO; the Department of Agriculture for FAO.

32-308-69-11

I think this is proper because these agencies have the greatest competency in these areas and, therefore, bring to bear a greater degree of competency in representation of these agencies.

But the weakness is that they are not effectively coordinated, they are not effectively coordinated on substantive matters, and the State Department cannot do it because they do not have the substantive competency. I think that this needs to be done on the White House level the same way that this problem was cured or a great step was made toward curing it in the creation of the international trade community, and I think that here we have a much more effective working and operating mechanism to bring to bear a coordinated U.S. position than we do in the international agencies.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you read the last two paragraphs of your statement? I think they are especially pertinent and constructive, and should be made a part of the record.

Senator AIKEN. We are going to put the whole statement in the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. But I would like him to read it so we can comment.

COORDINATION BETWEEN TRADE AND AID POLICIES

Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Chairman, if I may digress for a moment, my earlier reference to the Interagency Trade Organization, brings to mind another perplexing problem of policy administration; namely, the lack of coordination between trade and aid policies. As you know, there is considerable activity going on regarding trade preferences to developing countries. It seems to me that the trade preference issue combines the concerns of trade and aid, as realistically they must be combined, and that we should endeavor to see whether our policymakers consciously relate the two, or if it is feasible to do so. Unfortunately, I have little to add on this topic at present, but I believe it is of sufficient importance to warrant further exploration.

One of our failings in multilateral organization work has been best phrased by an old hand in the business: "We so desire to be loved that we cannot say no." We should not be adverse to standing up to opposition in multilateral organizations. We should either be frank and outspoken with a full and articulate statement of U.S. views, or we should be silent. We should boldly assert that our interest in the U.N. system is to provide an evermore efficient instrument to implement the U.N. Charter; thereby serving better the self-interest of the United Nations system and the United States.

(The full statement of Mr. Weaver follows:)

STATEMENT BY GEORGE L-P WEAVER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, I am George L-P Weaver. For most of the past eight and onehalf years, I was Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs and the United States Representative on the Governing Body for the International Labor Organization. I have just completed a year as Chairman of the Governing Body of the ILO. I want to thank you for this opportunity to share with you some of the views I have developed in the course of my direct involvement with international organizations and the U.S. policymaking apparatus relating to these organizations.

The focus of my presentation will be on multilateral aid, the value of which was given prominent recognition by President Kennedy through his original concept

of designating the Sixties as the first United Nations Development Decade. This decade is coming to a close and will leave with us three primary lessons: (1) the process of development is much more complicated than we thought at the beginning of the Sixties; human resources development, for example, is a key factor along with the abilities and aspirations of people in the application of capital and technology to achieve desired goals; (2) more and more of the newer nations of the world have come to recognize the significance to their development of a balance in the food and population equation, and the need for access to the technology for the solution of the equation; and (3) the U.N. agencies themselves are undertaking a critical self-analysis as the necessary prelude to essential cooperation required for any significant and meaningful multilateral contribution to the next development decade.

I believe that the multilateral approach is an effective way to tackle the tough problems of development. And it is a relatively apolitical method of furthering U.S. interests abroad.

The United States participation in multilateral organizations and programs reflects the United States national interest in keeping the peace, furthering social and economic progress, and building stable and democratic national institutions and governments in developing areas of the world. In the broadest terms. United States policy has been to use the multilateral approach when it appeared to be more effective than the bilateral, and in particular when enough other countries expressed a willingness to put up sufficient resources to make the resulting operation truly international and multilateral.

United States contributions to international organizations, both assessed and voluntary contributions, amount to sizeable sums and are in the realm of really big business. Since 1946 the United States has provided a total of just about $4 billion in direct contributions to international organizations. Currently, moreover, annual contributions are running about one-third of a billion dollars per year. Up through the fiscal year 1966, which ended on June 30, 1966, these contributions increased each year, and for fiscal 1966 the contributions amounted to $357 million. This sum was paid out to a total of 71 international organizations but does not include sums made available by the United States to the various international banks active in the development field.

For the first time in fiscal 1967, United States contributions declined-$35 million. As of June 30, 1967, the total contributions for the year amounted to $322 million and were spread out to 75 international organizations. These organizations are engaged either in (1) economic and social development; (2) peacekeeping; or (3) cooperation on matters of concern to many nations. About $198 million, or 61 percent of the total, was in the form of voluntary contributions for 21 operational programs mostly involved in the development of natural resources, improvement in agriculture, trade, health, educational services, and assistance to refugees and children.

About $110 million, or 34 percent, represented the United States' share of assessments to meet the regular budget costs of 52 international organizations. The remaining $14 million were devoted to defray the costs of two peace-keeping operations.

During fiscal 1967, the $322 million, about $1.62 on a per capita basis, represented 39 percent of the total contributions by all governments to intergovernmental organizations.

I have always felt that too little of our bilateral AID budget went to technical assistance programs which our experience has proven to be effective. Now that Congress has limited the number of countries that can receive help under our bilateral system, it can be expected that a larger number of developing countries will turn to multilateral organizations for technical assistance. At present, these organizations are spending more money for technical cooperation programs than is the United States.

There are real problems with the present mechanism which exists to guide and implement our participation in intergovernmental organizations.

The operational and representational responsibilities for United States participation in intergovernmental organizations has been delegated to the different, appropriate executive departments; the ILO to Labor, the WHO to the Public Health, FAO to Agriculture and so forth. The Department of State has sought to maintain strategic control over these responsibilities by exercising budgetary and administrative authority, but it has been too bogged down in the involvement of normal affairs to give adequate guidance to the executive departments.