occasion to question violation of any of those agreements by the Soviet Union?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, we have had questions about violations. I could supply for the record a list of those questions as they arose. If you would like a detailed explanation, I will be glad to supply it for the record.

Senator JAVITS. I think we should have that, Mr. Secretary. (The following information was later supplied :)

QUESTION REGARDING SOVIET VIOLATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT During the period 1965–68, questions under the Limited Test Ban Treaty were raised with respect to several nuclear events. These questions related to radioactive debris from underground nuclear explosions, and not to the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere outer space, and under water, which is the essential arms control provision of this agreement. Both the U.S. and the USSR have affirmed their commitment to the preservation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty with unimpaired authority.

Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides for mutual inspection by the contracting parties in order to ensure the observance of the provisions of the Treaty. The United States has periodically exercised its right of inspection under this article, most recently in 1966-67, and has found no evidence of any violation of the Treaty by the USSR.

The Outer Space Treaty includes a provision (Article IV) in which the parties "undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons." Although the Soviets have tested a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) these tests have not involved a full orbit around the earth nor do we have any evidence that nuclear warheads have been used in such tests.

SOVIET AND U.S. OBSERVANCE OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

Senator JAVITS. On the whole, would you say, give or take the usual 10 percent, that when we have actually made an agreement, it has been complied with, since the war, on disarmament or arms control matters? Secretary LAIRD. On disarmament or arms control? Senator JAVITS. Or on arms control.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe there would be any question about that. Arms control and disarmament agreements are limited, and, to my knowledge, there have been no disagreements on those treaties. Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Senator yield for just one question there?

Senator JAVITS. Certainly.

Senator SYMINGTON. More specifically, if we have any right because of occurrences that they had violated the nuclear test ban treaty, they would also have the right based on occurrences to think, would they not, that we had, too?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe that we have violated the treaty in any way.

Senator SYMINGTON. We know we have not, but we have made mistakes.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure there were some.

Senator SYMINGTON. And therefore we would have the right to consider occurrences as mistakes just as they would have the right to consider theirs mistakes which they made under the treaty; the question would be whether they were made purposely or unintentionally, would it not?

Secretary LAIRD. I think that point would be up for some debate. But I want it made very clear that I am well satisfied that there has been no violation on our part.

Senator JAVITS. And apparently you feel the same way about the other side?

Secretary LAIRD. As far as the other side is concerned, our government has made no finding that they have violated the Test Ban Treaty. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Symington's caveat is a good one because there have been indications of-there may have been a mistake or two. Senator JAVITS. Now, Mr. Secretary, just as we must be eternally vigilant, as your testimony recommends, we also, would you not say, or would you say, have a right to take into consideration our experience with disarmament and arms control treaties with the Soviet Union in the last 20 years?

Secretary LAIRD. It is important for us to take into consideration those experiences.

Senator JAVITS. And on the whole, that experience, where we have actually made an agreement, has been good.

Secretary LAIRD. When we have actually had a treaty in the last 20 years covering arms control and nuclear testing, it has been good. I am sure you know that we had a moratorium at one period of time, but that is not covered by your question. As the Senator from New York knows very well, some people confuse it with a treaty, but it was not a treaty.

SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE

Senator JAVITS. Now, I notice with interest in your statement where you say, "it would be foolhardy to expect early abatement of fear of aggression in Europe."

Now, I assume in that statement you characterize our policy, that is it would be foolhardy for us to expect early abatement of fear of aggression in Europe. What about the Europeans, how are they responding and do they seem to entertain the same view we do?

Secretary LAIRD. There has been a significant increase in concern. The Chairman of the committee objects to my reference to Czechoslovakia, but since Czechoslovakia, there has been increased concern in the NATO countries. At the NATO Council and also the defense planning meeting that I attended in Brussels, I was aware of this concern. The budgets of some of these various countries had been on the decline as far as the military preparedness is concerned, but some have now gone forward with increases in their military budgets for the current fiscal year. I believe that this was brought about by the concern which they felt about the Soviets' very successful operation against Czechoslovakia.

Senator JAVITS. Do you see any likelihood of an abatement of our military burden in Europe, in connection with this concern?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not want to state, Senator Javits, that, if the various countries in Europe, particularly in NATO, go forward with any significant increases in their budgets, we would immediately react with a reduction in ours. I believe that that kind of reverse incentive would not be a practical course of action for us to take at this time. I am hopeful that we will be able at some future time to reduce our military expenditures, not only in Europe but here in the United

States and throughout the world, but I believe that it would be a reverse incentive to these countries if an increase in their budgets merely meant that we would reduce our commitment to them. Perhaps the year 1970 or the year 1971 is not the time period in which we should embark upon this kind of a program.

Senator JAVITS. Of course there are many other things that the Europeans can and should do to assist our situation.

Secretary LAIRD. There is no question about that, Senator Javits, I am concerned about it, and I am concerned about their military commitment. They have not done as well as they should have.

EFFECT ON U.S. POLICY OF A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR COMMUNITY

Senator JAVITS. Well now, following that up further, what would you say would be the effect upon American policy if European plans resulted in a concert of nuclear weapons development and deployment between the United Kingdom and France, which is apparently one of the aspects to the negotiations regarding admitting Britain to the Common Market? Would that have a material effect on American foreign policy?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; I believe it would. Several proposals are being considered, and the Finance Minister of West Germany in a speech which he made in London quite recently-within the year-outlined a program that I believe is of considerable concern to the United States.

If no European community was established for the control of the joint nuclear stockpile which would be developed, any participation by West Germany I believe, would be a violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Senator JAVITS. But if a European community were established, the American interpretation is that it would not be a violation.

Secretary LAIRD. If a European community were established, then the pooling of the French and German assets would be permitted under the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Senator JAVITS. That is the American construction.

Secretary LAIRD. That is the American construction.

Senator JAVITS. We are not sure the Russians agree with that. Secretary LAIRD. We are not sure that the Russians agree with that, but I believe that it is quite clear that it would be possible.

Senator JAVITS. Now, is this considered desirable for American policy?

Secretary LAIRD. Personally, I have serious questions about it, Senator Javits. This is a matter that is being studied at the present time by the National Security Council. Those studies are going forward at the present time, and I would like to reserve my final judgment until they have progressed a little further down the line. My immediate reaction, however, is to have some questions about it. I would have to be convinced.

is it not?

COORDINATION OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC-MILITARY MATTERS

Senator JAVITS. Now, this is a mixed diplomatic-military question, Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. How do you proceed in those matters? We have heard that your office for International Security Affairs has undergone a considerable shakeup. How do you proceed now? How does the new administration proceed in a mixed diplomatic-military question? Do you rely on your own resources? How do you coordinate, if at all, with the State Department? Who makes the final decision?

Secretary LAIRD. The final decision on a matter such as this would, of course, be made by the President of the United States. But we have, I believe, gone forward in establishing in the present National Security Council's procedures perhaps one of the best mechanisms in the decisionmaking process that has been used by our Government. Using this vehicle through the study groups, the Under Secretaries' group and, finally, the Council itself, we are able to see that all agencies State Department, the Defense Department, the Disarmament Agency, or other concerned agencies of the Government-have an opportunity to put forward and discuss their views. This is done through the preparation of position papers which are discussed at the study group level and then taken before the Under Secretaries' group, and finally to the National Security Council. A question like this would follow that procedure.

SOVIET ULTIMATUM ON WEST GERMANY

Senator JAVITS. One peripheral question, Mr. Chairman, and I shall try to be not much longer. I notice you speak of Czechoslovakia. You said the Chairman had some views on it himself. But I notice you did not mention the so-called ultimatum served by the Soviet Union on West Germany, which implied that certain authorities in the Soviet Union under the United Nations Charter coupled with the treaties concluding World War II, such as exist, and de facto situations concluded in World War II, seem to me gave much more alarm in Europe than Czechoslovakia. They invaded a Communist state, but serving the ultimatum on West Germany, which is a NATO country, and giving themselves certain unilateral authorities there seems to me, certainly cannot be acceptable to Europe or to the United States, or anybody else in the free world.

Would you have any comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary LAIRD. I would agree with you, Senator, that it is a serious matter. I am aware, however, of the references made in the recent Gromyko speech which indicate that the Soviet Union may wish to modify its position somewhat as regards Berlin and the German situation.

Senator JAVITS. Would that not be a very hopeful thing in pursuing SALT or other disarmament negotiations?

Secretary LAIRD. I think it would be not only hopeful but helpful. Senator JAVITS. Good; thank you very much.

MILITARY AID AND BASE RENTALS

Just one or two other questions, and then I shall be through. There has been a question raised as to whether a good deal of our military aid is not for all practical purposes negotiated rent for bases which we already have. For example, I notice with great interest that you are going to put in a request asking us to amend the bill to look after Spain. This comes after the conclusion of the base agreement.

It is not necessarily wrong, but do you not think, in terms of the disclosure to the American people, we ought to be rather tight about it? One of the guidelines listed in your statement is that no military sale shall be approved unless it is consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States, so that we must acknowledge frankly that military aid, either grants or sales or credit, may very well be tied up with the presence of U.S. bases in a given country.

Secretary LAIRD. There is no question about that. Senator Javits. As far as I am concerned, I would not object to having the funds required to carry out the Spanish agreement included in the defense appropriation bill because I look at it as rent for facilities needed to maintain our Polaris submarines and also certain Air Force facilities. There perhaps would be an objection from some of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. It was felt they would object to being bypassed if this were carried in the defense authorization. I believe it will be submitted to this committee so that the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations will not be bypassed. But I think you are correct. I look at it as a rental payment.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I have two other questions? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

DETERMINING THE THREAT OF AN ACTIVE INSURGENCY

I am very puzzled by one statement you made, and I think it very important to explain. You say in your statement, "In our own hemisphere, direct military attacks by an outside power or by Cuba do not seem to be in the offing. Yet active insurgencies exist currently in Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela."

Now that, of course, implies that we have to give military aid to those countries if their military establishments require it because active insurgencies exist.

It reminded me somewhat of the American Revolution. I just wonder by what standard we judge whether an active insurgency is a threat to the security of the United States or whether in some cases an act of insurgency might be a great help to the security of the United States. Now, I will immediately say that I think that we are extremely fortunate to have the elected governments that we do in Colombia and in Venezuela, and it seems to me we would like very much to keep them in power.

But after all, there is still another question; namely, that it is the business of the local people. I just wonder whether we have articulated any philosophy on that score. In other words, having agreed at this time that direct military attacks by Cuba, fomented by Cuba or international communism or whatever name anybody would wish, certainly we would say that is a challenge to our security, that it violates the Monroe Doctrine and so on. The question that troubles me is by what standards are we judging the desirability of our giving military aid where you have active local insurgencies in given countries, in the face of our own revolutionary disturbance. I think the American people ought to know what are our criteria in matters of this kind. Haiti would be a striking example. A military dictatorship would be another example. What does the Secretary think about that?