change in the military order to our military forces in Vietnam to maintain maximum military pressure upon the enemy? If there has not, you can say so; if there has, you can say so.

Secretary LAIRD. In order to satisfy you, Senator, I would say that there was not. The changes which I enumerated are significant, I think, but certainly during this present period, the maximum pressure is being kept up by General Abrams.

I would not think that there had been any change as far as that was concerned, but this is a matter which is currently under assessment as part of the study which I announced earlier today, and I want to make that very clear.

Senator GORE. I am sorry it took so long.

Secretary LAIRD. I wanted to make it very clear, Senator, that this whole matter is something which is under constant review by the administration. We are watching very closely to see if there has been a change in tactics by the other side. We have seen some change on their part from the standpoint of conserving manpower in Vietnam. Their casualties are very high, as you know. They seem to be standing off in these attacks by fire, and carrying on his kind of an operation at the present time. I cannot say with certainty that there will not be new initiatives on their part.

As you know, we have had longer periods than this when the activity has been at a low level. Such periods have run up to 20 and 30 days and longer. But it is important for us to examine this period, and, if there is a significant change, to make sure that we do not miss that change.

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I had several questions. I will ask but one more out of concern for the time of my colleagues: You said that the second purpose of General Wheeler's visit would be to reassess the question of deployment. Now, because I have already consumed my quota of time, I will not ask you a series of questions, but out of a sense of duty, I must not let the opportunity pass to express to a high administration official, as I have done upon every occasion I have had an opportunity to do so, that a piecemeal, gradual withdrawal, which seems to be the policy now being inaugurated, leaving in Vietnam sufficient U.S. troops to maintain the Thieu-Ky regime in power, is not, in my opinion, a road to peace. Rather it is prolonging the war and, at very best after a period of years, having a Korea-type settlement, which has not been very satisfactory.

I would urge you and urge you to suggest to the President that we utilize our pervasive presence in Vietnam, our influence and our power, to bring about a settlement of the issues dividing the forces and the factions in South Vietnam so that they will have a will to live together in peace. I know of no way of having peace in that area unless the people who live there have a will to live in peace. I know of no way we can force that will but perhaps we could persuade it, persuade it in a way that will let all of our sons come home, not a few at a time.

I do not wish to deny you the opportunity of responding but I will not ask further questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield on that point, maybe before the Secretary comments.

Senator GORE. Yes.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary made his statement about Vietnam in the beginning, and he mentioned that Admiral McCain is among those General Wheeler is to confer with. Admiral McCain earlier this year wrote an article for Reader's Digest which was widely published. I have commented upon it before. He said that we have the enemy on the run and they are about to surrender and so on. It was a very strong statement.

That matter was discussed at length on how it seemed that the facts did not support his theory. Now, on July 9, which was just recently, there was a news report from Tokyo, according to the Chicago Tribune Press Service and I read:

The United States top commander in the Pacific told Japan today that a military victory in Vietnam is possible, informed sources said. Admiral John S. McCain, Commander of American forces in the Pacific, made the statement to Japanese officials in a periodic defense advisory meeting at the foreign ministry. Skipping a couple of paragraphs, Admiral McCain also declared that the U.S. now holds the military initiative throughout South Vietnam and, given time, could win a military victory there, these sources reported.

In connection with Senator Gore's point, are you certain that the administration and the military have given up the idea of a military victory? Admiral McCain feels it is feasible, and if General Wheeler is going there and the Admiral persuades him it is, then I presume you would not bring any more troops home and we might even return some of them. I do not understand this continuation of Admiral McCain's statements in view of the administration's policies or at least those of the President.

Secretary LAIRD. First, our objective in Vietnam was set forth very clearly by the President in his speech last May outlining our policy on Vietnam, and again at the Midway conference. Our objective in Vietnam is not a military victory, but to establish a condition there in which the people can have the right of self-determination by free and open elections and be free of outside domination.

Now, I am sure Admiral McCain understands what the objective of the United States is in Vietnam. I think his statement dealt with whether a military victory was possible. He said a military victory was possible. That is certainly his opinion, and it is the opinion of many others. But there are certain very grave risks involved with such a course, and it is not the objective in Vietnam.

I want to assure this committee that we have not escalated the objective in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE IN U.S. OBJECTIVES?

Senator GORE. Is there or has there been any change in the objectives of our country in Vietnam by the present administration? Secretary LAIRD. Yes, I believe that there are certain changes. Senator GORE. In objectives?

Secretary LAIRD. Basic changes that have been made. Both in his speech last May, and again in the Midway conference, the President outlined very clearly changes in the direction of our policy with respect to Vietnam. I think the most significant one has been the change in and acceleration of our Vietnamization program.

We are making progress in that area, and I think it is a very impor tant area for us to give full support.

Senator GORE. Are you certain that you want to say that there have been changes in the objectives of our country in South Vietnam? Secretary LAIRD. There have been changes in policy. The objective has not been escalated.

Senator GORE, Well

Secretary LAIRD. The overall objective, I believe, as set forth by the previous administration, was the right of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. There have been certain changes in our offers to the other side. We made some in the outline of our negotiating position as set forth by the President in May and again at Midway. President Thieu also certainly has indicated certain changes as far as the negotiating position of the South Vietnamese Government is concerned. However, I want to make it clear that our overall objective has not been escalated, and I felt that the statement that was quoted from Admiral McCain might give one that impression.

Senator GORE. I did not ask you, Mr. Secretary, if the objective had been escalated. I am going to send you a top secret document with a marked sentence which I will ask you to look at, and then I will ask you again if there has been a change in objectives. Your aide has the document there. I have an arrow pointed to the sentence there.

Have there been changes in the objectives of the U.S. Government in South Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. NO.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE, Mr. Chairman

Secretary LAIRD. Senator, the military order in this directive is somewhat different from the foreign policy objective which we have, and I think that you understand the difference.

Senator GORE. I understood your answer.

Secretary Laird. Yes. And our objective in Vietnam still is the

same

Senator GORE. The same as it was?

Secretary LAIRD. The establishment of a free and independent government through open and free elections in Vietnam. I believe that that objective has not been escalated in any way toward a military victory, and, as far as the military orders are concerned, they are under review at the present time. This is a matter to which we are giving the highest priority, and I spend perhaps more time on this than anything else, because it is the No. 1 problem, not only of our country but of the Department of Defense at this time.

I can assure you that this is a very important period of time, and I wanted you and this committee to know how much importance I attach to General Wheeler's appraisal of the situation during the visit which he is currently making there.

Senator GORE. Thank you for your cooperation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary and General, it seems to me that when we talk about objective, it is in a sense of what we hope eventually will be the situation that is finally developed. That is a different matter from the steps by which we believe we may get to that situation.

CONCERN OVER VIETNAMIZATION OF WAR

When you came back early this year from your trip to South Vietnam, you were quoted, Mr. Secretary, as expressing grave concern. I think the words were that you were appalled by the little extent to which the South Vietnamese had moved to make this their own war and take their responsibility for it. Was this a fair statement of your reaction at that time?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Case, I was concerned about the progress that was being made toward modernizing the Vietnamese forces. I expressed that concern and went before the Congress to ask for additional funds to provide for modernization and for the Vietnamization program.

As you know, funds for the phase II accelerated Vietnamization program or modernization program were not requested in the 1970 budget, and I felt if we were going to make progress in this area that we must push forward, I used the term "Keep the maximum pressure on" with reference to Vietnamizing the war, and this has been done.

Fortunately the Congress, both the House and the Senate, approved the supplemental request which I asked be added to the supplemental appropriation bill. The Senate Armed Services Committee has now reported out the authorization which I have requested to accelerate the phase II modernization program, and I believe that we are making great progress in this area.

I do not mean to be a pessimist about these matters. I have said that I was neither a hawk nor a dove at one time, but rather pessimistic about Vietnam. I do not think we should promise more than we can deliver as far as Vietnam is concerned. In the past, I think the credibility of the Department of Defense has been somewhat questioned because of the very optimistic pronouncements that were made from time to time about the war. That is why I have urged that we not announce our replacement programs more than 2 or 3 months at a time. I want to be sure that we will be able to deliver on any announcement we make, and thus restore the credibility of our Government and particularly the credibility of the Department of Defense.

The President has announced when the next decision will be made. The next decision date will be prior to August 15. This is an important decision, and one which we are currently studying very carefully.

Senator CASE. Well then, it is a fair summary of your view then that you were concerned? That was your word just now, and may I

say

Secretary LAIRD. Very concerned.

Senator CASE. May I say it in my words, concerned about the state of the South Vietnamese ability to take more of this war on themselves at that time?

Secretary LAIRD. I think it was absolutely essential to give greater emphasis to this program of modernization and upgrading South Vietnamese forces so that we could move in the direction of reducing American commitments in Southeast Asia.

Senator CASE. That was your view at that time, your concern as to the then state of affairs on that subject?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I expressed hope that the Congress would support

Senator CASE. No, no; you were concerned, were you not?
Secretary LAIRD. I am concerned today, Senator.

Senator CASE. And you were concerned then?

Secretary LAIRD. I am concerned-I was concerned all during the last 4 years.

Senator CASE. So have you been, Mr. Secretary

Secretary LAIRD. I do not want to show a lack of concern, Senator Case.

Senator CASE. You are very helpful to us in anticipating things that we have not asked for, but if I might I would like to develop a rather simple point in my own way.

Secretary LAIRD. Very good.

Senator CASE. I have the same problem to the same degree, Mr. Secretary, that the Senator from Tennessee has. I am not trying to trap you, and I do not think he was.

Secretary LAIRD. No; I know you are not, but I wanted to show my concern, and I am sure

ABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO DEFEND ITSELF

Senator CASE. Well, I think it ought to be said that this administration has greatly changed the direction of this war. Whether it meant to or not it has started a process of withdrawal which cannot be reversed, and cannot very much be controlled as to time. We have very much changed this whole situation, and that is the reason that I am concerned particularly to get from you an assurance of the maximum effort being made to put the South Vietnamese in a position so that when the final question comes before this country, and specifically before the President, with the advice of all of you, as to whether we are going to get out finally, and leave the South Vietnamese to their own fate, they will be ready to take on the job without the kind of slaughter that is in all of our minds.

Now, I do not want to be misunderstood because I have urged for some time that we withdraw in order to get them started doing this job, and I believe that what has been done is right. But I do not believe you can do it just by withdrawing. You have got to do this other job, and that is the reason I press this question, Mr. Secretary. We may say that we withdraw as they are able to take the job over. But in fact we have started a process of withdrawing which we won't be able to adjust nicely to their capacity but which has its own inner dynamics which are going to drive it all the way, it seems to me, at least as fast as the time schedule suggested by the former Secretary of Defense, and referred to by the President in his statement of hope that he would do as well or better.

Now, this is the very heart of the problem we face, putting the South Vietnamese into position where they can and will do the job. That is the question I want to get more assurance on than just that we have appropriated money, that we have given them some new rifles and stepped up delivery of some armaments. That is not the real problem here. The North Vietnamese fought, the Vietcong fought, without any of this stuff and fought the South Vietnamese to a standstill, so we had to come in to prevent their being taken over, as you know. The question is, is this regime being put into a position where South

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