superintendent, it was inchoate until the times for the commencement and completion of the work should have been indorsed thereon. The clause fixing these times having been indorsed upon the contract before the expiration of fifteen days from its date rendered its execution complete, and made the contract valid.

The provision in the contract that the work shall be done "according to the specifications hereunto annexed and made a part of this contract," does not extend to the clause by which the time for the commencement and the completion of the work is fixed. The "specifications" thus referred to are those which, by section 3 of the act aforesaid (Stats., 1889, p. 159), are to be furnished by the city engineer, and which, by section 5 of the act (Stats., 1889, p. 160), are to be stated with the notice inviting proposals for doing the work.

As the contract was equally valid whether the superintendent indorsed thereon the clause fixing the times for the commencement and completion of the work on the same day that he signed the contract, or upon any day within fifteen days from its date, it follows that, if his term of office expired before the expiration of the fifteen days, this act could be performed by his successor. The act of fixing these times is the act of the officer, and not of the individual, and can be performed by the individual who at the time of performing it is the incumbent of the office. The execution of the contract being inchoate on his part until this act is performed, it is immaterial that one of the steps in the completion of its execution is performed by the outgoing officer and the other by his successor. They are each official acts, and are entitled to the same consideration, whether performed by the same or different

officers.

The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.

GAROUTTE, J., and VAN FLEET, J., concurred.

Hearing in Bank denied.

[No. 19521. Department One.-July 9, 1895.] D. HERBERT HOSTETTER, APPELLANT, v. LOS ANGELES TERMINAL TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

OF

DEED VAGUE DESCRIPTION-CONFLICTING LINES-STATEMENT ACREAGE.-Where the description of tracts of land by monuments, distances, or otherwise is vague and indefinite, by reason of conflicting lines, or by the omission of a line, or from any other cause, a statement of the acreage is an essential part of the description. ID.-BOUNDARIES-NATURAL MONUMENTS-RIVER-LINE OF OFFICIAL BED.-Natural monuments are all controlling, and, where it is plainly apparent that a river is called for as a boundary, it would control the calls for distance; but, where it is not clear that the river was intended as a boundary, and the description is satisfied by monuments consisting of the bank and the east line of the official bed of the stream, which corresponds with the distances and acreage given in the deed, the identity of the lot granted is established by taking the east line of the official bed as a boundary line instead of the river. ID.-CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC GRANT.-Grants of land by public bodies to private parties are to be interpreted in favor of the grantor.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. LUCIEN SHAW, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Galbreth & Morrison, for Appellant.

The estimation of acreage is merely a description of the premises and not words of limitation upon the quan tity conveyed. (Stanley v. Green, 12 Cal. 164; Roat v. Puff, 3 Barb. 353; Jackson v. Defendorf, 1 Caines, 493; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. 706.) Land bounded by a river extends to the thread of the river. (Morrison v. Keen, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 474; Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 451; 35 Am. Dec. 637; Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 496; Civ. Code, sec. 830; Arnold v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 514; Mariner v. Schulte, 13 Wis. 692; Walker v. Shepardson, 4 Wis. 507.) The official map of the river is more to be relied on than a call for distances and quantity. (Wolfe v. Scarborough, 2 Ohio St. 361, 368; McIver v. Walker, 9 Cranch, 173; 4 Wheat. 444; Lunt v. Holland, 14 Mass. 149; Davis v.

Rainsford, 17 Mass. 207; Magoun v. Lapham, 21 Pick. 135; Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 436; City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 13; Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 551.) A lot may be as precisely or definitely described by number as by metes and bounds. (Jackson v. McConnell, 19 Wend. 175; 32 Am. Dec. 439; Roat v. Puff, supra; Jackson v. Defendorf, supra; Mann v. Pearson, 2 Johns. 37; Jackson v. Barringer, 15 Johns. 471; Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 355; 4 Am. Dec. 67; Jackson v. Camp, 1 Cow. 605; Doe v. Thompson, 5 Cow. 373; Preston v. Bowmar, 6 Wheat. 582; Newsom v. Pryor, 7 Wheat. 10; Evans v. Corley, 8 Rich. 315; Wolfe v. Scarborough, supra; McIver v. Walker, 9 Cranch, 173; 4 Wheat. 444; Lunt v. Holland, supra; Davis v. Rainsford, supra; Magoun v. Lapham, supra; Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; 8 Am. Rep. 104; Coats v. Mathews, 2 Nott & McC. 99; Sayers v. City of Lyons, 10 Iowa, 254; Large v. Penn, 6 Serg. & R. 488; O'Herrin v. Brooks, 67 Miss. 266; Nash v. Wilmington etc. R. R. Co., 67 N. C. 416.) Statement of quantity is the most uncertain part of a description, and courses or distances will be rejected when inconsistent with boundaries. (Kruse v. Scripps, 11 Ill. 103; Powell v. Clark, supra; Jackson v. Barringer, supra; Jackson v. Moore, supra; Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill, 453; Hess v. Cheney, 83 Ala. 251; Jackson v. Defendorf, supra; Emery v. Fowler, 38 Me. 99; Doe v. Porter, 3 Ark. 18; 36 Am. Dec. 448; Jackson v. Defendorf, supra; Mann v. Pearson, supra; Evans v. Corley, supra; Wolfe v. Scarborough, supra; Lunt v. Holland, supra; Roat v. Puff, supra.) What is most material and most certain in a description must prevail over that which is less material and less certain. (Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 446; Hathaway v. Power, supra; Doe v. Porter, supra; Jackson v. Moore, supra; Jennings v. Brizeadine, 44 Mo. 332; Jackson v. Wendell, 5 Wend. 147; Doe v. Thompson, supra; Newsom v. Pryor, supra.) A map referred to in a deed is an essential part of the deed. (Vance v. Fore, supra; McCall v. Davis, 56 Pa. St. 434; 94 Am. Dec. 92; Glover v. Shields, 32 Barb. 379; Davis v. Rainsford, supra; Kennebec

Purchase v. Tiffany, 1. Greenl. (Me.) 219; 10 Am. Dec. 60; Thomas v. Patten, 13 Me. 329; Lunt v. Holland, supra; Doe v. Cullum, 4 Ala. 576.) Where a river makes a lot fractional, the river is the boundary of the fractional lot. (Schurmeier v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; 88 Am. Dec. 56; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 275; Menasha W. W. Co. v. Lawson, 70 Wis. 600.) If a man owns the bank or shore of a stream he owns to the thread of the stream. (Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. 152.)

T. E. Gibbon, for Respondent.

The grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor. (Civ. Code, sec. 1069.) Under the surrounding circumstances the number of acres contained in the deeds is a material part of the description to show the intention of the parties. (Pico v. Coleman, 47 Cal. 65; Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218; Hall v. Shotwell, 66 Cal. 379.)

GAROUTTE, J.-This is an action in the nature of ejectment to recover the possession of a certain tract of land one hundred feet in width and nineteen hundred and thirty-six feet in length, situated within the boundary lines of the city of Los Angeles. It is conceded that in the year 1868 the city of Los Angeles had the title to the realty, and plaintiff claims title as successor in interest of the grantees of the city. The city conveyed certain lands to plaintiff's predecessors in interest, and he now claims that those deeds carried the city's title to the property involved in this litigation, and it is upon the construction of such deeds that the merits of the present case depend.

The first deed grants, conveys, and quitclaims unto Thomas Rowan that certain piece or parcel of land situated, lying, and being in the city and county of Los Angeles, and known on the official map of said city as fractional lot No. 6 (six), in block No. 57 (fifty-seven), of Hancock survey of said city, containing 7.25 (seven and twenty-five one hundredths) acres of land. The second deed grants, conveys, and quitclaims unto Pru

dent Beaudry that certain piece or parcel of land situate, lying, and being in the city and county of Los Angeles, and known on the official map of said city as lot No. 1 (one), in block No. 57 (fifty-seven), containing 24.77 (twenty-four and seventy-seven one hundredths) acres. That portion of the official map of the city of Los Angeles relating to the lots in dispute may be fairly illustrated by the following diagram :

This land lies upon the east side of the Los Angeles river, and the river at high water is confined upon the east side by a precipitous bank some hundred feet in height. The river here, in flood time, is wide in extent and lessens as summer advances; and the width of the river bed or bottom varies with the seasons and the amount of rainfall. At the date of the city's deeds the official width of the river-bed had been established and by those lines the strip of land here involved lay between the high bank or bluff and the east line of the official bed. In other words, this land. forms that part of the actual river bed or bottom lying