tue of conveyances subsequently executed by Pioche and Robinson the defendants Luty and Thomas claimed title to the land, "commencing at a point where the northwesterly line of Fourth avenue intersects the southerly shore of Islais creek, and running thence in a northwesterly direction along the northeasterly line of said Fourth avenue extended, to the center of Islais creek, and thence ascending said Islais creek along the center line thereof to the northeasterly line of Fifteenth avenue, if extended in a northwesterly direction, as said avenue is delineated on said map; and thence in a southeasterly direction, and along the northeasterly line of Fifteenth avenue, if extended as aforesaid to the southerly shore of Islais creek; and thence in a northeasterly direction along said southerly shore as it winds and turns to the point of commencement." With reference to their title to this land the court finds, "That the lands described in the conveyance to Hewston include all the property described in plaintiffs' complaint, unless such deed is to be construed as including no part of the lands covered by the waters of Islais creek, in which event the said deed includes all the lands described in plaintiffs' complaint, except that lying in Islais creek"; and, "if Pioche and Robinson retained any title to any part of the lands described in plaintiffs' complaint, after the making of the conveyances herein before set out, then such title thereafter and prior to the commencement of this action became vested in the defendants Thomas and Luty as to the lands described in their answer." The conclusion of law that "the plaintiffs are the owners of all the real property described in their complaint" must be regarded as a finding that Pioche and Robinson did not retain any title to any portion of the lands described in the complaint. The term "shore," in its ordinary use, signifies the land that is periodically covered and uncovered by the tide, but it is sometimes applied to a river or pond as synonymous with "bank." In the absence of any qualification a grant bounded by the "shore" of a river,

when the grantor is the owner of the river, conveys the land up to the lowest point of the shore at any time, in order that the grantee may at all times have access to the stream by which the land is bounded. It is competent, however, for the grantor to so designate the line on the shore which shall constitute the boundary, that there shall be no uncertainty in its location, and in such case the line of high or low water mark would be immaterial in determining the extent of the grant. In the present case the starting point of the description in the grant to Hewston is "the intersection of the ditch with the shore line." This starting point may be susceptible of exact location, and from some of the evidence offered at the trial it would appear capable of ascertainment, although the court does not find its location. The only land to which plaintiffs have title is that embraced within a line drawn from this starting point around the various courses to the "south shore of Islais creek," and "thence along said shore as it winds and turns to commencement." The point in the "south shore," from which the last course is to be drawn, must be the same point in the shore as is the starting point; that is, at whatever point between high and low water mark was the intersection of the ditch with the shore line, there must be the point in the "shore line" to which the course along the easterly line of Fifteenth avenue is to be extended. The term "shore" must be construed with the same meaning wherever it is used in the same. conveyance, and its definite location in the first course requires the same location in the last. This is a fixed boundary or monument to which the distance "two chains sixty links," must yield. Whatever land lies between this boundary and the center of the creek is vested in the defendants Thomas and Luty, and the finding of the court that the plaintiffs were the owners of this portion of the demanded premises was errone

ous.

3. The defendants other than Thomas and Luty claim title under Harvey S. Brown to certain lots in gift map

number four, upon the theory that the Moss mortgage did not include any part of the bed of Islais creek. As Brown had conveyed to Moss all the lands described in the mortgage before he made the conveyance under which these defendants claim it is evident that the plaintiffs' title derived from Moss is superior to theirs.

The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed as to the appellants Thomas and Luty. As to the other appellants they are affirmed.

GAROUTTE, .J., VAN FLEET, J., MCFARLAND, J., and HENSHAW, J., concurred.

[No. 19485. Department One.- July 19, 1895.]

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, RESPONDENT, v. THE LINDA VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT ET AL., APPELLANTS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION-PUEBLO LANDS-ASSESSMENT BY IRRIGATION DISTRICT. -An assessment by an irrigation district upon the pueblo lands of a city situated within the district, which are unoccupied and uncultivated lands, susceptible of cultivation by irrigation, and which would be benefited thereby, is not a tax within the meaning of section 1 of article 13 of the constitution, exempting property of municipal corporations from taxation, and such pueblo lands may be sold by the irrigation district for unpaid assessments thereon.

ID. EXTENT OF EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION.-The exemption of municipal property from taxation relates to general county and state taxes, and has no reference to assessments for improvements made under special laws of a local character.

ID. IMPLIED EXEMPTION.-There can be no implied exemption of municipal property from taxation or assessment which is not held or used for municipal purposes, or devoted to a specific public use. ID. POWER OF LEGISLATURE OVER PUEBLO LANDS.-The legislature may empower a city to sell its pueblo lands, and may make it liable for an assessment for its proportion of expense incurred to secure a local benefit.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. E. S. TORRANCE, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Gibson & Titus, for Appellant.

The assessment does not fall within the prohibition of section 1 of article XIII of the constitution, which provides that property belonging to a municipal corporation "shall be exempt from taxation." This is an assessment and not a tax. (Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 234; Burnett v. Mayor of Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; 73 Am. Dec. 518; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; 72 Am. Dec. 276; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. Ann. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann. 498, in support thereof; Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360; Welty on Assessments, 2.) The term "taxation" does not include within its meaning an assessment for local improvements. (Elliott on Roads and Streets, sec. 370; Burnett v. City of Sacramento, supra, which was a street assessment case; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., supra; Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo County, supra. Also see Tregea v. Owens, 94 Cal. 317; Bloomington etc. Assn. v. People, 139 Ill. 16; Winona etc. R. R. Co. v. Watertown, 1 S. Dak. 46; Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall, 295; 85 Am. Dec. 624; Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 426, note; Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 530; Mayor of Troy v. Mutual Bank, 20 N. Y. 390; American Tr. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 20 N. Y. 388; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266; State v. Linn County Court, 44 Mo. 504; Cooley on Taxation, 207-209, 650, 653; Black on Tax Titles, 97; 2 Coke's Institutes, 232; Carthew's Reports, 438; Ames v. City of San Diego, 101 Cal. 390; Essex County v. Salem, 153 Mass. 142.) In the absence of any express exemption of the property from taxation, an exemption can be implied only when the property is actually appropriated to public uses. (Proprietors of South Congregational Meeting House v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538; Worcester v. Western R. R. Corp., 4 Met. 564; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. 611; Wayland v. County Commrs., 4 Gray, 500; Worcester County v. Mayor

etc. of Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; 17 Am. Rep. 159; Boston Society etc. v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468; Sioux City v. Independent School Dist., 55 Iowa, 150.)

William H. Fuller, and Clarence L. Barber, for Respondent.

The lands assessed and sold by appellants were municipal lands, situate within the city limits, and are exempt from taxation under section 1 of article XIII of the constitution. (Const., art. XIII, sec. 1; Pol. Code, sec. 3607; Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 600, 601; Low v. Lewis, 46 Cal. 549, 550.) The word "tax" within the meaning of the constitution includes "assessments." (Anderson's Law Dictionary, 80, 1006; Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360.) The provisions of the irrigation law upon the subject of taxing or assessing property must be construed as referring to and meaning private property and persons, and not including public property, nor the state, or any subordinate part of the state government, such as counties, towns, and municipal corporations. (People v. Doe, 36 Cal. 222; In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296; 27 Am. St. Rep. 106; City of Meridian v. Phillips, 65 Miss. 362; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; Irrigation Law, sec. 17; Stats. 1886-87, p. 37; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed.,72; Board of Improvement v. School Dist., 56 Ark. 354; 35 Am. St. Rep. 108; Worcester County v. Mayor of Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; 17 Am. Rep. 159; City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730; County Commrs. v. Board etc., 62 Md. 127; Toledo v. Board of Education, 48 Ohio St. 83; Edgerton v. Huntington School Tp., 126 Ind. 261.)

HAYNES, C.-The city of San Diego brought this action against said irrigation district and its directors and officers, to quiet its title to several parcels of land, containing in all nearly three thousand acres. The defendants answered the complaint, alleging its organization under the act of March 7, 1887, "to provide for the