Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource UseCambridge University Press, 2002 M04 4 - 276 pages Why do states often fail to cooperate, using transboundary natural resources inefficiently and unsustainably? This book, first published in 2002, examines the contemporary international norms and policy recommendations that could provide incentives for states to cooperate. Its approach is multi-disciplinary, proposing transnational institutions for the management of transboundary resources. Benvenisti takes a fresh approach to the problem, considering mismanagement as the link between domestic and international processes. As well, he explores reasons why some collective efforts to develop the international law on transnational ecosystems have failed, while others succeeded. This inquiry suggests that adjudicators need to be assertive in progressively developing the law, while relying on scientific knowledge more than on past practice. Global water policy issues seem set to remain a cause for concern for the foreseeable future; this study provides a new approach to the problem of freshwater, and will interest international environmentalists and lawyers, and international relations scholars and practitioners. |
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Contents
The need for collective action in the management | 22 |
States as collective actors | 43 |
structural failures | 64 |
Transnational institutions for transboundary ecosystem | 101 |
The structure and procedure of institutions | 131 |
Common terms and phrases
accompanying text actors agreements AJIL allocation aquifers basin Benvenisti boundaries Cambridge University Press chapter Chicken game collective action collective-action communities concerning conflict conflict paradigm constitutional constraints context Continental Shelf cooperation courts customary international law decision disputes doctrine domestic groups Domestic Politics Drainage Basins economic ecosystem institutions ecosystem management effective efficient ensure environment equitable example fresh water Gabcikovo-Nagymaros global governments Helsinki Helsinki Rules Human Rights Ibid ICJ Reports incentives International Law Commission International Watercourses irrigation joint judicial Law Review litigation management of transboundary market failures ment natural resources negotiations NGOs Non-Navigational obligations optimal outcome participation parties policies pollution potential practice Precautionary Principle principle procedures protection regimes regulation relations relevant reprinted riparians risks River Robert shared resources sovereignty sub-state sustainable ternational theory tion trade transboundary resources transnational ecosystem transnational institutions treaty unilateral users utilization Watercourses Convention