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infeasible to complete the entire system. It dismisses as insignificant the resulting increases in auto use and air pollution, and appears to spread out the auto gain over a 24-hour period rather than to show it at rush hours. It excludes from transportation comparisons the monetary and energy costs of operating those additional private auto.nobiles and of constructing and maintaining those added highway lanes which would follow a rail service cut. It is silent on the labor intensive, energy efficient and air quality improving features of rapid rail. It omits consideration of more economical alternatives to the proposed feeder bus system, and it disregards the efficacy of transit incentives combined with auto disincentives to increase ridership. It downplays the likelihood of transfer of federal interstate highway funds to finance Metro construction, and it ignores other sources of construction and operating capital, such as federal assistance and a regional transit tax.

As described in the following statement which I delivered before the House Committee on the District of Columbia Fiscal Affairs Subcommittee on March 2, the Faucett report is a slight and superficial exercise, a subservient bow to the almighty automobile.

We urge your Committee to consider the Faucett report as a desperate and poorly disguised attempt to intercept the imminent transfer of District of Columbia and other local interstate highway funds to Metro. We hope you will thwart this and other last minute efforts to keep superhighway plans alive and to derail Metro just as its first operating line is about to go into service. Your Committee's help is very much needed to assist the region's local governments in developing the package of regional taxes, federal assistance, and the transit incentives plus auto disincentives necessary for the Metro system to serve the present and future residents and visitors of this National Capital area. We thank you for providing the opportunity for us to bring this matter to your Committee's attention, and we appreciate your continuing interest in the problems of the Metropolitan Washington Region.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 4, 1976)

AREA Road POLLUTION CONTROL HELD WEAK

(By Stephen Klaidman) The Environmental Protection Agency has found that the air quality standards in the highway portion of the Washington area's regional transportation plan are inadequate and has recommended that the Highway Administration withhold funds until air pollution control measures are strengthened.

The EPA finding, which was disclosed yesterday at a meeting of the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, must now be reviewed by the Federal Highway Administration, which has the authority to decertify the transportation board and discontinue financing for the highway portion of the plan.

The multibillion dollar highway development plan includes the possible construction of an additional beltway outside the existing one, the construction of new four-lane arterial roads and the widening of existing roads.

EPA's findings and recommendations were made in a letter from Daniel Snyder, regional administrator of the environmental watchdog agency, to W. H. White, regional administrator of the highway agency.

EPA found the "transit portion" of the plan, which includes Metro, "is consistent with air quality goals," but that "the highway portion is inconsistent.”

According to Dennis Bates, director of health and environmental protection for COG, the kinds of things that would have to be revised would be numbers of car pools, buses, downtown parking spaces and anything else in the plan that affects air quality.

Snyder made it clear in his letter that the goal was not to scrap the plan but to make sure that pollution would be held to an acceptable level.

“We must emphasize," he wrote, “that clean air is not an optional goal, but rather a requirement of the Clean Air Act."

Snyder's letter noted also that “the air quality analysis performed for the long-range plan indicates that (acceptable standards) will not be attained even in 1992."

Air quality, said Snyder. "is a serious problem. We do not consider decertification (discontinuation of funding) a solution to the problem, but view it as a means to force a solution because the planning process is not responsive to environmental quality.”

GREATER WASHINGTON CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL, AFL-CIO,

Washington, D.C., March 31, 1976. Hon. ROMANO L, MAZZOLI, House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MAZZOLI: The Greater Washington Central Labor Council is well aware of the recent debates concerning the Washington Area Metro Rail System. We believe that the present problem highlighted in the report, “Washington Area Metro Rail System ; Perspectives and Alternatives", should be given careful consideration. We wholeheartedly agree with the idea of improving the present system. The Labor Council does not agree, however, with the study's proposals and this letter will hopefully explain our opposition.

It is our belief that the finance and time constraints associated with this study have prevented a complete analysis of all aspects of this issue. Working with these limited resources, the study was forced to make certain assumptions that were not adequately supported by the data.

In the discussion of rising fuel prices, the report suggested that gasoline shortages and rising prices may increase the demand for mass transportation, but dismissed any study of this increased demand as problematical, Increasing gasoline costs is an extremely relevant problem and the associated higher costs of car operation certainly merits extensive consideration.

The report's discussion of alternative to the proposed 98 mile system is severely hindered by the admitted informational constraint. "It is difficult to estimate how many potential patrons would adjust their travel patterns in a fashion which is consistent with the original WMATA forecast without recourse to computer models which were not available within the resources of this study." (p. 39)

The Commission would like to stop all Metro construction for approximately six to nine months. During that time period a detailed investigation of the costs and benefits of the proposed system would be undertaken. Though a detailed report concerning the merits of the present Metro system would be beneficial, to halt the construction until such a report could be presented would have serious consequences.

What would happen to all the workers presently employed ? With clearly high unemployment rates, this effect could only increase the unemployment problem rather than providing some help towards solving it as current Metro construction does. There would be cost incurred from a temporary halt in terms of rehiring and training employees to take places of those who had found employment elsewhere during the layoff period. There would also be additional costs due to inflation and because of the increased period of time needed to complete construction as a result of the delay.

Certainly a drastic halt of the Metro, with all of its attendant repercussions must be based on more conclusive evidence than has been represented in this limited study. Congress should make use of the best methodology and allocate sufficient funds to conduct a comprehensive study because the policies Congress advocates set precedents for all the lesser legislatures. The meager $4,000.00 study concerning the Metro Rail System establishes a bad precedent. For the U.S. to discontinue or even alter a program on the basis of this type study is totally incomprehensible.

In comparison to Europe, our present transportation system is extremely outdated. Let's not halt construction and further delay a badly needed, efficient. mode of transportation. The costs of a temporary halt of construction would most likely be greater than any benefits that could be the result of such action. Congress approved Metro construction previously and it should continue its support.

The Greater Washington Central Labor Council thanks you for consideration of this viewpoint, and urges you to support the continuation of Metro because we desperately need it. Sincerely,

ROBERT E. PETERSON, President.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D.C., April 26, 1976. B-141529 Hon. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Chairman, Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs of the Committee on the District of

Columbia, House of Representatives. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of December 2, 1975, presenting several questions concerning activities of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). As requested by your staff, we are responding to your request for our opinion on the legal nature of the metrorail capital contribution and operating subsidy agreements in advance of our reply to the other questions.

Enclosed is a copy of the legal analysis our staff prepared regarding the agreements between the local governments and WMATA for financing the metrorail system. We trust that it may be of some assistance, notwithstanding that we perceive no clear or even reasonably reliable legal answer to whether localities would be bound to contribute funds in accordance with revised estimates or construction costs or whether capital contributions must be refunded if the system is not completed. Sincerely yours,

PAUL G. DEMBLING,
(For the Comptroller General

of the United States). Enclosure.

LEGAL ANALY818 Question. Submit for the record an opinion from your legal staff on the binding or non-binding nature of the agreements local governments have entered to make capital contributions and payments for operating subsidies. Also include comments on any obligations for refunding capital contributions if the entire adopted regional system is not completed.

Answer. The only formal agreement providing for payment by the various localities to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) for rapid rail transit is the Capital Contributions Agreement (CCA). It was signed by the City of Falls Church on March 29, 1969, and subsequently signed by the other Virginia jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, the Washington Suburban Transit District for Montgomery County and Prince George's County, and WMATA. A guaranty by the Maryland counties of the obligations of the Washington Suburban Transit District, which had no independent revenues, was attached. (The Transit District's outstanding capital obligations have been assumed by the State of Maryland. See, Md. Code Ann. art. 94A. $ 11A (Supp. 1975).)

At the time the CCA was signed, WMATA and the localities also entered into a Transit Service Agreement providing for metrorail operating subsidies to be paid in accordance with a prescribed formula. We understand that this agreement was intended to provide necessary support for WMATA to issue gross revenue bonds. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in effect held the Service Agreement in violation of sections of the Virginia Constitution designed to control indebtedness. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Masscy, 210 Va. 253, 169 S.E.2d 556 (1969). A revised agreement was held to be constitutional, and if it had been signed by all parties it presumably would have been legally binding. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Massey, 210 Va. 680, 173 S.E. 2d 869 (1970). However, at that time the Service Agreement was no longer thought to be important for bond issue purposes, and there was some concern that the allocation formula was unrealistic. (The governing bodies of each locality have adopted resolutions in various forms agreeing to operating subsidies and efforts in general to assure the viability of the financial plan in order for WMATA to obtain Federal bond guarantees.) On January 1976, the WMATA Committee on Development of Metrorail Deficit Allocation Formula recommended an allocation formula for Phases I and II (17.6 miles in operation, primarily within the District of Columbia), which is presently under consideration by the localities.

The CCA requires WMATA to construct and acquire the regional transit system substantially in accordance with the Adopted Regional System-1968 (Revised) as it may be amended. (Sec. 2.1) There is no obligation to construct means to force a solution because the planning process is not responsive to environmental quality.”

GREATER WASHINGTON CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL, AFL-CIO,

Washington, D.C., March 31, 1976. Hon. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MAZZOLI: The Greater Washington Central Labor Council is well aware of the recent debates concerning the Washington Area Metro Rail System. We believe that the present problem highlighted in the report, "Washington Area Metro Rail System ; Perspectives and Alternatives”, should be given careful consideration. We wholeheartedly agree with the idea of improving the present system. The Labor Council does not agree, however, with the study's proposals and this letter will hopefully explain our opposition.

It is our belief that the finance and time constraints associated with this study have prevented a complete analysis of all aspects of this issue. Working with these limited resources, the study was forced to make certain assumptions that were not adequately supported by the data.

In the discussion of rising fuel prices, the report suggested that gasoline shortages and rising prices may increase the demand for mass transportation, but dismissed any study of this increased demand as problematical, Increasing gasoline costs is an extremely relevant problem and the associated higher costs of car operation certainly merits extensive consideration.

The report's discussion of alternative to the proposed 98 mile system is severely hindered by the admitted informational constraint. “It is difficult to estimate how many potential patrons would adjust their travel patterns in a fashion which is consistent with the original WMATA forecast without recourse to computer models which were not available within the resources of this study." (p. 39)

The Commission would like to stop all Metro construction for approximately six to nine months. During that time period a detailed investigation of the costs and benefits of the proposed system would be undertaken. Though a detailed report concerning the merits of the present Metro system would be beneficial, to halt the construction until such a report could be presented would have serious consequences.

What would happen to all the workers presently employed ? With clearly high unemployment rates, this effect could only increase the unemployment problem rather than providing some help towards solving it as current Metro construc. tion does. There would be cost incurred from a temporary halt in terms of rehir. ing and training employees to take places of those who had found employment elsewhere during the layoff period. There would also be additional costs due to inflation and because of the increased period of time needed to complete construction as a result of the delay.

Certainly a drastic halt of the Metro, with all of its attendant repercussions must be based on more conclusive evidence than has been represented in this limited study. Congress should make use of the best methodology and allocate sufficient funds to conduct a comprehensive study because the policies Congress advocates set precedents for all the lesser legislatures. The meager $4,000.00 study concerning the Metro Rail System establishes a bad precedent. For the U.S. to discontinue or even alter a program on the basis of this type study is totally incomprehensible.

In comparison to Europe, our present transportation system is extremely outdated. Let's not halt construction and further delay a badly needed. efficient. mode of transportation. The costs of a temporary halt of construction would most likely be greater than any benefits that could be the result of such action. Congress approved Metro construction previously and it should continue its support.

The Greater Washington Central Labor Council thanks you for consideration of this viewpoint, and urges you to support the continuation of Metro because we desperately need it. Sincerely,

ROBERT E. PETERSON, President.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D.C., April 26, 1976. B-141529 Hon. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Chairman, Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs of the Committee on the District of

Columbia, House of Representatives. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of December 2, 1975, presenting several questions concerning activities of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). As requested by your staff, we are responding to your request for our opinion on the legal nature of the metrorail capital contribution and operating subsidy agreements in advance of our reply to the other questions.

Enclosed is a copy of the legal analysis our staff prepared regarding the agreements between the local governments and WMATA for financing the metrorail system. We trust that it may be of some assistance, notwithstanding that we perceive no clear or even reasonably reliable legal answer to whether localities would be bound to contribute funds in accordance with revised estimates or construction costs or whether capital contributions must be refunded if the system is not completed. Sincerely yours,

PAUL G. DEMBLING,
(For the Comptroller General

of the United States). Enclosure.

LEGAL ANALYSIB

Question. Submit for the record an opinion from your legal staff on the binding or non-binding nature of the agreements local governments have entered to make capital contributions and payments for operating subsidies. Also include comments on any obligations for refunding capital contributions if the entire adopted regional system is not completed.

Answer. The only formal agreement providing for payment by the various localities to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) for rapid rail transit is the Capital Contributions Agreement (CCA). It was signed by the City of Falls Church on March 29, 1969, and subsequently signed by the other Virginia jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, the Washington Suburban Transit District for Montgomery County and Prince George's County, and WMATA. A guaranty by the Maryland counties of the obligations of the Washington Suburban Transit District, which had no independent revenues, was attached. (The Transit District's outstanding capital obligations have been assumed by the State of Maryland. See, Md. Code Ann. art. 94A. $ 11A (Supp. 1975).)

At the time the CCA was signed, WMATA and the localities also entered into a Transit Service Agreement providing for metrorail operating subsidies to be paid in accordance with a prescribed formula. We understand that this agreement was intended to provide necessary support for WMATA to issue gross revenue bonds. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in effect held the Service Agreement in violation of sections of the Virginia Constitution designed to control indebtedness. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Massey, 210 Va. 253, 169 S.E.2d 556 (1969). A revised agreement was held to be constitutional, and if it had been signed by all parties it presumably would have been legally binding. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Massey, 210 Va. 680, 173 S.E. 2d 869 (1970). However, at that time the Service Agreement was no longer thought to be important for bond issue purposes, and there was some concern that the allocation formula was unrealistic. (The governing bodies of each locality have adopted resolutions in various forms agreeing to operating subsidies and efforts in general to assure the viability of the financial plan in order for WMATA to obtain Federal bond guarantees.)_On January 8, 1976, the WMATA Committee on Development of Metrorail Deficit Allocation Formula recommended an allocation formula for Phases I and II (17.6 miles in operation, primarily within the District of Columbia), which is presently under consideration by the localities.

The CCA requires WMATA to construct and acquire the regional transit system substantially in accordance with the Adopted Regional System-1968 (Revised) as it may be amended. (Sec. 2.1) There is no obligation to construct

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