who has not received at least fifteen percent of the votes cast. Lists which have no candidate having at least fifteen percent of the total vote are eliminated.

Schwyz. Law of 1898 amended by law of 1907. The list system is used for elections to the cantonal Grand Council.

Soleure. Law of Mar. 17, 1895, for elections to the Grand Council and to Municipal councils by the List System with multiple vote and Droop quota. By this law the total vote of each party is determined by the number of tickets with the party name at the top, even though such ticket contains names from other lists. Seats remaining unfilled after assignment by quota are allotted to the parties having the highest total vote.

Ticino. Law of Feb. 9, 1891, amended 1892, 1895, 1898. Elections for the Grand Council, Commercial Councils, Executive Councils and District and cantonal jurés are held by the list system with Multiple vote and Droop quota. Remaining seats are given to the parties having the highest total vote.

Zug. Law of Sept. 21, 1896, for the election of members of the Grand Council, Executive Council, and for the election of judges. This law combines cumulative vote with the list system. Each elector has as many votes as there are members to elect, and can distribute them as he pleases. In case he does not dispose of all his votes the bureau of electors completes his ticket, dividing the remaining votes among his candidates. Seats are assigned by simple quota.

Seats remaining unfilled are given to the parties having the strongest fractions of a quota provided that number amounts to an absolute majority.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES1

Multiple Districts

The constitutions of all states require that State Senators shall be elected by districts. In nineteen states it is specifically required that but one Senator shall be elected in each district.

[Mass., Mich., Minn., N. H., N. J., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Ore., Penn., R. I., S. C., S. D., Ver., Tex., Wis.] Seven states require members of the lower house to be elected by single districts.

[Cal., Kan., Ken., M. D., Mich., N. Y., Wis.]

Thirty constitutions guarantee at least one representative to each county or town, but permit general tickets where more than one is to be elected to a district. Seven states have no constitutional provisions which would interfere with proportional representation in the election of Representatives.

[Del., La., Ill., Ind., Minn., Nev., Wash.]

In all other states constitutional amendments to permit multiple districts would be necessary. (Michigan 1890.) 2

1 Based largely on "Proportional Representation," by Prof. J. R. Commons, see p. 265 of that work.

2 See Maynard v. Board of Canvassers (1890). 84 Mich. 228.

Limited and Cumulative Voting

Five constitutions require that every elector shall be entitled to vote for all the officers which may be elective by all the people.

[Minn., Mont., N. J., Nev., N. Y.]

Others provide constitutional guarantees which have been interpreted adverse to proportional representation:

Cumulative voting has been held to be unconstitutional under provisions granting citizens the right to vote at all elections, on the ground that the clause implies such citizen shall have but one vote.

[Maynard v. Board of Canvassers (1890), 84 Mich. 228.]

The reverse of this decision is found in People v. Nelson (1890) 133 Ill. 565.

Limited vote has been held to be in violation of the provision that citizens shall be entitled to vote at all elections.

[State v. Bedell, 53 Atl. 198 (N. J. 1902); State v. Wrightson, 56 N. J. L. 126; State v. Constantine (1884), 42 Ohio St. 437; In re Opinion of Judges (R. I. 1898), 41 Atl. 1009.]

The opposite decision was given in Commonwealth v. Reeder, (Penn. 1895) 33 Atl. 67.

These provisions would not be violated by the Multiple Vote of the List System.

Plurality Elections

Nearly all State Constitutions contain a plurality rule of elections, which would prevent the election of

candidates on a general ticket who had not received a plurality of the votes. This would leave room only for the simple cumulative vote. In twenty seven states, however, the Constitutions do not apply this rule to the election of members of the legislature.

CONCLUSION

List System

This system will be found best adapted to use in the United States because of its great simplicity, its adaptibility to large constituencies, its direct recognition of the party system, and because it may be operated with the Australian ballot. It is further recommended, as set forth in the following, because it has been found to secure a fair and accurate distribution of seats to the various political parties, because it has been found to express fully the choice of the people as to the candidates to be elected within each party, and has been found fair as between the candidates. It is not only simple in its calculations involving simple operations and a single process, but is not varied by contingencies of the voting or counting. The results are easily subjected to review and recount. Multiple Vote

This is to be preferred to single vote not only for legal reasons, but also because it gives greater opportunity for the expression of personal preferences. With the provision that the elector be allowed to distribute his votes among the candidates of all the lists, it will enable the voter to select especially desirable candidates of other tickets than his own, it will en