which would make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major part of the Reserve Forces. That plan, appropriately modified to reflect the subsequent increase in the size of the active Army, was put into effect in 1962 and brought to near completion in 1963. Under that plan, the Army Reserve component structure was realined to provide a priority force of 6 divisions and their supporting forces, 11 brigades, the units required to round out the Active Army, the on-site air defense battalions, and the training and operational base units-all manned at 75 percent or more of their T.O. & E. strengths and with readiness for deployment goals of approximately 8 weeks. Eight previously existing divisions were eliminated at that time from the Reserve component structure.

The present structure is a vast improvement over its predecessor but there are still a number of ways in which it can be further improved. Units for which there are no foreseeable needs in our contingency war plans should be eliminated from the structure altogether and the resources they now consume applied to more urgent requirements; and the present dual management of the Army Reserve components should be replaced by a single management structure.

Our analyses of the various kinds of limited war situations we are likely to face over the balance of this decade indicate a requirement for an Army force of about 22 divisions, plus 2 special-purpose divisions. Sixteen of these 24 divisions are provided in the Active Army. The other 8 divisions (including the 2 special-purpose divisions) plus all of the units needed to round out the 24-division force, can and we believe should be provided with the Army Reserve component structure. All of the resources and efforts devoted to the Reserves should be directed to raising their combat readiness of this Reserve Force to the required level.

The existing Reserve component structure still devotes considerable resources to units for which there is no requirement, and I want to emphasize this, no requirement in our contingency war plans, namely, the 21 divisions and various nondivisional units in the low-priority category. Of the 700,000 paid drill spaces programed for the Army Reserve components, about 200,000 are allocated to these units, providing manning levels of only 55 to 60 percent. Although tentative readiness goals ranging from 6 to 9 months have been established for these low-priority units, their actual availability for deployment would depend on the delivery of weapons and equipment from new weapons production. At the present time we estimate that the low-priority units have on hand approximately 35 percent of their authorized equipment, much of it is substandard and unsatisfactory for combat use. Thus, in the event of a callup, these low-priority units would have to be completely reequipped and, even under the best conditions, this would require 12 to 18 months after a full mobilization is undertaken-such a leadtime of 12 to 18 months for the procurement of equipment exceeds the time required to activate the units and to recruit and train their personnel.

Admittedly, we could acquire the necessary equipment and wartime consumables for the low-priority forces during peacetime, but to do so would entail procurement expenditures of about $10 billion. Such an expenditure is clearly unjustified for units for which there is no requirement in our contingency war plans.

Since there is nothing to be gained by maintaining Reserve units for which there is no military requirement and for which the equipment leadtime exceeds the training leadtime, we have reached the conclusion that they should be eliminated from the force, and that our efforts and resources should be concentrated on those units for which we do have demonstrable and urgent requirements.

At the same time, we believe we should take the long deferred step of simplifying and streamlining the management of the Army's Reserve Forces. As matters now stand, we have two Army Reserve Forces, each operating under a different chain of command. The Army National Guard, consisting of combat, combat-support and service-support units, with a total authorized paid drill strength of 400,000 men, is administered by the Department of the Army through the National Guard Bureau, the Governors of the States and the States' adjutants general. The Army Reserve, also consisting of combat, combat-support and service-support units, with a total authorized paid drill strength of 300,000 men, is administerd by the Department of the Army through the Continental Army Command, the Continental Armies, and the 14 Army Corps.

This arrangement complicates the overall management of the Army Reserve Forces and results in an unnecessarily large overhead. Two separate management organizations consisting of headquarters and headquarters-type agencies must be maintained and staffed with substantial numbers of supervisory personnel. Moreover, because there are two separate managements, differences in organizations, standards and procedures arise, thus making more difficult the administration of the Reserve components and the integration of the units into the overall Army structure. Finally, the existence of two separate organizations, often in the same communities, results in unnecessary duplication in recruiting activities and in facilities.

Our proposal to transfer the Army Reserve units to the Army National Guard should not be interpreted to mean that we consider the former inferior to the latter. Rather, our selection of the Army National Guard is based on two major considerations. First, each of the States has a continuing need for a military force responsive to its Governor which can be used to deal with natural disasters and for the preservation of law and order, and if the National Guard were eliminated, the States would have to meet that need in some other fashion. Second, the State National Guard organizations, as the lineal descendants of the State militia, are deeply embedded in our constitutional tradition and in our country's history and are entitled to preference as the senior Reserve component.

We have the greatest regard for the officers and men now serving in the Army Reserve and we are indebted to them and their predeces

sors for their devoted service to the Nation's defense. We hope that they will choose to affiliate themselves with the Guard units in their communities, and the Defense Department will do everything in its power to provide them that opportunity. Those reservists who do not wish to do so can remain on the Army Reserve rolls as individuals where they can continue to participate through correspondence courses and, in many cases, annual training tours. Indeed, men with obligated service who do not wish to affiliate with the Guard units will be required to continue their affiliation with the Army Reserve. However, drill pay would be limited to members of organized units, all of which would be in the National Guard.

In addition to streamlining the management of the Army Reserve components, we also seek to accomplish the following objectives:

(a) To retain in the structure only those units which are actually needed and to treat all of them as high priority units.

(b) To provide all units in the realined structure with 100 percent of their authorized equipment and the manning levels required to meet their readiness goals.

(c) To maximize participation in and support of units in the new Guard structure by distributing them throughout the 50 States, and in so doing equalize to the extent possible the opportunity for participation in organized units for members of both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

On the last page of my statement you will see table I, which contains certain statistical data relating to our present and proposed

structure.

In the upper half of the page under the heading "Units for which there is a military requirement," are listed units we have today that we plan to keep.

In the second part of the table, the lower half, you see the leading units for which there is not a military requirement. These are the units we propose to eliminate.

In the middle section of the table, you see the present structure in a series of five columns, the first two of which show the Army National Guard strength and the Reserve strength, and the last three columns of which show the proposed new structure.

Now, under the present structure, the units for which there is an early requirement a count for 498,500 of the total authorized strengths of 700,000. In the third column of figures you can see that. The 498,000 figure is the total men in units for which there is a clear military requirement. The 700,000 at the bottom of the column is the strength of all Reserve and Guard units at the present time.

Under the realined structure this strength would be changed to provide a total of about 550,000 spaces. You can see that in the third column from the right-hand edge of the paper, 550,000, and you will notice the arrow linking the figure 498,000 and the figure of 550,000. We actually plan an increase of over 50,000 men in the units for which we have a military requirement. This increase is necessary to increase the readiness of those units.

The presently existing and proposed structures are shown on table 1. Under the present structure, the units for which there is an early requirement account for 498,500 of the 700,000 authorized drill pay spaces. Under the realinement structure, they would be provided a total of almost 550,000 spaces and all units not required by the contingency war plans would be eliminated. The units required to "round out" the Active Army would be given about 5,000 more spaces so as to raise all units to 80 percent manning levels and to permit the introduction of new logistics concepts at the corps and Army support levels. The number of separate brigades would be increased from 11 to 16 and all would be provided with brigade bases. About 28,300 additional spaces would be needed to accomplish these purposes and to raise all units to 80 percent manning. About 7,000 spaces would be added to the 6 division forces and about 5,000 spaces would be added to special purpose division forces to raise all units to 80 percent strength. Another 4,500 spaces would be added to State headquarters, principally to accommodate the transfer of the present U.S. Army Reserve school system to the Guard. Overall, the realinement would result in the elimination of about 2,100 company and detachment size units-from about 8,100 in the present structure to about 6,000.

All of the organized units in the realined structure would be under the management of the Army National Guard. Where feasible and necessary to facilitate participation by all of the present members of the Guard and Reserve, company-size units may be split between two locations. The U.S. Army Reserve would retain responsibility for managing the individual reserve pool and for providing individual fillers for the units at summer camp or upon mobili

zation.

In my judgment, and the judgment of the senior military and civilian officials of the Department of Defense, the proposed realinement will not only increase the combat readiness of the Army Reserve Forces but also, when completed, should produce recurring annual savings of at least $150 million which can be applied to other needs. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. (Table 1 as referred to is as follows:)

TABLE 1.-Comparison of present and proposed Reserve component structure