is precluded by existing law, attachments of U.S. Army Reserve personnel will be solely for the purpose of maintaining unit readiness. These personnel will be those who do not volunteer for Army National Guard membership but whose participation is required to maintain unit readiness until such skills can be obtained by future accessions. When Army National Guard personnel become available, personnel attached will be released to the pool. Therefore administrative efforts expended for attached personnel will be in lieu of such effort for assigned personnel. There will be a brief overlap period when administrative workload is increased due to having on board both assigned and attached personnel. For personnel accounting and reporting purposes, both the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve will have responsibilities during the period of attachment. However, U.S. Army Reserve accounting responsibility will involve only two changes, once upon attachment and once upon termination of attachment. Preparation of unit payroll for attached U.S. Army Reserve personnel will be the responsibility of the Army National Guard unit to which attached; payment will be made from U.S. Army Reserve funds by the finance and accounting officer serving that unit.

Question No. 3. Please submit names and ages of the adjutants general of the 50 States. How many adjutants general are over 62?

Answer. Attached is a list of State adjutants general showing their ages. The asterisk indicates those over age 62 (a total of six).

Question No. 4. Is it true that a Defense Department survey indicated that only 15 percent of Army Reserve enlisted men having a Ready Reserve obligation would join the National Guard in the event of a merger, and that only 8 percent of those having a Standby obligation indicated they would join the Guard?

Answer. In response to the question "If you are now a member of a U.S. Army Reserve or U.S. Air Force Reserve unit and your unit should be inactivated, which of the following would you choose to do?", enlisted personnel answered as follows:

With Ready Reserve obligation-Would join the National Guard, 17 percent.

With Standby Reserve obligation-Would join the National Guard, 13 percent.

The above question was part of a survey conducted as a part of study of the draft. The question was added after the basic questionnaire had been pretested, completed, and was already in printer's galley form. The question was rather hastily prepared following the December 12, 1964, press announcement of the proposed merger and was designed to elicit some information on this point. Because of urgent time pressures, it was not possible to conduct the detailed review of this item, including pretesting, which had been conducted for the remainder of the questionnaire.

Percentages cited above represent the latest tabulation of the results for personnel in units and, from a sampling reliability standpoint, are probably reasonably valid. However, in interpreting the responses, the following limitations are relevant :

(1) The question posed assumes that the U.S. Army Reserve unit to which the respondent belongs will be inactivated. It does not provide for transfer of U.S. Army Reserve units to the Army National Guard. There is every reason to believe that a higher percentage would respond favorably under the latter situation.

(2) The question posed does not clearly define the specific opportunities which might be available to the U.S. Army Reserve member interested in transferring to the National Guard. For example, it does not indicate whether the transfer would be in the same rank nor does it provide any indication as to the type of position available. The actual decisions made by individual Army Reserve members will clearly be strongly influenced by these considerations.

(3) Finally, the questionnaire reached respondents very shortly after the announcement of the initial reorganization proposal, when the information available to them was still largely based on press reports. More detailed official information has now been distributed by the Department of the Army to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard concerning the proposed merger and its effect on individual units. It is expected that individual unit commanders will exert a positive influence in encouraging continued active Reserve participation on the part of unit members.

On the basis of the above considerations, it is believed that the proportion of Army Reserve unit members who will voluntarily continue in active Reserve training status will, in fact, be substantially greater than suggested by the responses.

QUESTIONS ON POSSIBLE MERGER OF AIR FORCE RESERVE INTO AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. Is it true that studies conducted by the Department of Defense indicate savings of more than $200 million over the next 5 years if the Air National Guard is merged into the Air Force Reserve rather than vice versa?

2. What are the combat ratings of Air Force Reserve units compared to the ratings of Air Guard units? Is it correct that none of the Air Guard units has a C-1 rating?

3. What are the respective percentages of nonobligated volunteer personnel in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve?

4. Statistics indicate that the accident rate of the Air National Guard is considerably higher than that of the Air Force Reserve. Please furnish comparative statistics for the last several years.

5. Have Department of Defense representatives been dispatched to attempt to "sell" this proposal or the proposal to merge the Army Reserve with the Army National Guard?

6. What are the relative total strengths of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard?

7. What primary governmental or military function does the Air National Guard serve under the control of the Governors?

8. What were the results of the questions directed toward reservists which were added to the draft survey questionnaire mailed out by the Department of Defense? Is it true that only 23 percent of Air Force Reserve enlisted men with Ready Reserve obligation indicated that they would join an Air National Guard unit in the event of a merger? What were the figures for officers and enlisted men not having any obligation?

9. How are our contingency war plans affected by the merger of the Air Force Reserve into the Air National Guard? What are the effects of the reverse situation, with the Guard becoming a part of the Air Force Reserve?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON POSSIBLE MERGER OF AIR FORCE RESERVE INTO AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Question No. 1. Is it true that studies conducted by the Department of Defense indicate savings of more than $200 million over the next 5 years if the Air National Guard is merged into the Air Force Reserve rather than vice versa?

Answer. It is not true. The OSD has conducted no studies on an Air Force Reserve merger.

Question No. 2. What are the combat ratings of the Air Force Reserve units compared to the ratings of the Air Guard units? Is it correct that none of the Air Guard units has a C-1 rating?

Answer. As of March 31, 1965, the C ratings of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard were as follows:

The Air National Guard has four units in the C-1 category.

By way of explanation, the C rating system is only one of the measurements used to determine a unit's capability. C ratings provide a mathematical measurement in four areas: Personnel assigned, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and state of training.

In addition to the C rating system, the Air Force uses several other methods of evaluating a unit's combat capability. These include:

1. Participation of units in exercises;

2. Overall managerial effectiveness inspections;

3. Operational readiness inspections;

4. Tactical evaluation tests for air crew members;

5. Participation in contingency situations such as the Berlin and Cuba Contingencies; and

6. Staff assessments by higher headquarters after field visits.

Only by using all these methods in combination can we develop a reliable assessment of the Air Reserve Forces' operational capability. When these techniques are applied and interpreted, the Air Force finds a high, and close to comparable, level of combat readiness in Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units.

Evidence of Air Reserve Forces capability is the support now being provided in the current southeast Asia situation. Air Force Reserve C-124 units, now rated C-4, are providing mission support in the Pacific for MATS (16 missions in April). Air National Guard units, now rated C-2 through C-4, are also providing mission support for MATS (42 missions in April). Such evidence shows that C ratings alone cannot validate the operational capability of a unit. Question No. 3. What are the respective percentages of nonobligated volunteer personnel in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve?

Answer. Nonobligor personnel constitute 44 percent of the Air National Guard unit assigned strength and 54 percent of the Air Force Reserve unit assigned strength as of December 31, 1964. It should be noted that the 56 percent obligor personnel of the Air National Guard are also volunteers. The 46 percent obligors of the Air Force Reserve have been mandatorily assigned.

Question No. 4. Statistics indicate that the accident rate of the Air National Guard is considerably higher than that of the Air Force Reserve. Please furnish comparative statistics for the last several years.

Answer. In comparing accident statistics, the type aircraft being operated and the mission must be considered. Some aircraft have higher accident frequency than others. In addition, the type of mission also contributes to greater dangers, such as the frequency of landings and takeoffs and munitions delivery on training targets.

The units in the Air National Guard, which are equipped primarily with high performance fighters, interceptors, and other tactical aircraft, are more nearly equivalent to units in the Tactical Air Command. In contrast, the units in the Air Force Reserve are equipped primarily with transports and troop carriers, and are more nearly equivalent to cargo units in the active establishment. Traditionally, the pattern has been that jets and other high performance aircraft have a higher accident rate than slower moving transport aircraft.

All factors considered, we recommend comparison of the Air National Guard and Tactical Air Command as appropriate based on type aircraft being flown and the mission requirement. The Air Force Reserve can more appropriately be compared with the USAF cargo major aircraft accident rate. Again by the type aircraft being operated and the missions being performed, the Reserve Forces rates are reasonably comparable to the active establishment.

This comparability between active Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve is what one would expect, as all are subject to the same safety programs, controls, and inspections. The professionalism of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard flying units has resulted in a commendable and steady decrease in the accident rates of both components.

Question No. 5. Have Department of Defense representatives been dispatched to attempt to "sell" this proposal or the proposal to merge the Army Reserve with the Army National Guard?

Answer. Representatives of the Department of Defense have not been dispatched to try and "sell" proposed Army Reserve merger.

Question No. 6. What are the relative total strengths of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard?

Answer. (As of Dec. 31, 1964) The relative strength of the unit structures involved in a possible merger is as follows: Air National Guard, 73,231; Air Force Reserve, 39, 342.

In addition, the Air National Guard has 624 individuals not assigned to units. The Air Force Reserve has 325,004 individuals in Ready, Standby, and Retired categories.

Question No. 7. What primary governmental or military function does the Air National Guard serve under the control of the Governors?

Answer. Air National Guard units have value under control of the Governor in the functions of rendering aid in disaster and control of civil disturbances. Typical examples are shown in attachment 1. Flying units in the Air Force Reserve are troop carrier and air rescue, which lend themselves to use in both of these functions.

ALABAMA

An immediate disaster force has been organized at both flying bases (Montgomery and Birmingham) to cope with any immediate emergency which may occur within the area. This force is composed of approximately 100 air technicians at each location and has been trained in riot and crowd control and other emergency duties. These immediate disaster forces have been used on several occasions, notably during the 1962 civil strife at both locations. These immediately available forces are initially called pending notification and arrival of Army National Guard forces. Their immediate availability has proved invaluable in controlling civil disorder before it gets out of hand.

Numerous mercy flights to transport sick and disabled persons who could not otherwise be moved have been accomplished throughout the years. This

has enabled patients to be moved to hospitals for treatment by specialists who were not available locally. In addition, oral polio vaccine was flown to Alabama for the last innoculation program conducted in 1964. Numerous other flights to transport various vaccines and serum have been accomplished for the State and county health departments when other means of transportation were impracticable. Approximately 30 flights of this nature have been accomplished. Assistance in the field of aerial photography has been rendered to various governmental agencies, State departments, cities, and other agencies throughout the years. Some examples are listed below:

(a) 1961-64: Provided erosion control study of Perdido Pass Coast Line for Corps of Engineers at Mobile, Ala., and State department of conservation using identical monthly aerial photographic coverage over a 15-month period to show erosion by tide and currents. The Corps of Engineers stated that this was a most comprehensive erosion control study and their first known application of aerial photography in this area. This study enabled the Corps of Engineers to control erosion and stabilize this coast line area.

(b) Numerous aerial photographic sorties have been flown for the State highway department in connection with the Defense Highway System, namely Highways Nos. 65 and 85. Strip photography of proposed interstate routes and construction progress photography have been accomplished. Aerial photographs for other activities have been accomplished periodically.

(c) Aerial photography for State department of conservation (forest fire areas periodically, State forest areas, causeway, Mobile and Baldwin Counties, farmlands and shorelines for watershed and erosion control program). Specific instances of assistance are listed below:

(a) 1961: The most extensive flood in recent years in Alabama was completely documented by aerial photography of every major river system within the State. This aerial photographic coverage was made available to the Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Ala., for flood control and river development studies; to the highway department for route planning and high-water mark for road construction; to Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority for river development studies; to Maxwell and Craig Air Force Bases for construction planning and flood control and to various other cities, municipalities, State, and Federal agencies for planning and flood control purposes. Over 50 sorties were flown and approximately 500 man-days used in accomplishing this project.

(b) March 1961, ice storm: Approximately 20 men, 10 vehicles, and generators were used to provide emergency power to rural schools and dairies when powerlines were broken during the ice storm, Without this assistance school would have been closed due to lack of lights, heat, and water. Dairies were furnished electrical power to operate milking equipment. Personnel and equipment were used to pump water from flooded basements and to remove personnel from low areas. Emergency standby communications between various locations were established to aid in flood rescue operations.

(c) In 1962 extreme flooding conditions existed in many areas of Alabama. Our units provided men and vehicles to assist in evacuation of people in flooded areas. It was necessary to use tactical type vehicles because commercial vehicles were not capable of going into areas where required. Personnel from almost all Air National Guard units in Alabama were utilized in evacuation, with evacuees being housed in local armories and fed by our food service personnel. Assistance was also rendered in evacuating livestock from low-lying areas and feeding stranded cattle. A command post was established, jointly operated by the Army and Air National Guard, to coordinate efforts with civil defense and local law enforcement agencies.

(d) In 1963 men and vehicles from our Gadsden, Ala., unit assisted in extinguishing a forest fire which threatened a local community. Tactical type vehicles assisted in getting firefighters into the areas where commercial vehicles could not traverse the rough terrain.

(e) In 1963 a statewide telephone and teletype network was established using organic equipment to provide communications between Gadsden, Birmingham, Montgomery, and Dothan. This communications net exercise was designed to test the feasibility of such a net for backup to aid in disaster control as well as furnishing tactical communications between the units. AN/TRC-24 radio relay equipment was utilized in this successful operation, and can be used to replace damaged communications in any area of the State.

(f) Air Guardsmen have been used for riot control duty during the freedom rider demonstrations in 1961 to Gadsden, Birmingham, and Montgomery, Ala., involving from 500 to 600 troops and most assigned vehicles. In addition a radio-telephone net was established within the city of Gadsden to assist city officials and civil defense forces in communications.