system which was established in 1933, which is State oriented and whose relationship to the Chief of Staff is vague and questionable. From now on the Chief of Staff must depend upon "cooperation" and threat of withdrawal of Federal funds instead of military discipline for effective management. He cannot control the training. The proposal that a modern military striking force can be developed by the States is not based on either logic or experience.

The elimination of the corps system will save 2,500 management and staff personnel, but the "streamlining" of the management structure as proposed will increase full-time support personnel attached to State headquarters from 4,000 to 8,500 personnel, according to the Secretary's own figures.

Obviously, the plan does not streamline but instead perpetuates and makes exclusive a cumbersome structure to manage 52 separate jurisdictions at increased costs. This change is the very antithesis of good management.

Any savings realized will, of course, be from a reduction in force of trained personnel with a consequent shrinkage of the mobilization base. The merger, itself, will increase, not reduce, costs.

The directive is unconstitutional, for in the Congress, alone, resides the authority to "raise and support armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

In other words, the Congress in its judgment provides the forces. The President, through his Secretary of Defense, commands them.

To a question raised relating to the positive and direct control of the National Guard by the Army Chief of Staff, the reply has been made that there is no real question here for the Guard is now pretty well federalized. If this be so, it represents another violation of the Constitution, for article I, section 8 of that document gives this authority entirely to the Congress, and requires that Congress reserve "to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to discipline prescribed by the Congress."

At the direction of the President of the United States, the President of our association and our national staff were given a lengthy briefing by the Secretary of the Army and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army stated very frankly that this was his personal plan, that it was generated in secret, without military staffing until after the basic decision was made. The statutory bodies within the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense, charged by Congress with responsibility in this area, were not consulted until after the basic decision was made.

After listening at length to his arguments we became convinced that the sole purpose behind the plan was to get rid of the 21 divisions, required and approved by the Congress, to save the Reserve pay of the individuals concerned. You should know that the bulk of the divisions eliminated were National Guard divisions. We are of the opinion that the elimination of the Reserve and the augmentation of the Guard were decided upon as the easiest way out, politically.

The latest edict of the Secretary of Defense abolishing the congressional units was much more far reaching than just that. The order prohibits any personnel in all services, all over the Nation who are in standby status, from taking part in training except those who have 18 years' service, or a remaining obligation. These personnel are your most experienced. They also are subject to recall in the event of a declaration of a national emergency declared by the Congress, yet they are prohibited from training.

The decision relating to the Army flies into the face of the Gray Board, whose members devoted almost a year to exhaustive study of the problem. It flies into the face of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and its subsequent amendments, an act designed, after lengthy study and deliberation, to cure the gross deficiencies of the organization that existed prior to its passage and to which this action now regresses.

We believe the decision to return the Army Reserve to the status it held in the early 1920's and to put all of the Army's Reserve defense eggs into the National Guard basket under State training and supervision is fraught with danger and should be rejected.

NOTE. Congressman Sikes' speech of Jan. 13 in the Congressional Record (p. 628). Article in New York Times by Hanson Baldwin, military editor (Jan. 17, 1965). Article in New Republic by S. L. A. Marshall (Jan. 23, 1965).

In its memorandum which sets forth the foregoing three challenges, the ROA discusses almost every aspect of the realinement. The following questions and answers address the prinicpal issues involved and respond to the ROA memorandum.

(a) Why are the 14 corps headquarters being eliminated?

The merger of the unit structure of the two components into the National Guard eliminates the most important mission of the corps headquarters.

The primary functions of the 14 corps headquarters are to command the units of the U.S. Army Reserve, to maintain the records of the individual members of the mobilization reinforcement pool within their respective areas of jurisdiction, and to assist in the management of the ROTC program. Further, as a result of a separate study, the Army proposes to centralize the records of the nonunit members of the Ready Reserve. The corps headquarters have no role to play in the Army's war plans after mobilization; hence no contingency benefit derives from their continuation. The corps functions related to ROTC can be performed satisfactorily by the CONUS armies.

Although the realinement of the Reserve components was not undertaken to permit the elimination of the corps headquarters, that course of action will be feasible and, as a result, a number of Active Army personnel can be released for other high priority missions.

(b) What is the rationale for the realinement of the Reserve components? The reorganization plan will place all required units in the National Guard; will bring the unit structure into better balance with current contingency plans, will produce increased readiness; and will correct the present imbalance between manpower and equipment resources within the Army's Reserve components. The major objectives of the realinement are:

(1) To produce a Reserve component troop structure tailored to meet the requirements of the present contingency and mobilization plans.

(2) To insure that all units in the 550,000-man structure are capable of performing the quick reaction role assigned by contingency plans.

(3) To provide for a postmobilization expansion of the Army if required. (4) To eliminate one element of the dual management system now provided to manage the unit structure of the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.

The reorganization will produce a higher degree of combat readiness by increasing the overall size of the high priority force, the amount of equipment for this force and the personnel strength of many of the units within the force.

All units in the 550,000-man force will be authorized full equipment allowances and will be manned at from 80 to 100 percent of wartime strength. At present, only 450,000 men, out of the authorized total unit strength of 700,000, are assigned to units that are adequately manned and equipped for a quick reaction role.

As additional personnel and equipment are made available to the force, and as higher levels of training are thus made possible, unit readiness objectives (i.e., number of weeks required for a unit to mobilize, complete training and deploy) will be reduced progressively.

Upon completion of the realinement this troop structure will include the following elements, all in the Army National Guard :

Eight combat divisions including two special purpose divisions designed for emergency mobilization missions.

Sixteen independent brigades available for separate missions, as reinforcements for Active Army or National Guard divisions, or as nuclei for expansion to division size if mobilization of additional divisions should be required. Each independent brigade is essentially one-third of a division consisting of four or five combat maneuver battalions plus a brigade base of armored cavalry, aviation, engineer, artillery, and other supporting units.

Mobilization base units: This category includes the 13 existing training divisions, each capable of operating a training center on mobilization. Other elements needed for an orderly mobilization are also included in this category.

Round out units to augment elements of the Active Army and National Guard to make them capable of sustained combat.

Onsite air defense units: Existing units of this type will be retained intact. We have carefully weighed the new structure in the light of the tasks and environments that might reasonably be expected in the future. It is considered that the gain to the Army in readiness of the 8 divisions and 16 separate brigades provides such an improvement in the expected responsiveness of the forces within the required time frame as to offset the loss of the 21 reinforcing Reserve divisions and the other small units in the reinforcing Reserve.

(c) By what authority can the Army Reserve components be reorganized without prior approval of the Congress?

Insofar as the law is concerned, section 3012, 10 United States Code provides pertinently that "There is a Secretary of the Army, who is the head of the De

partment of the Army *** responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army." As used herein, "Army" includes "the Army National Guard of the United States" and the "Army Reserve" (10 U.S.C., sec. 3062 (c) (1)). The Secretary's authority with respect to the organization of the Army is dealt with in 10 United States Code section 3074, which provides, "Except as otherwise prescribed by law, the Army shall be divided into such commands, forces, and organizations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army."

The statute describing the composition of the Ready Reserve (10 U.S.C. sec. 268) states that it "consists of units, or Reserves, or both," thus compelling the conclusion that the Army Reserve need not necessarily be organized in units.

Under the Constitution, Congress is vested with the sole authority for raising and supporting forces necessary for the defense of the United States. However, the Congress has not legislated as to the tactical organization of the Army Reserve or otherwise restricted the authority of the Secretary of the Army to prescribe its organization.

The Army General Counsel has concluded, therefore, that 10 U.S.C., sections 3012 and 3074 cited supra, empower the Secretary of the Army to accomplish the planned realinement of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard of the United States, and that no authorizing legislation is needed.

It is clear, however, that full implementation of the plan will depend upon the appropriations necessary to support the new structure. Further, it would be necessary for the Congress to avoid including, as has been included in previous years, a requirement for the Guard and the Reserve to be programed to achieve an end strength of 400,000 and 300,000, respectively, or any other strengths which would be inconsistent with the proposed structure.

(d) Why was National Guard and not the USAR selected as the surviving element in the unit structure? Does this not further fragment the chain of command?

The Department of the Army believes the more compelling arguments favor concentration of the unit structure in the National Guard. It is recognized that the States must have forces available to the Governors to preserve law and order and to assist when natural disaster strikes. The justification for that longrecognized requirement has been reinformed in the past several years. It would be wasteful of the Nation's resources to require the States to maintain militia to preserve law and order while, at the same time, the Federal Government maintained a military reserve unit structure separate and apart from the State forces. The Army National Guard has shown itself to be responsive to the national defense.

Historically and constitutionally, the command and control of the military forces of the United States rests with tthe President as Commander in Chief. He exercises his authority through the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries.

In the case of the Army National Guard in peace, the chain of command for the supervision of National Guard activities extends from the Department of the Army, through the Chief, National Guard Bureau, through the Governors of the States, and the States Adjutants General, to the units. Upon mobilization, National Guard units become a part of the Active Army and are commanded and supervised according to the procedures applicable to all other Active Army units. Under the proposed merger of the U.S. Army Reserve units into the Army National Guard, these relationships will remain unchanged.

Nothing in the Army's proposal envisions the further fragmentation of existing authorities and responsibilities. To the contrary, the Army's proposal will consolidate the unit structure of the Reserve components under one managerial system as opposed to the two systems which are involved at present.

(e) The realinement places the responsibility for military training upon the Governors of the several States. Can the Governors, through their political appointees, do a better job of training military forces than the professionals of the Regular Forces?

The Constitution of the United States places the responsibility for training the ARNG upon the Governors of the several States, "*** according to the discipline prescribed by the Congress." Title 32, United States Code, section 501, codifies this provision of the Constitution as follows: "501 (a), The discipline, including training, of the Army National Guard shall conform to that of the Army ***; (b) The training of the National Guard shall be conducted by the

several States, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia in conformity with this title." Further, title 32, United States Code, section 105, charges the Secretary of the Army with the responsibility for conducting specific annual inspections to insure that the Army National Guard continues to meet the standards required for Federal recognition. By Army Regulations, USCONARC is charged with the supervision of the training of both the USAR and the National Guard and with the responsibility for conducting the training inspections required by law. The same directives, standards, criteria, and training programs are applicable to each component. Nothing in the plan for realining the Army's Reserve components contemplates a change in the current system for supervising training.

(f) What was the role of the Section 5 Committee in the planning? After discussing the structure of the Reserve component over a period of some time with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Ailes formed a small group of officers on October 6, 1964, to study a possible restructuring of the Reserve components to obtain a better balance between personnel and materiel. On October 20, 1964, that group reported on a proposed concept for the realinement of the Reserve components of the Army.

At that time, it was considered premature to seek the views of the Section 5 Committee until a reasonably well developed plan had been formulated. The work of that small group was therefore turned over to a larger number of staff officers representing each principal staff division of the Army staff. Their mission was to develop a more detailed plan from the concept, and to assess its feasibility, sufficiency, and cost. Such a plan was developed and during the time prior to December 12, 1964, the proposed plan was discussed with key Members of the Congress and with senior officers of the Guard and the Reserve, including all Reserve members of the Section 5 Committee, presidents of the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association, and the president of the Senior Reserve Commanders Association. The plan in its final form was submitted to the Secretary of Defense early in December. It was presented to the Section 5 Committee on December 13 and to the Reserve Forces Policy Board on December 22, 1964.

The National Defense Act of 1916 contains the basic guidance for the use of the Section 5 Committee as follows: "Each policy or regulation affecting the following subjects shall be prepared by a committee of officers of the appropriate division or divisions of the Army General Staff and of an equal number of officers of the Army National Guard of the United States:

"(1) The organization or distribution of the Army National Guard of the United States.

"(2) The organization and distribution of training of the Army National Guard."

Similar language is provided for Army Reserve matters.

Clearly the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, assisted by the Army staff, must make the assessment of the tasks and environments that might reasonably be postulated for the future, must draw up a basic structure of forces that will be adequate to meet the need, and determine the division of these forces between the Active Army and the Reserve components. Further, this fundamental work must be accomplished before the Section 5 Committee is consulted. The Section 5 Committee has neither the time, the staff, nor the expertise to develop these basic determinations.

As is its proper role under the law, the Section 5 Committee was used to advise the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on how best to execute the proposed plan. This it is prepared and equipped to do, and is doing, in a very loyal, efficient and capable manner.

(g) How much money will this realinement save?

This realinement was not undertaken to save money. On the contrary, the first step was to determine the size and configuration of the Reserve forces required under current war and contingency plans and how best to achieve the readiness such a force must have in a modern world. The cost required to support such a force was then determined.

In speaking of savings, it is necessary to differentiate between operating and investment costs. It is estimated that the fiscal year 1966 budget supporting the proposed structure will be approximately $171.4 million less in operating costs than that which would have been required to support a 700,000 paid drill structure in fiscal year 1966. Military construction appropriations for the

ARNG and the USAR totalled $17.8 million in new appropriations in the Army's original fiscal year 1966 budget. This sum added to the $171.4 million totals $189.2 million as indicated in the attached table.

Fiscal year 1966 Reserve component budgets compared to Oct. 1, 1964, budget estimates

(h) How long would it take to form and train additional divisions if they are needed in some future emergency?

It takes about 42 weeks to form and train a division made up of untrained fillers. In this connection and based on current and predicted assets, it is estimated that to fully equip the existing low-priority divisions would require from 12 to 18 months after mobilization.

(i) Is the USAR being abolished?

The proposed realinement does not abolish the Army Reserve. Although it will have no organized units, the Army Reserve will remain in being and will fill a necessary and important role. It will be composed of individual reservists who, in case of mobilization, will become fillers in Active Army and National Guard units and will also include individuals designated to fill specific positions in Army headquarters and installations upon mobilization. At the present, there are about 450,000 officers and men of the Army Reserve, not assigned to units, who are available for call to active duty in an emergency under Presidential Executive order. Although the number may increase, this group will not be affected by the proposed changes.

The Standby Reserve, consisting of 230,000 officers and men (of which 217,700 have a remaining military obligation), also will be unaffected by the proposed merger. Members of the Standby Reserve declared to be available by Selective Service may be called to active duty, involuntarily, only in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress.

Some USAR unit members will not elect Guard membership. Such refusal on the part of key personnel or a substantial number of the members within any unit could degrade the readiness of that unit. In order to maintain readiness in such units, members of the USAR unit may be attached to the Guard for the minimum period necessary to maintain unit readiness or for the remaining period of their statutory or contractual obligation, whichever is shorter.

Reservists who are members of units that will be eliminated by the proposed merger or reservists who do not elect to transfer with their unit to the National Guard, upon execution of the proposed plan, may revert to the Ready Reserve or the Standby Reserve. Those who elect transfer to the Standby Reserve may continue to earn retirement points only if they have a remaining military obligation or if they have at least 18 but less than 20 creditable years of service. Those individual members of the Ready Reserve may continue to earn retirement points by participation in extension courses and period of active duty for training