PROPOSAL TO REALINE THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

AND THE ARMY RESERVE FORCES

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1965

U.S. SENATE,

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman) Symington, Jackson, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond) met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1114, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis presiding.

Present: Senator Stennis, Symington, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond.

Also present: Senators Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Inouye, McIntyre, Miller, and Fong.

Staff members present: James Kendall, chief counsel; Robert M. Neal, Lt. Col. Glenn A. Smith. Also Charles Kirbow, chief clerk, Senate Armed Services; T. Edward Braswell, professional staff member.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. All right.

The subcommittee will please come to order.

The first thing I want to say is that we extend a hearty welcome to the other members of the Armed Service Committee. All of you have been given notices of the meeting and we will continue to send you notices of each meeting because of your responsibility in connection with this matter.

Now, one of the radio networks is here and has requested permission to record some of the testimony. I don't think it would be fair to let one record after the others had been told it wouldn't be recorded.

I don't try to rule out television and radio, but unless there is some special reason, I would prefer that we leave it off.

The subcommittee members can take those things up any time they wish, but it would be out of order today because the others have been told it would not be recorded.

Now, I have a brief statement that brings to the attention of the subcommittee some of the major points that the chairman thinks are involved, and which gives some of the history of this matter as it developed and just why we have it before the Preparedness Subcommittee.

So, I will take time to read this.

1

Today, we have our open hearing on a proposal by the Department of Defense to realine the Army Reserve component structure by the transfer of the unit structure of the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard.

This plan, if implemented, will reduce the drill-pay strength to 550,000. This compares with the present aggregate authorized drillpay strength of 700,000-400,000 for the National Guard and 300,000 for the Reserve. The Secretary of Defense asserts that it will result in increased combat readiness on the part of the Army Reserve forces and, at the same time, will produce cost savings of approximately $150 million per year.

This is but the first of a number of sessions during which the realinement plan and its implications will be explored in detail. Because of the importance of and interest in the matter, we have invited all members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to sit with us and take an active participation in the hearing. This, of course, is a standing invitation for the duration of the hearing.

The realinement proposal has, of course, generated considerable controversy. Objections have been expressed both in and out of the Congress. Many dedicated reservists are apprehensive and concerned about the future of the Reserve forces and their personal future in the program.

The citizen-soldier concept is as old as our Nation. It is sanctioned by the Constitution itself. The National Guard dates back to the beginning of our country and the history of today's Army Reserve goes back to the turn of the century. The validity of the Reservemilitia concept has been proved over and over again during the many crises which have confronted this Nation. Time and time again the reservists have answered their country's call to arms with unselfish and unfailing patriotism, dedication, and valor. The country owes today's reservists and their predecessors a debt of gratitude which can never be fully paid.

For several months prior to Secretary McNamara's announcement of December 12, 1964, the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee had been conducting an exhaustive study of the Reserve program. That study was directed primarily to certain deficiencies which adversely affected the combat readiness and military preparedness of the Reserves from the standpoint of training, equipment, spare parts, maintenance, and the like. The shortage of equipment applies to both Reserves and the National Guard. With the Secretary's announcement, of course, the thrust of the subcommittee's inquiry was shifted.

The recommended plan constitutes a drastic change in the organization of the Army Reserve forces. There has been a number of such changes over the years. Each, however, was made only after a full and deliberate study by both the military and the Congress and an affirmative finding that the changes were necessary, proper, and desirable. If this change is to be effectuated it should be done in the same manner. That is the primary purpose of this hearing. The proper forum for studying and analyzing a proposal of this nature is the responsible congressional committee.

In the appropriations act for fiscal year 1965 and for several prior years, the Congress made it clear that it was its judgment and intent that a force of 300,000 Army Reserves and 400,000 National Guardsmen should be maintained. I am of the opinion that no change should be made in these figures unless and until the Congress had taken another look at the matter and expressed its considered judgment.

There are a number of fundamental questions involved in this hearing. The basic and controlling question is the effect which the merger will have upon the combat readiness and military preparedness of the Nation. If with a lesser cash outlay, we can enhance our present and future defense posture, then certainly the proposal is worthy of the utmost consideration.

However, we must not let our enthusiasm to save money induce use to reduce our ability to defend ourselves. Therefore, we must inquire into the national security considerations which underlie this proposal.

Another important consideration is the effect which the merger plan, if implemented, will have upon career reservists who have served faithfully and effectively for a number of years. These men deserve full consideration both for their past accomplishments and their desire for continued service. We must be certain that they are provided an adequate and appropriate opportunity to complete their retirement requirements.

We are also interested in obtaining adequate assurance that, if the plan is effectuated, the readiness of the remaining Reserve force, by equipment purchases and otherwise, will be increased as has been asserted.

There is also the matter of cost. We will inquire into the question of whether the alleged annual savings of $150 million will, in fact, be achieved by the merger and, if so, whether or not the savings can best be achieved by a reduction of some other element of the national budget while continuing the military training of our reservists as at present.

These are but a few of the many important questions which will be inquired into during these hearings.

As I said, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee got into this matter before anything was said about a proposed merger and was studying mainly the matter of the shortage of equipment for the National Guard and for the Reserves. Since we were already in it, Senator Russell referred it to us, even though we are not a legislative committee. He asked us to take this assignment, and, of course, the subcommittee took it. I thought it best to just invite all members of the Armed Services Committee to be here with us.

Personally, I have always thought that the Reserves and the National Guard got slight treatment when it comes to dividing the money. They never did have enough equipment and never did have enough means put at their disposal for them to develop anything like their full potential, and I have looked upon them as getting a great amount of service for the military dollar that was spent on them.

I think all of the subcommittee members felt that way, and that is why we went into this matter of equipment.

Now, today, we have with us Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, and Gen. Harold K. Johnson, who is now the Army Chief of Staff.

I understand each of you gentlemen has a very brief statement. I want us to get this whole picture out on the table. There is a great contradiction in belief of what the proposed merger means to various groups and individuals. I hope the subcommittee agrees that today, if we can, we will get the whole thing out on the table, the controversial points explained and what they mean. Then we will move into questions.

I will say that we want to call on the additional members of the Armed Services Committee for questions, but we will have to discipline ourselves a little and be brief on these matters.

We contemplate now that the subcommittee will make a report to the full committee, as on a piece of legislation. There is no real legislation before us, and there is no investigation before us. We are not sitting as an investigative body, and for that reason I am not going to ask the witnesses to be sworn. This is a hearing on what is essentially a legislative matter.

In order to get your position, the points you want to make and what is involved, I am going to just let you gentlemen make your statements, which I understand are not over 15 minutes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have a brief five-page statement, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Ailes and General Johnson also have short statements.

Senator STENNIS. Then we will question Secretary McNamara this afternoon because he has another commitment for tomorrow.

Secretary Ailes, I think you and General Johnson may have to come back again.

Secretary AILES. We will be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman. Senator STENNIS. I just mention that. Is there any suggestion from any member of the subcommittee? If not, we will proceed, Mr. Secretary.

MC NAMARA STATEMENT

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are all delighted to have this opportunity to present to you the outline of our proposed plan for realining the Army Reserve and Guard structure.

Last December, I announced that I had instructed the Secretary of the Army to prepare plans to realine the Army's Reserve and National Guard Forces to improve significantly the early deployment capability and combat readiness of those forces. The Ready Reserves are of crucial importance to our limited war planning. This will be particularly true at the end of this decade when our airlift and sealift capability will be large enough to move most of our central reserves of active ground forces overseas within a relatively short period of time. Indeed, improved readiness for the Army's Reserve components has been one of our major objectives since May 1961 when President Kennedy first announced that a plan was being developed