Senator STENNIS. All right. Secretary Ailes, do we have copies. of your statement?

Secretary AILES. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. All right, you may proceed.

AILES STATEMENT

Secretary AILES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, we are here today to discuss the reorganization of the Reserve components of the Army and to solicit your support of this action.

It is my purpose to present background information concerning the reorganization. I will be followed by the Chief of Staff of the Army who will discuss the reorganization from the standpoint of military requirements.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I believe you have stated that you wanted to hear from General Wright, who is the Chief of Reserve Components and General Wilson, who is Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and General Sutton, who is Chief of the Army Reserve, will do that at your convenience.

I would like to make it crystal clear

Senator STENNIS. All right.

Secretary AILES. I would like to make it crystal clear at the outset of this hearing that the current reorganization plans do not in any way flow from failures or unsatisfactory performance by either of the two Reserve components or by any unit of those components.

On the contrary, during the past 4 years I have closely observed the outstanding performance of our Reserve component personnel and units and know firsthand of their dedication and ability. I have the greatest respect for the officers and men who make up the Reserve components and I am mindful of the efforts which they devote to our military preparedness. Their contributions are in keeping with a tradition which goes deep into the American past and is well known to this subcommittee.

Since the reorganization announcement by the Secretary of Defense on December 12, 1964, there has been a considerable amount of erroneous publicity which was uncomplimentary to one or the other of the Reserve components. Therefore, I consider it of the utmost importance that the official record show a categorical denial of the allegation that performance failures motivated this reorganization. The reorganization is being undertaken for the purposes of bringing manpower and equipment into balance with each other and with contingency war plans, producing increased combat readiness, and streamlining the management structure of the Army's Reserve components.

With regard to the first of these purposes, I would like to point out that our war plans contemplate the employment of a 22-division, quick reaction force. This force consists of 16 Active Army divisions, 6 high priority Reserve component divisions, and a long list of combat and combat support units in the Active Army and in the Reserve component troop lists which constitute the backup for these divisions.

The logistical guidance under which we operate is designed to equip this force. Our PEMA program is determined by starting with the

requirements for this force and subtracting the total assets available to the Army.

The resulting figure is our unfunded requirement. With necessary adjustments to meet modernization needs and to permit sound procurement practices, it forms the basis of our PEMA buy each year. Thus, we are prepared to equip the 22-division force and little if thing more.

any

The Reserve component troop list is not limited to the units which are a part of this 22-division force, although this part of the structure does include some 450,000 of the paid drill spaces in the National Guard and the Reserves.

When one realizes that the structure also contains at the present time, along with other units, some 21 low-priority divisions, it becomes clear that our troop structure is out of balance with our equipment program and our war plans. These 21 low-priority divisions are not a significant military asset to the United States unless backed up by the necessary supporting units and unless the divisions and those supporting units are equipped.

Equipping such a force is obviously as big a job as equipping the present Active Army and high-priority Reserve the present 22-division force. Doing so would add some $10 billion of unfunded PEMA requirement, would require the virtual doubling of the present Army inventory, and would present huge problems in terms of storage, care, and maintenance, not to mention the continuing problem of modernization.

By adding 5 independent brigades and 2 special-purpose divisions to the logistical guidance, and by increasing the manning levels of other units and the high-priority force, we have raised the highpriority force for which we are buying equipment from 450,000 to 550,000 men and, in the process, we have brought the troop structure into balance with the equipment program and the war plans. The details of how we plan to get from the present structure to the new structure will be provided by General Wright and General Wilson in subsequent presentations.

The second purpose which we expect to achieve by this reorganization is that of increased readiness. This improvement in readiness is provided through

The addition of units (specifically five independent brigades) to the high-priority force so that the whole troop structure remaining after the reorganization will be--as Mr. McNamara said— in high priority.

An increase in the manning levels for some units in the present high-priority force. It is provided by the increase of the entire high-priority units and by other measures on which readiness genuinely depends-technicians, an increase in the number of fillers who will go in summer camp with all these units and by operation and maintenance funds which permit this equipment to be maintained.

The new structure of 550,000 paid drill spaces and approximately 6,000 company and detachment-size units will be supported by some 27,220 full-time technicians as compared to a like number supporting 700,000 paid drill spaces and 8,000 company and detachment-size units in the present structure. We are programed for 60,000 fillers for 2

weeks of annual active duty training with high-priority units in fiscal year 1966 and hope to increase this level to over 100,000 when the reorganization is completed. This compares to 42,000 fillers in the fiscal year 1965 program.

The funding level in the operation and maintenance area can be increased to insure that adequate space parts, organizational clothing and equipment, and other necessities are available in adequate quantities to permit effective training. The increased emphasis on weekend or multiple drills which has proven so valuable in the recent past can be continued, all these factors are very important in connection with readiness.

The goal has been that of achieving greater usable combat power which is geared to the situation and the strategy. I believe that this reorganized structure and the improvements in unit readiness will meet this goal.

The third purpose which we set out to achieve was that of streamlining the management structure of the Army's Reserve components. The Army is hampered at the present time by a dual system for managing the Reserve component units which involves substantial duplication and which necessarily results in differences in organization, standards, and procedures in a military organization where uniformity should be the rule.

A large number of headquarters and headquarters-type agencies are required and a substantial number of personnel are involved in these supervisory activities. The full capacity of neither system is completely utilized. I think it is worth noting that although paper units existed in the U.S. Army Reserve prior to World War II, paid drill units, organized, trained, and equipped so as to be capable of being mobilized for combat when required, came into existence after World War II in 1947 and 1948.

At that time, there was a decided trend toward sharply curtailing the size of the Active Army. To compensate, the major goal of the Reserve program was to develop properly manned, equipped, and trained forces of sufficient size to support a deliberate all-out mobilization similar to those which the country had experienced in World Wars I and II.

In 1948, equipment was no problem; there were substantial stocks of World War II equipment of all types. The need, therefore, was for units and manpower. Based on the war plans and mobilization concepts of that period, a Reserve organization in excess of 1,300,000 men became the goal.

Clearly, this size Reserve was beyond the capability of the States to manage and for that reason units in the U.S. Army Reserve were established under the direct control and management of the Active Army. This second management system was established at that time.

Today the problem is just the reverse. We do not have excess stocks of modern equipment. Our contingency and war plan call for a combat ready, immediately deployable, well-equipped Reserve force of approximately 550,000 men. This size force can be effectively managed by one organization.

The Governors of the States have a continuing need for a force at their disposal which can be used when natural disaster strikes and' for the preservation of law and order as required. A Federal Reserve Military Establishment existing within the State's boundaries,

under State control in peacetime, can meet this need and the national need as well. And if we are to have one management system, it follows that it must involve the National Guard organization since that organization will be required in any event.

The existing Active Army Corps which manage the units of the U.S. Army Reserve have no role to play after mobilization; hence, there is not contingency benefit that derives from their continuation. It appears clear that if we were today establishing for the first time a Reserve organization of approximately 550,000 men, we would establish a single structure based on the National Guard of the several States.

Since it appears that this is the size organization which will be required for some considerable period of time, we should be guided by our foreseeable future needs rather than the requirements of the past.

For the reasons I have just cited, it was determined that the best solution was to merge the unit structure of the National Guard and the Army Reserve. Under this merger all unit and all paid drill spaces are brought into the Army National Guard. The Army Reserve will contain all nonpaid drill units and all individuals who are unaffiliated with units.

I believe that the goal of a streamlined management system will be achieved by this reorganization. In this management arrangement we can achieve uniformity in dealing with units through a single chain of authority and in dealing with individual reinforcements through a single chain of authority.

Furthermore, this merger will permit the elimination of the 14 Active Army Corps Headquarters whose primary function is the command and management of the Army Reserve.

Their only other assignment is college ROTC which we can handle equally as well out of the Army headquarters.

The plan which we are presenting today was developed in several stages during the past 5 months. Initially, on October 6 I formed a small group headed by Brigadier General Kenan, Deputy Chief of Reserve Components, operating under my personal supervision. The Chief of Staff was informed at that time. This group studied various ways in which we could achieve better balance, readiness, and management. It was essentially a preliminary exploration or feasibility study. Because of the preliminary nature of the task assigned to this group, their work was done on a close-hold basis. We were faced with the "chicken and the egg" dilemma.

As all of us here know, any discussion of force restructuring is highly sensitive and arouses immediate controversy which can interrupt the efforts to prepare careful, well-thought-out plans. It was, therefore, necessary to develop a concept and at the proper time present this to the appropriate agencies. This we have done.

After determining the feasibility of achieving the desired goals, the broad concept developed by General Kenan's group was turned over to the Chief of Staff for the development of a more complete concept by the Army staff. The concept developed by the Army staff and approved by the Chief of Staff and by me was furnished to the Secretary of Defense and on December 12, 1964, the Secretary of Defense made a public statement announcing the concept and directing that detailed plans be prepared.

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On December 13, which was a Sunday, briefings were held for the General Staff Committees on Army National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, commonly referred to as Section 5 Committees.

On December 22, briefings were held for the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which is the Board that advises Mr. McNamara on these matters.

In carrying out the directive of the Secretary of Defense to develop detailed plans for the reorganization, the Chief of Staff established a group consisting of representatives of the Chief of Reserve Components, General Wright's office, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Chief of Army Reserves, the Section 5 Committee, and the Continental Army Command.

General Wright will discuss the organization for planning in greater detail. I believe that you will see that the appropriate agencies have actively participated in the development of the final plan.

On February 12, the Section 5 Committee met and approved the plan that we are discussing here today, by majority vote, the majority consisting of the Active Army and National Guard members of the committee.

The plan is in final form and is being distributed to the States and the Continental Army Command right now. The period from March 1 to May 30 is allocated for consultation with the States on the troop structure. The actual reorganization is scheduled to be carried out between July 1, 1965, and March 31, 1966. The reorganization will be phased to maintain the highest possible degree of combat readiness at all times.

In summary, I am confident that the reorganization will accomplish the desired goals of improved balance between men, equipment, and plans; will produce increased readiness; and will provide a much improved management structure.

I fully realize the implications of these proposals as far as many individuals are concerned. So much hard work has gone into our Reserve components in recent years and the loyalties which this effort generates are so strong that any major change will necessarily stir emotions and create controversy.

But the essence of military preparedness is the willingness to change and change again to meet the threat we face. Inertia or any tendency to stay with the status quo because it is easier to do so cannot be tolerated. We have gone to great lengths in the preparation of the detailed plan to insure the fairest and most equitable possible treatment of individuals and units of both components.

I believe that this reorganization is in the best interest of the United States and should be carried into execution as planned.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND COMPOSITION OF SECTION 5 COMMITTEE

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I had originally announced that we will have questions first for Secretary McNamara, but for clarification, in your reference to the Section 5 Committee, are you referring to a section of the law? Please explain what you mean.

Secretary AILES. Yes, sir. A statute establishes really two committees which we normally refer to as the Section 5 Committee. The membership consists of six Reserve General officers