was subsidized by the Bolshevist government out of the public revenue had for its avowed aim the spread of the Bolshevist revolution throughout the entire world. There was no common ground of understanding between the United States government and a government whose views of its international relations were so different from its own. The frontiers of Russia must include all territory of the former Russian empire with the exception of Finland, Poland within its ethnic limits, and such territory as should be assigned to the Armenian state. This principle would involve the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory within these frontiers, and, in the opinion of the United States government, a declaration to this effect should be made by the Allied and associated powers. This declaration ought to be followed by warning that no transgression of it would be permitted on the part of Finland or Poland, or any other power. If this were done the Bolshevist régime would be deprived of its support from the nationalist spirit of Russia.

In a reply of the French foreign office the principles of the above note were cordially approved.

VILNA. An obstacle was thrown in the way of an adjustment in Central Europe by the adventure of General Zellgouski at Vilna. On October 9 the White Ruthenian division of the Polish forces under his command captured the city which was unable to offer any serious resistance. The Lithuanian troops retired through the city as the enemy advanced in it, and there was but little street fighting. The invaders at once proclaimed a new Lithuanian government at Vilna, saying they had come to liberate the fatherland from "eternal enemies who tried to introduce bloody Bolshevist government"; and they repudiated the Russo-Lithuanian treaty. They appealed to the principle of self-determination. Their aim was to set up a government more favorable to Polish aspirations and ultimately secure annexation to Poland. On October 10 the Control Commission of the League of Nations arrived at Vilna but realizing that nothing could be done went on to Kovno. Zellgouski had acted in defiance of the Warsaw government, which afterwards disavowed his action, but Polish sentiment appeared to be in its favor and official disclaimers were mild and indicated an intention ultimately to pardon it. The Lithuanians protested to the League of Nations and the Powers. In the protest addressed to the United States they said the Polish government had permitted reënforcements to join the troops of Zellgouski. The Geneva Assembly of the League of Nations as noted above opposed the Polish raid on Vilna. It provided for the organization of a small force from Great Britain, France, and Spain, to which were to be added contingents from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. All these Powers contributed with the exception of the Netherlands which at the close of the year was awaiting action by the legislature. This international army entered the region between Poland and Lithuania and put an end to the conflict.

DANZIG. The free city of Danzig was placed under the protection of the League by the treaty. During the year it was under the administration of Sir Reginald Tower, as high commissioner, under the League. A constituent assembly was

arranged for and plans were made for a permanent constitution. There was anxiety in French and Polish quarters in respect to this constitution which was characterized as the work of proGermans and as containing several things prejudicial to Poland; and on October 22, the Poles through their delegates at Paris declared their intention of asking from the Council of Ambassadors the right to continue negotiations in respect to the Danzig agreement. The Poles alleged that this agreement did not fulfill the stipulations of the Treaty in respect to Polish access to the sea and Polish control of customs. The agreement created a committee of control over the port made up half of poles and half of residents of Danzig under a neutral president. The Poles demanded the right to buy land and develop the port so as to admit of an annual movement of about 5,000,000 tons; and they also demanded execution of the clause placing Danzig under the jurisdiction of the Polish customs. At the discussion of the Danzig question before the Council of the League of Nations, November 14, the Polish representative, Paderewski, demanded Polish military control on the ground that the port had been assigned by the Treaty to Poland, and that without military control, Poland could not have full use of the port. This was opposed by the German representative from Danzig who argued on behalf of the principle of self-government. In November the problem of Danzig had not yet been solved. Article 104 of the Treaty had provided for a convention determining the relations between Poland and the free city of Danzig. It was declared that the chief allied powers and their associates would determine this agreement which was to place Danzig under the Polish customs administrations to provide for a free zone and to assure Poland of the control and administration of the Vistula and of the railway system within the limits of the city as well as of the postal, telegraph and telephone communications between Poland and the port. The text furthermore provided for the assurance of Poland without restriction of the free use of waterways, docks, basin, etc., within the free city and the control the prejudice of the Poles residing in the city. Moreover no discrimination was to be made to the prejudice of the Poles residing in the city. The importance of Danzig to Poland was manifest. The new Polish State had no other outlet on the sea. Danzig being at the mouth of the Vistula dominated the entire Polish river system. It was argued that if Poland were denied the free use of the port she would be deprived of the necessary outlet for her commerce and would therefore fall under the economic control of Germany. The events of 1920 showed moreover that Poland being shut in between hostile Germany and a Bolshevik Russia could not defend her independence if she did not have the port of Danzig, to assure her of provisions. At the conference of the ambassadors, the representative parties, namely, the Warsaw Government and the Government of Danzig, submitted their projects. The former sought to prevent any obstruction on the part of the inhabitants of Danzig of Polish exports and imports. It wished to make Danzig a Polish port rather than a free port, as England had demanded. Accordingly it claimed part of the docks and it insisted on practically complete customs control. The

Danzig project on the other hand was based on the principle of the sovereignty of the free city. It called for a Danzig customs control independent of the Poles and for an administration of railways and water connections under a mixed commission. It sought to prohibit Poland from concerning itself with the Polish inhabitants of the city. The French consistently with their support of Poland throughout held on general principle that all the claims of Danzig were without foundation. It was impossible to reconcile the two plans and a compromise was likely to please neither party. The problem was unsolved at the close of the year.

THE QUESTION OF UPPER SILESIA. Much was said in the French press about a German campaign for acquiring Upper Silesia. The German commissioner in the matter of the plebiscite asserted the principle that persons born in Upper Silesia though not domiciled there should be entitled to vote and also persons who though not born in Upper Silesia had been domiciled there after December 1, 1918. On the Polish side, objection was made to this as indicating a desire on the part of Germany to profit from the votes of Germans who had merely by chance been born in the region, though they had left it without intending to return, and also of those Germans who had settled in Silesia after it was clear that Germany had an important interest in their doing so. It was estimated that between 250,000 and 300,000 Silesian Germans were scattered throughout the empire. With their votes and the admssion of the more recent German settlers, the government of Berlin hoped, it was said, to falsify the plebiscite, giving the Germans a merely artificial majority. If the Germans insisted that the plebiscite should not take place until spring, it was because they sought more time for the transport of voters. The Germans were charged by the Polish and French writers with the intention of colonizing all the doubtful districts with compact masses of voters who would demonstrate in the favor of Germany. There were said to be in East Prussia certain districts where these immigrant voters were more numerous than the residents. The German papers were saying that English and Italian troops ought to maintain order during the plebiscite. The Polish and French writers seemed to see in this an exception that the Allied forces on guard would countenance the German programme.

The danger of concentrating 200,000 or 300,000 Germans in Upper Silesia at the time of the plebiscite was emphasized. It was pointed out that German organization of a strictly military character had been carried out and that a central bureau had been established at Breslau apparently for administration purposes, but really composed exclusively for former soldiers with Prussian officers at the head. These were awaiting the right moment to intervene and settle the question by force. Reports were published to the effect that men belonging to the Reichswehr, armed with revolvers had been sent into Upper Silesia to organize a movement against the Poles and the French. The latter regarded as a suspicious circumstance the fact that Germany insisted that the plebiscite should be held in all the districts on the same day. They implied that this indicated a purpose to employ the troops that Germany had organized. The Germans were said to be making every effort to influence the Silesian population-for example, by

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promising them self-government as a part of the empire. Hopes were held out to them that they would possess complete autonomy under German government. Chancellor Fehrenbach declared that if the result of the plebiscite were favorable to Germany, Silesia would be admitted as a selfgoverning state under the German constitution. In other quarters of Germany, however, there was, opposition to this policy and it was proposed especially by Prussian statesmen that the government should confine itself to vague promises. These charges against the German government had been made by French and Polish partisans frequently during 1919 and they continued throughout the year As the date appointed for the plebiscite drew near there were reports that war between Germany and Poland would follow a decision favorable to Germany. The plebiscite was deferred till early in 1921.

FRANCE AND POLAND. As the comments of the Liberal papers in England and the United States exhibited the Polish situation in a wholly unfavorable light and while attacking the French position did not make clear what that position was, the following statement of the French case is here presented. On June 5, 1918 the Supreme Council of War decided that the creation of an independent Polish state with free access to the sea was one of the conditions of a solid peace and the rule of law and justice in Europe. In the Treaty Articles 87 to 93, inclusive, embodied this decision. Finally Poland as a signer of the Treaty became a member of the League of Nations. Now inasmuch as the Bolshevists from the beginning were bent on the destruction of the Polish state the policy of the Allies in the matter was definitely fixed. It was their duty to protect Poland. Moreover, in all the countries of Europe the Socialist organizations had ranged themselves on the side of the Bolshevists and they did not content themselves with mere declarations but acted openly against Poland. This had been the attitude of the British Labor party, the Italian railway men, and the the extreme Socialists in German Switzerland, for example. Poland was struggling against these radical forces which were trying to dominate and exploit the working populations. The attitude of the governments of the countries concerned had been as follows: In the first place Germany did not conceal her desire that Bolshevism should work in her interest for the destruction of the Treaty, and she had an especial interest in Poland on account of her wish to regain the Polish provinces that had been detached from Prussia. She would like to play the role of savior of Russia. Her policy had been clearly indicated by events in the Saar, in Upper Silesia, in Eastern Prussia and at Erfurt. As to the little states of Central Europe, threatened as Poland was by the danger of absorption within the Bolshevist state, their attitude was hard to understand. For example, Lithuania not content with offering her territory to Germany and Russia for the passage of their troops had even united her forces with the Germans and Bolshevists in the attack on Poland. In the autumn relying on the support of the Germans and the Soviet government she refused to enter into any agreement with Warsaw. CzechoSlovakia had taken advantage of Poland's difficulties by settling in her own interest the question of Teschen, and after that had followed a neutral policy. Rumania had remained silent.

While the course of these little states could perhaps be pardoned in view of their weakness the attitude of the great Powers among the Allies had no such excuse. The British cabinet had taken squarely a position against Poland. While Poland was claiming, according to her rights, the material aid of her Allies, England openly favored the interests of the Bolshevists. At least this had been the spirit of the government though public opinion in England seemed not to favor it. Italy had completely reversed her policy and drawn away from Poland. Public opinion looked to an intervention of the Council of the League of Nations but nothing had come from that quarter. Late in the summer there had been a meeting at London to consider the danger of a conflict between Moscow and Persia. The representative of the League at Danzig had caused the passage of arms and munitions destined for Poland to be forbidden contrary to Article 104 of the Treaty. Only France had maintained a worthy attitude.

In this brief summary it will be observed that no attention is paid to any of the arguments reiterated far and wide in the press of Englishspeaking communities and particularly the argument that Poland had taken an aggressive course. Although Polish troops had been for months hundreds of miles behind their own borders having invaded the territory of the Soviet government and although Poland claimed territory not only far in excess of that allotted to her by the Treaty but territory peopled by an alien race, the French case as above indicated had nothing to say on these points. In general each party to the dispute proceeded along the line of its own interest or beliefs paying no attention to the arguments of the other. The consequence was that in this dispute as in many others during the year most of the discussion was completely valueless serving only to stimulate those readers whose minds had been made up already.

THE ARMISTICE AT RIGA. The signature of the armistice at Riga by the Polish and Russian delegates gave assurance of an early peace between the two countries. In quarters friendly to Poland there was some surprise at the moderation of the Bolshevists and it was hinted that the peace was only a provisional one. The question of Galicia which was the most difficult of all was settled in principle. Among the French the fear was expressed that the Bolshevists were merely making a temporary truce with Poland on account of their insecure position in Russia and the danger that was threatening them at the hands of General Wrangel. Having their hands free on the Polish frontier they would be able to transfer their forces to the Crimean frontier and dispute the advance of Wrangel. It was said that the Germans had made an agreement with the Soviet government to aid it in its struggle with all its enemies and that war material was passing from Germany into Russia. It was said specifically that mititary transports destined for Poland had been held up in the Kiel canal and at Danzig contrary to the terms of the Treaty and that the Council of Ambassadors protested and finally secured the free passage of these transports. The German authorities, however, disclaimed responsibility for these incidents laying the blame either on their Bolshevistic workingmen or on the force of necessity. There was no

doubt, however, according to pro-Polish writers that the Germans were responsible.

TREATY WITH HUNGARY. On account of disturbed conditions in Hungary, the treaty between her and the Allies was delayed for three months. It was presented to the Hungarian delegation, January 15, but straightway encountered such determined opposition on the part of the Hunga rians, that it was reconsidered by the Supreme Council. Some slight changes were made and the treaty was again presented and was signed in Paris, June 4. The main protest had been made against the territorial clauses. These provided that Hungary should give up her claim to all territories awarded to Italy, Jugo-Slavia, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia. The Allies, however, would not give way in this respect. Other features of the treaty were as follows: Limitation of the army to 35,000 men; requirement that Hungary should be responsible for her part of the Austro-Hungarian debt; free export of food-stuffs into Austria; and the assurance to Austrian buyers of as favorable terms as those offered to Hungarians. The other clauses were similar to those of the treaty of St. Germain with Austria. The signature of the treaty was preceded by agitation in Hungary on the part of the irreconcilable group of the Christian National party headed by the former prime minister, Friedrich. The day of signing was made a day of national mourning in Budapest and was the occasion of a series of riots in which several Jews were killed and many wounded. In the National Assembly and in the churches and public meetings, the treaty was bitterly denounced and speakers, including members of the cabinet, declared that its terms could not be fulfilled and that it contained the germs of future wars. The treaty was ratified at Budapest, November 15. See HUNGARY, History.

FRENCH POLICY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. In the French press, M Millerand was applauded for having pursued a policy in central Europe favorable to the interests of the liberated nationalities. It was said that he had placed them under the protection of France and this policy in central Europe, especially along the Danube and in the Balkans was welcomed as certain to increase French influence and consolidate the results of the victory. The same policy as seen by many British Liberals and especially by the members of the Labor party were described as follows: The French government with the aid of capitalists was said to be extending its economie control over the new states of Europe. Great munition plants in Czecho-Slovakia and in Upper Silesia and Poland had been acquired by France. The economic life of Hungary was passing under French control; France was paramount in banking circles and in the management of railways and river navigation and French interests had recently secured concessions in the port of Budapest. French journalists saw in all this a praiseworthy activity and prudence on the part of their diplomats and financiers, while in England the policy was described as part of a vague and magnificent scheme for giving France the leadership in Europe through influence over the little states and Poland up to the shore of the North Sea. In certain quarters this policy was attributed to the determined hostility of France against Bolshevism. French writers admitted that this element entered into their foreign policy and congratulated themselves on that

passports and certificates of various kinds involved travel in a tangle of red tape. The postal service was bad and according to some reports practically inoperative. The authorities of one country blamed those of the other for these conditions. In short the Balkan countries were described by travelers as separated from each other by Chinese walls and commercial communication was out of the question.

The

THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. As noted in the previous YEAR BOOK, conferences on the Adriatic question were held in London during December, 1919. As a result of these, a memorandum was prepared by the representatives of France, Great Britain and the United States and delivered to the Italian representative December 13. This provided that Fiume should be a free buffer state under the League of Nations and that the city and hinterland of Zara should be a sovereign state under the authority of the League, if it became a member of the Jugo-Slav customs union; also that four specified islands were to be transferred to Italy and that Albania as an independent state should be administered by Italy under mandate, and that the city of Valona should be turned over to Italy. The other demands of Italy were rejected. Italy now requested that the treaty of London be fulfilled; and a new conference took place in Paris for the purpose of forming a compromise agreement. In this the United States was not represented. new conference modified the December proposals, and provided that Fiume should not be a free buffer state, but an independent state under the League and joined to the territory of Italy by a narrow strip along the coast, while its contiguous city Sussak should go to Jugo-Slavia, the port and transportation to be under the League of Nations; Zara to be an independent state under the League; the Italians of Dalmatia to have the right to vote for Italian nationality without leaving the country; Italian business enterprises in Dalmatia were to be safeguarded by treaty. This disregarded the boundary line proposed by President Wilson. The Jugo-Slav government accepted this settlement in general, but insisted on the frontier proposed by President Wilson. Upon being pressed for a more definite answer, the Jugo-Slav government rejected these proposals. On February 12 the Supreme Council insisted upon their acceptance without change, or the acceptance of the treaty of London. On February 14 President Wilson declared to the British, French and Italian governments that if the Adriatic problem was settled without the support of the American government, the latter would consider withdrawal from participation in European affairs. The prime ministers of the Allies replied in defense of their arrangement and appealed to the President not to withdraw. The President replied, February 24, declaring, in justification of his objection, that the proposed agreement was contrary to the principles for which the war was fought, and suggesting that new conferences should take place between Italy and Jugo-Slavia for the purpose of agreeing on terms acceptable to both. The Allied prime ministers, February 27, offered to withdraw both the proposals of December 9 and January 20 in order to facilitate a solution. The President refused to consent to the withdrawal of the proposals of December 9 or

to the application of the treaty of London. New negotiations between Jugo-Slavia and Italy resulted in a failure to agree, March 9 but were later resumed.

THE TREATY OF RAPALLO. On November 12, the Italian and Jugo-Slav governments came to an understanding on the points at issue and signed the treaty of Rapallo. According to the treaty of London, concluded by the Powers of the Entente four weeks before the entry of Italy in the war, Italy was assured of the control of the Adriatic Sea. For the terms of that understanding and the points at issue after the armistice see preceding YEAR BOOKS.

a

The agreement reached at Rapallo was as necessarily happens in compromise and such cases both parties made a sacrifice of their extreme claims. As to Valona and the Albanian protectorate Italy had abandoned her claims. In the arrangement at Rapallo, renounced she recognized Jugo-Slav unity; Dalmatia, with the exception of Zara, and renounced also all but six of the islands; and restored to Jugo-Slavia two small territories lying to the southeast of Istria. On their part, the Jugo-Slavs agreed to an Italian frontier enclosing all of Istria and extending as far as Monte Nevoso; and gave up any claim of control over the railway and port of Fiume. Generally, it appeared that Italy had agreed to limit her control of the Adriatic to the northern sea, while Jugo-Slavia had consented to the annexation by Italy of half a million of their fellow citizens. Yet in one sense, both of the Powers gained by the transaction. As to the Jugo-Slavs, they acquired a considerable part of the regions occupied by Italy after the armistice. If Italy had retained those regions, Jugo-Slavia would have been shut off from the Adriatic, whereas she now had ample possessions on the coast. As to Italy, an Italian newspaper set forth the results as follows:

"Encircled by her rocky barriers which are as formidable as a stormy sea, Italy is henceforth to be a sort of continental England. She has realized her most difficult aims-so difficult that the collapse of a giant empire a thousand years old She is was necessary for their realization. now hemmed in on the west by France, which certainly has no designs on Piedmont and on the east by a state, only one-quarter the size of Austria, which has recognized the Italian rights over all Italy. Henceforth, Italy is really a great power and she owes this to her own strength and not to the concessions of the European concert. That means in a word that the victory of Vettorio-Veneto was no ordinary victory but the end of an old system and the beginning of a new one. Three years before, Italy went to Rapallo suffering the humiliation of Caporetto. She now goes to Rapallo wearing the crown of victory." This however, did not represent the attitude of all the press. Certain papers declared that the last word on this subject had not been spoken and protested against an arrangement which left the Jugo-Slavs in possession of such important seaports and islands. The nationalists were far from content,

FIUME. In spite of the sensational methods of d' Annunzio the question of Fiume lost its hold on public attention during the year. In Italy itself it appeared not to be regarded with much seriousness. In September a proclamation of independence was issued by d' Annnunzio on the