as socii. The moral judgments, imperatives, and ideals they emit, although in the main telic, do betray considerable admixture of crude sentiment. The general reprobation of vice, idleness, waste, sacrilege, or impiety does not voice concern for the corporate welfare. It merely voices common, private sentiments. Of some of our judgments—abhorrence of the unnatural, for instance the roots run far down into our ancient, pre-social instincts.

At a moment when ethicians, weary of juggling conscience, innate ideas of right and wrong, the Ten Commandments, and what-not out of the individual mind, are coming to perceive the social bases of morality, one would not lay a straw in their way. Yet it is well to recognize that, after all is said, ethics is more than a mere wing of sociology. Some of the piers that support it rest in biology, some in individual psychology, some in social psychology, and some in social morphology.

Politics, like ethics, has the double task of explaining what is and determining what ought to be. In so far as it aims to arrive at principles for the guidance of political action, it is more like an art than a science, but it may be termed a normative science. Still, it is possible to regard matters of government as phenomena, and to study them with a view to ascertaining the causes and laws of their occurrence. Political science of this ætiological sort will stand in some close relation to sociology. Whether it will stand to it as part to whole or as special to general, depends, as in the preceding cases, on the specificity of the forces and facts it deals with.

Now, government is not the sphere of operation of characteristic forces, but the meeting-place of nearly all the kinds of forces present in social life. "The functions of the state," it has well been remarked, “are coextensive with human interests." This is true only because the more important human desires— greed, vanity, sympathy with the weak, love of truth, passion for homogeneity, craving for justice-make themselves felt in moulding the policy of government. One motive leads to public relief of the poor, another motive inspires state endowment of research, a third impels to the artificial assimilation of the foreign ele

ments in the population, a fourth dictates the seizure of markets. In fact, almost every species of interest sooner or later records itself in government.

There are, to be sure, two special traits of human nature which come to light in government. The one is the lust of dominating; the other, its counterpart, is the impatience of restraint. In other words, power is sought for its own sake, and liberty is prized for its own sake. Were these two forces alone implicated in government, political science would have a basis apart from sociology. But who will seriously contend that the "will to power" is now the chief motive tending to enlarge the authority of the state, or that hatred of restraint is the chief counteracting force? In the early stages of social development a state is often the creation of a single energetic will. Says Mr. Bryce of the East: "A military adventurer or the chief of a petty tribe suddenly rises to greatness, becomes the head of an army which attacks all its neighbors, and pursues a career of unbroken conquest till he has founded a mighty empire." With greater social advance, however, there is sure to arise a compact fabric of government and law, which offers successful resistance to the vaulting ambition of the individual. As regards the antagonistic force, Mr. Bryce observes: "The abstract love of liberty has been a comparatively feeble passion." "Rebellions and revolutions are primarily made, not for the sake of freedom, but in order to get rid of some evil which touches men on a more tender place than their pride."

In fact, the political is simply imbedded in the social. Political grouping is not distinct from, but tends to be a resultant of, the linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic groupings of population. Political organization is only a part of social organization. The substance of the state is prestige, time-hallowed relations, habits of co-operation and obedience. The sphere of government becomes an expression of collective need. The will that sets in motion the public organs is not the mere sum of individual wills, but the highly elaborated will of sections, classes, or the nation itself. Government is becoming functional to society, and if political science remains distinct, it will be

because the breadth of the field calls for the specialist, and not because there are natural boundaries marking it off from sociology.

Comparative jurisprudence deals with phenomena which exhibit the working of two special principles of human nature—the thirst for vengeance that torments the sufferer of a wrong, and the desire for fair play that moves the beholders of a wrong. These formidable impulses were early led into the safe channels of legal redress, in order that society might be spared the evils of feud and retaliatory violence. In time, however, the laworiginating impulses became socialized and rationalized. In-wrought with other motives, they come to express the will of the Social Personality. The just settlement of disputes, from a private need, becomes a public function. When we consider the transformation of law by jurisconsults and judges, the enlargement of it by the action of the legislator, and the renovation of it in the name of the principle of social utility, it is plain that jurisprudence cannot hope to be more than a feudatory state in the realm of sociology.

There is no reason why what is known as "the sociology of the family" together with the "population" section of political economy should not have been set apart as genetics. The family is certainly distinguished from other social structures by owing its existence to the highly special instincts of sexattraction and philoprogenitiveness. These instincts, moreover, being gratified individually, do not call into being joint activities or distinct professions such as we find in the religious or economic spheres. An institution it may be, but the family is not, properly speaking, a social organ.

It is unlikely, however, that we shall see split off a science treating of the social phenomena that center in the reproductive function. One reason is that the sex and family relations, since they are always standardized in law and morals, are, at every moment, in the most intimate sympathy with the reigning culture. Furthermore, all our researches go to magnify the importance of the non-instinctive factors in fixing the duration, size, and internal structure of the family. Not long ago Maine

and Hearn and Fustel de Coulanges brought to light the religious factor. Now it is the economic factor that is exalted. As motive to marriage the attraction of the sexes is reinforced, it appears, by man's desire for a servant and woman's desire for a protector. Children are reared, not from parental love alone, but also because a daughter can be sold for cash, while the son can be kept as a helper, a protector, and an avenger. Grosse therefore hits the bull's eye when he says: "If we wish to grasp

a particular social structure—say a form of family organization -in its essence and significance, we must study it in its natural connection with the civilization in which it grows, lives, and works."

As regards noetics, by which term we would designate the science that deals with the phenomena that arise from efforts to satisfy the craving for truth, and aesthetics, or the science that treats of the phenomena that arise in connection with endeavors to satisfy the craving for the beautiful, there is no doubt that, owing to their close and immediate dependence upon the psychology of the individual mind, they will retain a good deal of independence with respect to sociology. We are, in fact, coming to recognize in inventions and discoveries the first causes of many of the great transformations in society. Even in these branches of inquiry, however, new social factors are coming forward. In tracing the evolution of philosophies, sciences, and the fine arts, more causes and influences are being recognized. Attempts to resume the history of intellectual progress without taking due note of changes in the state of society have shown opinions and movements succeeding one another without meaning or logic. Those who would comprehend intellectual or æsthetic advance must consent to take into consideration such factors as the geographical environment, the prevailing occupations, the plane of comfort, town life, the influence of a leisure class, the attitude of the priesthood, the organization of education, the diffusion of learning, and the degree of honor attaching to intellectual and artistic pursuits.

The piers on which rests economics, the greatest of the social sciences and (save linguistics) the most independent, are certain

properties of the external world and certain properties of human nature. The latter are the desire for wealth, the aversion to labor, and the reluctance to postpone present gratifications. The first of these calls into being productive energies, the second and third limit this energy, the one in respect to labor, the other in respect to capital. All three co-operating distribute productive energy among places, seasons, occupations, and enterprises in a way that is termed "economic.”

It would be a mistake to regard these subjective foundations of economics as simple traits of human nature. The aversion to labor has in it, indeed, an element of organic repugnance to sustained effort. But it also contains a social factor, namely a conventional disesteem of labor derived from the stigma that a leisure class attaches to the functions of the industrial class.

As to the desire for wealth, it is exceedingly complex. It has a three-fold tap-root in hunger, or the craving for food, want, or the craving for clothing and shelter, and the love of bodily ease which expresses itself in a demand for comfort. Its side roots, moreover, connect it with nearly all the specific desires we have considered in the foregoing pages. The passion for sex spurs a suitor to amass the riches that can win him his bride. The lust of power is a demand for the wealth that procures power. The craving for beauty is a demand for costly artistic products. The religious impulse gives off a demand for the material accessories of worship. Even the most spiritual wants demand leisure for their satisfaction, and wealth is a means to leisure. The acquisitive lust is further whetted by the honor that attaches to profuse consumption and conspicuous waste.

Thus sooner or later all the cravings of human nature put in a requisition for wealth, and the confluence of these tributaries with the main stream of desire rolls down a veritable Nile-flood of greed which beslimes, yet stimulates, nearly every profession and function in society. This generic virtue of wealth it is, which makes it stand for desirability in the abstract, and gives rise to the myth that the lust of acquisition is the sole motive of human endeavor, the direct or remote cause of all social phenomena, the single force that holds together the social frame even