Europe, is that it is being put more and more into the hands of the state, is made more and more a social institution. No, our pedagogical ideal is explained by our social structure as truly as was that of the Greeks and Romans by the organization' of their states.

Not only is it society that has elevated mankind to the dignity of the model which the educator ought to strive to reproduce, but it is society which fashioned the model and fashioned him according to her own needs. The man that education ought to realize in us is not the man such as nature has made, but such as society wishes he should be. If there exists a hierarchy of our faculties, if to some of them we attribute a sort of precedence, and which we ought therefore to develop more than the others, it is not because that dignity is intrinsic, it is not that nature from all time made them thus, assigned them an eminence of rank; but it is because society has set a high value upon them. This scale of values, this hierarchy of faculties, never remains the same through two successive periods of history. At one time it was courage that held first rank, together with all those faculties that implied the military virtue; now it is thought and reflection; in the future it will perhaps be refinement of tastes and sensibility of art. Thus in the present, as in the past, our pedagogical ideal is, even in details, the work of society. It is society that draws the portrait of the man we ought to be, and in this portrait come to be reflected all the characteristics of the social organization.

Simply for convenience of expression it might be said that in each of us there exist two beings (êtres). The one is made up of all the mental states which refer only to ourselves and to incidents of our personal life. This may be called the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, of sentiment, of habits, which acquaint us, not with our own personality, but with the group or the different groups of which we are a part; such are the religious beliefs, the practical and moral beliefs, the national and professional traditions, the collective opinions of all sorts. Their ensemble forms the social being. To create this being in each of us- - this is the end of education. This social being is not given ready-made in the constitution of primitive man, nor is it a result of spontaneous development. Spontaneously, man was not inclined to submit to a political authority, to respect moral discipline, to sacrifice himself. not given to us at birth to be disposed to serve divinities, emblems symbolic of society, to render them a worship, to deny ourselves for their glory. It is society itself which has drawn from its own life those great moral forces coming into contact with which man has learned his own inferiority.

It was

But if sociology is preponderant in determining the end of education, has it the same importance in selecting the means? In choosing means and working out methods, psychology surely claims some consideration. Through psychology of the individual we come to know something of the individual through which are to be realized the ends that society marks out. But when it is remembered that the individual is not completely known until studied also through social psychology, it may still be an unsettled question as to the adequacy of psychology as usually conceived for determining method. We all know with what caution and with what limits, even in choosing methods, the principles of psychology are acted upon or accepted. Again, society, determining the aim, or, better, the aims, of education, must reasonably have something to say as to the means. Historically this has been true. When society was individualistic, whatever in education tended to do violence to the individuality was frowned down. In fact, whenever educational systems have been profoundly changed it has been under the influence of some great social movement felt throughout the group-life. It was not in consequence of some psychological discoveries that the Renaissance opposed new methods to those of the Middle Ages; it was that, in consequence of changes in the structure of European societies, a new conception of man and of his place in the world had taken place. Neither Basedow, nor Pestalozzi, nor Froebel, was a great psychologist. Regard for natural liberty, hatred of all oppression, love for a man, for a child-these express their doctrine, these are the basis of our modern individualism.

Thus, whether we consider the ends of education or the means it employs, they agree with, if they are not determined by, social conditions. It is the collective ideas and sentiments of a people that its educational system expresses. -E DURKHEIM, Pédagogie et sociologie," in Revue de métaphysique et de morale, January, 1903. T. J. R.

The Meaning of Ethnology for Sociology-1. Province and problems of sociology. It is impossible to give a complete definition of sociology yet. Such a definition must have for its foundation the widest and most abstract generalizations from the material with which we deal. However, there is need of a preliminary definition of the science with reference to the more closely related social sciences. Two preliminary considerations should be kept in mind. There is a close relationship of the phenomena treated by political economy and sociology, and a disadvantage has followed by dividing the more abstract principles between the two when the abstract side should have been given over to sociology and used by political economy rather as a method. Again, the historical school of political economy has complicated the problem of the division of labor by incorporating factors which clearly belong to sociology. Instead of recognizing political economy as a division of the more general science of sociology, the representatives of the historical school attempt to expand political economy into a sociology.

I may define sociology as the theory of social phenomena considered from the most general point of view. Its province would include the theory of the composition, forms, functions and the devolopment and abnormalities of human associations. The problems of sociology cannot be taken over by any other science, and their solution is urgently desired from both the theoretical and the practical side.

Six of the chief problems of sociology are as follows: First, the relation of the science to biology and psychology must be better worked out. Man as a social unit must be better known both somatically and psychically. One of its chief interests should be the construction of a theory of the races of men and of the anthropological types. The second problem is the clearing away of the unscientific illusions and constructions, such as the fundamentally false conception of the real equality of all men and their unlimited educability, with the survival of the contrat social, and much other rubbish. From the positive side, there must be the creation of a purely empirical foundation for all further sociological study. The third, and most difficult, whose fulfilment is far off, is the working out more completely of the hitherto neglected provinces indicated above. Fourth, a synthesis of all the separate social investigations. Fifth, the searching for the most general laws or regularities in societary life. Sixth, a systematic presentation of the preceding problems.

2. The meaning of ethnology apart from the theory of evolution.-We are concerned here only with the sociology of the primitive peoples. I want to remove the preconceived opinion that such a study is of interest chiefly because, according to the evolutionary theory, the primitive peoples give a living repetition of our own early history. If this were not the case at all, they would still be entitled to our most thorough study, merely because they are people, because they form societies of living beings, of men. Sociology is interested in all forms of human association, but here is a very large number of such associations, fairly well described, related in various ways, in all stages of development, though in the most different directions, and living in very unlike situations.

Many of the younger sociological students seem to be lacking in the real scientific interest of desiring to know and explain all the phenomena belonging to their field of work. They seem to regard the study of the primitive peoples as unworthy of their energies. We do not know yet the relations of the various forms and functions of these societies, and how they condition each other. There is a rich and fruitful field here for the sociologist. It is far away from the prejudices of today's complex questions and gives an excellent opportunity for the formation and working out of unprejudiced hypotheses.

3. The analogy between our early ancestors and the primitive people of today.— The evolutionary theory is doubtless true. The ancestors of the present civilized peoples, and of the civilized and half-civilized that have passed away, were once uncivilized. Guizot has pointed out the analogy between the early Germans and the Iroquois Indians. Mallery has shown the similarity in customs and beliefs of the North American Indians and the Israelites. Our folklore is a living reality among the present primitive peoples. The work of Post, Kohler, and Dareste shows that the development of law and legal institutions has not been different in principle for the primitive and civilized peoples. The unavoidable conclusion is that we can learn much about our past from the life of the present primitive peoples, and, owing to the

fact that history furnishes us data for only comparatively recent periods in human life, scientific ethnology has an important place in sociology.

4. Position of the primitive people.- The chief question under this heading is whether, in general, the primitive peoples possess a similar ability to the ancestors of the present civilized peoples; and, if all the conditions were the same, whether the development of the two would have been essentially the same, or whether they are fundamentally different, and so have followed different lines of development. Taking everything into consideration, it seems highly probable that the innate ability of all living primitive peoples is not of equal value for higher development. However, this difference in endowment does not destroy the value of the comparison between primitive and culture peoples. Certain lines of development are the same, and a more careful and critical study of the primitive peoples promises much for a science of association.

5. Particular advantages of ethnology. The principal advantage that the study of ethnology affords is that it gives us insight into the less complex associative phenomena of people still living. Though the pure primitive type is rapidly vanishing, yet the knowledge of these peoples has increased considerably in recent years. New problems can be presented for study through ethnology, and we are much less dependent upon accidental discoveries of material than in archæology and early history. Not only can the great problems of social and cultural evolution not be solved without the aid of ethnology, but there are also many other questions that depend upon it. I may mention merely the question of the equality or inequality of the human races, and why certain races have not made much progress.

A beginning has been made in the study of the primitive peoples. The colonies of almost all the largest civilized states and of some of the smaller ones afford excellent opportunities for the continuance of the study. This work should be done while it is possible, for these people are fast disappearing. Ethnology is of incomparable value for sociology in all its relations. It ought no longer to be left to the care of a few dilettants or martyrs, but the universities should open their doors to it--and to sociology.-S. R. STEINMETZ, "Die Bedentung der Ethnologie für Soziologie," in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, XXVI. Jahrgang, IV. Heft.

E. M.

Australian Marriage Systems.-The so-called "class system " in Australia presents many various forms, and may occur where descent is reckoned either in the male or female line. But, speaking roughly, the following bars on marriage exist: 1. Each man and woman in a tribe belongs to one of two divisions or "phratries within the tribe, say Matthuric and Kirarawa. Kirarawa must never marry Kirarawa, but always Matthuric, and vice versa.

2. Each man and woman also belongs to a given totem. Under Matthuric, say, six totems are ranged; under Kirarawa six others. Persons of the same totem may never intermarry.

3. Each of the two "primary divisions" is divided into two or more apparently non-totemic classes, the members intermarry as in a cross-figure in a reel, and their children take a name which is that of the class of neither father nor mother, the grandchildren returning to the class name of a grandparent.

In explanation of the primary divisions some inquirers say that the names are usually those of animals, and so are totemic; other writers insist that an original commune existed in an undivided condition at first and was then deliberately bisected so that half of its members might never marry with the other half, each half taking an animal name. Why such a deliberate bisection was made has never been explained, nor has an explanation been given of class two, for apparently nothing was gained by this classification, since by the primary division no one might marry within his or her totem-name.

My own provisional theory is as follows:

I do not think that very early man lived in an undivided commune of indefinite but considerable size and that the members intermarried. I think that difficulties of food-supply made a big horde then impossible, and that sexual jealousy, in an age so animal, made promiscuity improbable in a high degree.

I conceive, with Mr. Darwin, that men then lived in small knots, probably under one polygamous male. He would drive away his sons as they approached puberty, and all the females, including his daughters, would be his harem. All such male heads of groups would resent poaching on their game, the area of their food-supply, and their female mates.

Here we have a rude exogamy. No young male may marry in the group. But suppose that senescent or good-humored patriarchs allowed, here and there, young males to bring in female mates captured from without, probably going shares in them at first. Groups in which this was done would extend their area, being stronger, through the young males in war. Such groups would increase in size and in area of food-supply, while the combined young males would confirm their several rights to their captured females. Such groups would need names for all other groups in their radius, and these names would probably be the names of plants and animals. Such names would naturally give rise to speculation, as : 'Why are we here Emus, Crows, Hawks, Frogs ?" Myths would be invented: "Emu, Crow, Hawk, or Frog is our ancester, or ancestral friend, or we are evolved out of him. Being our friend and more or less sacred, we must not eat him nor touch a woman also of his blood."

Here, under a taboo, are involved exophagy and exogamy, each with a superstitious sanction. Now we have two marriage prohibitions, if we suppose that children of the Hawk or Crow group keep her group name when she is brought into the Emu group. As daughter of that local group, the Hawk woman's daughter is an Emu, and may not marry an Emu man. But as, by female descent, she is a Hawk, the girl may not marry a man of the local group Emu, who is also a Hawk, as son of a Hawk woman in the Emu group. A man, Emu by local group, Hawk by female descent, must catch a woman, Frog, for example, by female descent, Kangaroo by local group. But to get her while local groups are hostile may imply shedding kindred totem blood in battle. In these circumstances two local groups, Emu and Hawk, may make alliance and connubium. If they do, each local totem-group now becomes a primary division or phratry, each phratry containing different totem-kins by female descent, as in fact the two-linked intermarrying phratries always do (except among the Amuta). The local totem-taboo, and the taboo of totems by female descent, are both now respected, and a tribe with lawful brides accessible within itself is evolved. There has been no motiveless bisection, no equally motiveless segmentation into new totem-groups, no legislation enforcing exogamy on totem-groups not previously exogamous.

66

There remain for explanation the classes whose names are not apparently totemic, and whose members do not bequeath the class-name, either on the male or female side, to their children, who revert to grand-maternal or grand-paternal classnames. Of this arrangement, peculiar to Australia, Herr Cunow offers an explanation which seems to have plausible elements. These classes originally conveyed, in a rough way, a prohibition on marriages within the generation. Each name denoted coevals; the old ones," "the young ones," their names often mean (Cunow). In Australia the young and the old are marked out by degrees of initiation, by duties and services, and by taboos on certain sorts of food. These taboos also applied to marriage. The strong point of Cunow's theory is that the names for the classes do, in many cases, mean "big" and "little," or young" and "old," a point omitted by Durkheim in criticising the hypothesis. Meanwhile, by this time the tribes perfectly understand and can express real relationships by blood, as understood among themselves, and also, as a rule, object, as we do, to too near consanguineous marriages. This is the result of training in the rules, and of reflection on them.-A. LANG, "Australian Marriage Systems," in Folk-Lore, December, 1902.

66

E. M.

The Sociological Meaning of Alcoholism.—In order to give a correct answer to this problem, it is necessary that there should be agreement as to the method of investigation. I must refer to what Dr. Wlassak has said against the subjective method. I recognize the importance of the objective method, but I believe that introspection can give exact data, although they are not subject to such exact psycho-physiological measurement as Professor Kräpelin's method affords. From the memory the facts can be verified well enough, and where we are dealing with complicated phenomena,

we have, in general, no other method. We may cite here the statement of Helmholtz concerning the effect of alcohol on the complex mental processes and note that he used the subjective method. We cannot explain alcoholism without this psychical method or merely by the objective method. I believe psychological observation will agree with what has been verified by the biologists, pathologists, and psychiatrists. What I have to say will be drawn from the experience of a number of observations of others and from my own experience.

1. In the first place, all who had given thought to this question admitted that in excessive drinking they gained no real satisfaction. One feels that a person deceives himself and others in seeking arguments for the defense and praise of drinking. Professor Meyer has said that all alcoholism rests upon an illusion. It is selfdeception. The physical as well as moral indisposition occasioned by intoxication cannot be denied.

2. This psychological judgment of alcoholism gives us the key to the sociological analysis. What is its meaning, considered from the culture-history point of view? I have asked professional men, noted artists, and good psychologists what their motive is for drinking. In short, their answer is that their principal motive is the desire for or pleasure in the Rousseau state of nature. When I call this "practical romanticism" I do not repudiate all romanticism. But I may call attention to the fact that many of the romanticists of this century have desired to vegetate, to lead the life of a plant or an animal. Comte went back to fetichism and attempted to explain the superstitions of civilized men on this basis.. There are many defenders of superstition in modern times, and psychologically I consider the defense of the taste for alcohol the artificial employment of a superstition.

a) The modern man, not only the drinker, has a certain fear of clearness, precision, and purity of thought; he fears intellectualism or vigorous thought. Alcoholism, as Kräpelin shows, injures the power of thinking. The drinker desires and has a need of foggy thinking. Alcoholism is therefore culturally and politically unprogressive, conservative, and radically reactionary.

b) One of the defenses of alcoholism is that it gives something artistic, poetic, idealistic. Noted artists have often said to me: "Ohne Wein gehts nicht!" I admit that there are great artists who pay homage to wine, and much might be said upon this question, yet with reference to art it must be said that there is a distinction between fantasy and the fantastic. Or to say that in alcohol one finds idealism is a remarkable misuse of the word. To use idealism in this sense is to allude to myths and the mythical.

c) Another argument is that alcoholism increases cordiality, good nature, and sentiment. On the contrary, it does not promote, but rather injures, the emotional life. In alcohol one finds, not sentiment, but sentimentality. Investigations of the relation of alcoholism to crime show that it leads to violence rather than to fineness of feeling. With reference to the sexual life, which Professor Torel treated, I can only say here that alcoholism kills true love.

3. Relation of alcoholism to degeneration. While degeneration is not to be found in alcoholism only, it does furnish one of the threatening factors. The modern man is restless, and in the habitual use of alcohol searches for a new Eldorado. From this optimism he passes to a pessimism that leads to dipsomania and suicide.

4. I came to this congress a skeptic. I had not decided whether moderate drinking or total abstinence was right. I have heard the arguments pro and con, and they have made a decisive impression upon me. Not that I think the methods of the anti-alcohol advocates are entirely exact, not that I accept all that is attributed to alcoholism. A number of factors must be considered in this relation, such as nicotine, etc. I am inclined to think that certain arguments—as, for example, that alcohol is unnecessary – -are not sound. There are many apparently unnecessary factors in civilized life which nevertheless serve some purpose.

The scientific argument for the tactics of abstinence- and first of all it is a question of tactics-is sound and convincing. I close with the confession that the argument for the tactics of abstinence convinces me that a life free from alcohol guarantees a higher conception of life, and therewith a happier and purer tone to life, and finally more beautiful conduct in life.-PROFESSOR DR. T. G. MASARYK, “Die sociologische Bedeutung des Alkoholismus," Sonderabdruck aus den Verhandlungen des VIII. Internationalen Congresses gegen den Alkoholismus, Wien, 1901.

E. M.