economic theories of value and distribution; history and theories of private property; study of the extension of state activities into the realm of industry; reading from leading socialists and their critics. Associate Professor Howard.

9. Problems of American democracy. Discussions of the ballot, direct legislation, proportional representation, the machine, political parties, etc. Associate Professor Howard.

PSYCHOLOGY.

6. Psychology of the social relations. Assistant Professor Martin.

EDUCATION.

Education and society. The function of the school as related to the home, church, and other educational institutions and agencies of the community. Special phases of education in large cities and in rural communities, and special problems in connection with social education, as related to defective and criminal classes, foreigners, negroes, etc. Mr. Snedden.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY.

Social integration and disintegration in mediæval and modern Europe.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY.

TEACHERS COLLEGE.

The science of education is recognized as having its basis in psychology, ethics, biology, logic, and sociology, since each of these sciences has significance for education in so far as it throws light upon the nature of man both as an individual and as a member of society. Pedagogy, therefore, is treated not simply historically, nor simply systematically, in a general course, but special courses and lectures are provided in each of the important branches which lie at its foundation.

History of education includes also an account of the political and social theories of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, in so far as they affected education.

2. Sociology. A study of the evolution of society and its present state. Professor Williams.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

FRANK L. TOLMAN.

REVIEWS.

Human Nature and the Social Order.

By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Pp. viii+404.

In terms of his own thesis Dr. Cooley has transformed the social materials of his times into a personal product; his mind has reorganized and reproduced the suggested material in accordance with its own structure and tendency. All will agree that the result is a new and fruitful employment of the common material.” This common material has been accumulating rapidly during the last two decades. James's notable chapter on "The Consciousness of Self;" Royce's papers on social consciousness; Dewey's insistence on the essentially abstract nature of both the individual and society conceived as separate ideas; Tarde's system with its trinity of imitation, invention, and opposition; Baldwin's dialectic of personal and social growth; Ross's vivid presentation of the ways in which society cleverly cozens its members; Giddings's consciousness of kind and analysis of the social mindthese and many others are the current ideas upon which Dr. Cooley has freely drawn. The result is not, however, an "imitation," but an "invention."

In a style which often suggests Professor William James's picturesque conversational methods, the author sets up a thesis by the aid of which he restates many of life's most puzzling problems. There is no academic formality or scholastic strut about the performance. From title-page to finis one looks in vain for a new and eccentric terminology. The book abounds in brilliant obiter dicta. Although the work has a distinct unity, the reader often gets the impression of clever and discriminating essays covering a wide range of human experience. The volume is something of an anomaly in sociological literature, but it is none the less welcome for its very nonconformity. A number of illustrations are drawn from a study of the author's children, but the doting parent is successfully subordinated to the scientific observer.

Dr. Cooley's basal proposition is that human life is the real unity, of which individual and society are merely aspects which have been wrongly set in antithesis. This has led to a series of equally inde

fensible antitheses; e. g., individualism and socialism, free-will and determinism, egoism and altruism. The second of these antitheses is discussed under the heading "Suggestion and Choice." It is asserted that richness and variety of social suggestions compel choice, which thus becomes a true social force, although it is far from being the independent, unconditioned thing of the extreme free-will school. The person is not controlled by an external social will, but through his own will, in working up or synthesizing social suggestions.

Coming to closer quarters with the person, the author traces the process by which intercourse builds up personal ideals. All persons are declared to be imaginary or constructed in the mind out of the materials received through intercourse and interpreted by experience. Society is defined as a relation among personal ideas." The vagueness and ambiguity of this phrase are guarded by the warning that the unquestioned independent reality of a person is not to be confused with the ideas entertained about him; these ideas, however, constitute the immediate social reality.

Sympathy or communion is next discussed, not as a form of pity, but as an imaginative extension of one's life by the interpretation of other persons. A man's range of sympathy thus becomes a measure of his personality. Society, on the other hand, is the totality of the acts of communion by which the person is related to others.

Two chapters are devoted to an analysis of self-feeling or the meaning of "I." The sense of appropriation, the "my feeling," is accepted as an empirical fact and is conceived of as extending itself to things and persons in such a way as to break down the hard-and-fast distinctions between ego and alter. The "looking-glass" self, the image of the self conceived of as entertained by persons, is analyzed and its reaction upon conduct pointed out in detail. Self-assertion is declared to be respectable, unless it is inconsistent with personal or social moral standards, when it is stigmatized as egotistic. To be selfish, then, is to fail to appreciate the social situation as it is generally conceived. The proper antithesis of selfishness is not altruism, but rather right, justice, or magnanimity. A person may act out a narrower or a wider self; there lies the distinction, rather than in a setting off against each other the really interpenetrating self and other. The various personal qualities, pride, vanity, honor, self-reverence, humility, freedom, are interpreted in terms of the "looking-glass" and other types of the self.

Hostility is described as a personally protective activity which at

the same time performs the useful social function of preserving type and eliminating degenerate variation. It is conceived of as developing from an instinctive to a rational, ethical form. Emulation is treated consistently from the personal point of view and is subdivided into conformity, rivalry, and hero-worship. In the case of so-called non-conformity there is not so much a personal protest against all social control as a conformity with some social group or set of ideas other than those immediately, physically present. Hero-worship is an imaginative construction of personal ideals which become true and effective social forces.

Leadership is characterized, not as the creation of original ideas, but as vivid definition and organization of vague tendencies already existent. The leader must have the power to construct in imagination by sympathy the personal lives of his followers. The leader is a true social cause, as independent as a cause can be which is a part of a living whole; "impersonal tendency" is a mere abstraction, and while the phrase may be used, the examination of such tendencies will always disclose personal nuclei.

Conscience in final analysis is always a group thing actually existent in persons. The right is the rational in the highest sense; it is not individual as opposed to social, but rather the social as contrasted with the sensual. The social and personal conscience grows as the result of combining personal influences into higher and higher wholes. Thus personal authority, immediate or indirect, plays the chief part in the moral life, yet this very idea of the person is built up through intercourse, is a social thing. The group standard as a conception resolves itself into ideas about concrete persons.

Personal degeneracy is a variation from type due to failure to achieve personal synthesis. Here again to put heredity and environment in opposition is to misrepresent their relation, which is one of intimate union and co-operation. It is a mistake to attribute remorse and other sentiments to degenerates who are usually at peace with the low grade of social conscience which they have achieved. Crime assumes another aspect when contemplated in this way.

Freedom is "opportunity for right development." Restraint is narrowing or contraction of personality. The person is seldom in conscious conflict with his social milieu because he realizes his higher personal ideals by means of it. Growth of freedom involves certain stress and strain with incidental degeneracy which can never be wholly eliminated, but may be indefinitely reduced.

This brief summary is meant merely to give an idea of the scope and method of Dr. Cooley's book. It affords no adequate view of the argument; it sadly misrepresents the style and form of treatment; and wholly omits the illuminating observations, the sane philosophy of life, and the genuinely stimulating moral tone which enrich and pervade the volume.

As a destructive criticism alike of the artificial individualism which we have inherited from the last two centuries and of the sociological concepts which Mr. Spencer and the "social forces and tendencies" school have popularized, this book renders effective service. The old hard-and-fast distinctions, the clean-cut logical counters "individual” and "society" are badly blurred and fused. Under this concrete, detailed study of the person new complexities emerge and the old, simple labels seem pitifully inadequate.

As a reconciliation of extreme views of individuals and society Dr. Cooley's work is of first-rate importance. In "pouring out the bathing water of individualism he has not spilled out the baby, individuality." In fixing attention upon the life-process as a whole, turning now to the personal, now to the collective, aspect, the author produces the effect of unity with marked success. While his results are stated in less eccentric and peculiar terms, they do not differ fundamentally from the formulations of others. For example:

Society, like every living advancing whole, requires a just union of stability and change, uniformity and differentiation. Conformity is the phase of stability and uniformity, while non-conformity is the phase of differentiation and change. The latter cannot introduce anything wholly, but it can and does affect such a reorganization of existing material as constantly to transform and renew human life. (P. 274.)

This seems to be putting in other language what Professor Baldwin more ponderously sets forth in his dialectic of social growth as the interplay of the particularizing (i.e., differentiating, non-conforming) individual and the generalizing (ie., stable and uniform) society. There is much, too, which reminds one of Professor James. To both James and Baldwin Dr. Cooley expresses indebtedness.

To the habitual inveterate individualist much of the analysis of the person will be far from convincing. The author is by no means a mystic, and he protects himself cautiously, yet one might easily get the impression that "you" and "I" are practically identical, that there are "no fences in this field". a favorite phrase—and that the "self" is a somewhat elusive, not to say amorphous, thing. In dis