the special social sciences-the more general institutions and structures in whose composition these elements are combined being disregarded; next, there is necessity for a knowledge of all the special social institutions; then there will exist the possibility of a general sociology, first concrete, then abstract. This is the methodical order, which is at once logical, dogmatic, and historical or natural.

Such are the successive steps in the study of social science. However, as in all the other natural sciences, the human mind successively learns to descend from superficial consideration of the whole to deeper and deeper consideration of its parts. After the preliminary and the indispensable study of the two great social factors constitutive of every society, land and population, which are the subjects of the antecedent sciences, the first step in social science is, then, the statistical or quantitative evaluation of elementary social phenomena. These phenomena may be studied either apart from the organs, groups of organs, systems, and societies in which they appear, or in connection with the structures in which they are incorporated. Even in their abstract study, certain relationships appear among the phenomena. However, abstract statistics is not an adequate method, since the statistical elements are comparable only under similar circumstances. In proof of this, the theory of averages, for example, has value from the point of view of population only for members of the same variety of the human species. The arithmetical mean of the height of Laplanders and Patagonians considered together would not correspond to the average height of either race considered separately, nor would it correspond to the real general mean of both races. However, when we proceed from the midst of elementary statistical facts to the study of the social institutions in which these facts are combined, we then succeed in distinguishing in the arrangement and in the development of these institutions certain constant and necessary relations, which are independent of all transitory historical forms. Statistics alone cannot furnish us with a general conception of the organization and evolution of all human societies and of humanity. To enable us to approach and understand this

organization and evolution is the function of history-the history of particular social organizations, and, finally, the history of societies themselves in their ensemble as true institutions in the service of the great universal society. Thus in genetics the statistics of marriages and those of legitimate and illegitimate births initiate us perfectly into knowledge of the genetic elements of a given society in a given historical period; but the laws which we are able to derive by these observations are never applicable except to societies having the same institutions as those in connection with which the tabulated unions and births (some legitimate, others illegitimate) take place. Even the most general statistical facts, those relating to births and deaths, are comparable only in connection with institutions. In fact, what is the use of announcing pretended general and abstract laws if it is necessary to add all conditions being equal, and if these equal conditions do not exist? It is only by demonstrating the existence of a constant order of structure and evolution in the particular organs of the societies, and in the societies themselves, that it can be completely shown that there are laws of natality and mortality. It is, then, by studying genetics, not only in its elements, but also in its institutions, and as an integrating factor of societies, that we shall succeed in discovering constant and necessary relations, static and dynamic laws, common to all societies. Although sociology is given a first form by elementary statistics, it is, so to speak, the particular institutions and societies themselves that become the direct materials of sociology. For example, we shall show that a regular order of evolution exists among primitive promiscuity, polyandry, polygamy, the matriarchate, the patriarchate, and the androgynous couple who are politically equal, or rather equivalent, and who are recognized as such in the institutions. From these different special historical forms we shall be able, therefore, to deduce special laws, at first concrete, then abstract. Likewise, taking a further step, we shall advance to the consideration of the static and dynamic conditions of various co-ordinated institutions, at first in particular societies, and finally in societies considered as a whole. Thus we shall also succeed in discovering the general

laws, at first concrete, then abstract, which are applicable to all social types, past, present, and even future, including that grand social type which is in course of formation, the cosmopolitan type. Thus, disregarding successively the accessory variations in order that we may better consider only the constant aspect of societies, including even the constant aspect of the variations themselves, we shall be able to conclude, for example, that the constant genetic function is the preservation and development of the individual by the species and of the species by the individual, with the least possible waste of energy. Moreover, so far as concerns the distribution of wealth, and its special organ, commerce, we shall show that, in spite of all historical variations, its constant function is and will be to lead utilities to the point where they are necessary, with the greatest economy. Contrary to an imperfect view of the case, the commercial function appears accordingly to be as eternal as that of the entire social life of which it is a particular agent.

An attempt like that of Herbert Spencer or that of Auguste Comte to found a social philosophy or sociology without preliminary preparation in statistics, that is to say, in what may he called molecular sociology, or an attempt like that of Ad. Quetelet, with statistics alone, is an undertaking which has been upheld only because sociology is the last-born of the abstract sciences. Unless we deny the unity of scientific method and the existence of social science itself, it is necessary that sociology be brought under this inflexible and necessary discipline.

Does this mean that those who wish to treat of general and abstract sociology must necessarily devote themselves to all the preparatory statistical and historical studies? No; the lives of many generations, much less the life of an individual, would not be sufficient for this. But general abstract sociology can and must constitute itself a scientific specialty, the specialty of abstract generalizations, but on the express condition, as in the case of all the other scientific specialties, that the specialty in general sociology utilize in the most conscientious and methodical manner the reports and materials roughhewn by statistics and fashioned by the historians of the divers social institutions

and of the particular societies. The division of scientific labor forces itself on each generation, and even among the successive generations; in reality, this division of labor, whose negative aspect is most apparent, represents a continued, affective co-operation and collaboration, a single collective work, from the social point of view; it has always existed; the problem is merely to render the work more methodical and coherent by an appropriate organization.

Such is the course that we have followed up to the present time, and that we expect to pursue― considering, however, our individual effort, which has been especially facilitated by the whole of the anterior work, as only a very small contribution to the general contribution. After having studied in the second part of the Introduction to Sociology the social functions and organs by themselves, from the point of view of their structure and functioning, we now have to advance to new syntheses, those of the structure and the life of the ensemble of societies, considering first their structure. We have to investigate the general abstract laws of this structure, that is to say, the laws common to all civilizations at all times and in all places.

Let us recall, then, that this general, abstract structure is based upon knowledge of concrete social structures, including knowledge of their institutions or special organs, and that in both cases the materials are furnished by elementary statistics.

This is why, in conformity to this method, I have for a long time carried on numerous statistical studies, and have given many lectures (some of which have been published) upon certain great civilizations, particularly ancient Peru and Mexico, Egypt, India, China, Iran, Persia, and ancient Greece; this is why I have delivered and published many lectures upon advanced political economy and upon the detailed history of social economy. In short, my readers, and especially my pupils, have been the spectators, and at times the collaborators, of my preparatory studies and the critics of my method. This method advances continually from the simple to the complex, from the general to the special, from the concrete to the abstract; thus

abstract sociology appears to us as the positive philosophy of the inductions of all the social sciences.

It is these inductions, for example, and not simple biological analogies, which will lead us to recognize and to point out that the structure of all society is primarily determined by its economic organization; but in the concrete sociological synthesis this law will lose its absolute character by the very fact that every economic phenomenon is inseparable from the genetic, æsthetic, scientific, ethical, juridic, and political elements; the separation does not exist in abstract analysis. It is thus only that the fundamental character of the economic branch of the social structure is common to all civilizations; we can generalize and make an abstraction of all the local and temporary variations. In concrete reality no social phenomenon is free from mixture; the general abstract laws rise above this concrete character, but without losing sight of it. Let us here recall our definition of a law: A law is a constant and necessary relation between any phenomenon and the conditions under which this phenomenon appears. When the conditions remain the same, the phenomenon remains constant; this is the static aspect of law. When the conditions vary, the phenomenon varies; this is the dynamic aspect of law.

In last analysis, all relations can be reduced to relations of similarity or of difference, either in time or space, or else in time and space together. Laws must not be confused with causes; thus weight and gravitation are not causes. In the scientific sense, causes are the conditions which regularly accompany or precede the appearance of a phenomenon. We especially call the conditions which precede a phenomenon the causes of the same; for example, the ensemble of the conditions constituting springtime is called by us the cause of the blooming of the lilacs, Likewise, we consider low wages as a partial cause of illegitimate births; they regularly precede and accompany the latter. Therefore, the knowledge of causes-that is to say, knowledge of the conditions which precede, pave the way for, and favor the appearance of social phenomena-permits us to foresee the return of these phenomena. Hence, by modifying or suppress