WORK AND PLAY IN ADJUSTMENT TO THE SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENT.

NOTES ON GROOS'S "THE PLAY OF MAN."

GROOS, in accord with current theory, distinguishes work from play by the degree of freedom which the actor feels in the initiation and continuance of his activities. One who is constrained to the performance of a certain task, who has no option in the matter, who is compelled to co-ordinate all of his powers in attaining any end, is said to be working. It is essentially the same in effect whether this compulsion is enforced from without, as when the master forces his vassal to apply himself to any undertaking, or whether it originates within as a profound need that must be ministered to in the way of securing food or clothing or shelter. When a horse is forced to run under the lash of its rider, or when he runs to escape from enemies or to get food, he is working; but when he is turned into the meadow at night and speeds away at his liveliest gait, he is playing, for he could cease acting at any moment if he chose- he feels free to do or not to do—and he is performing just for the delight of the activity itself. Again, when a hungry cat is foraging for food, it is working; there is no spontaneity, no freedom in this act; it must hunt; but when this feeling of coercion is lacking, and the cat is going through all the motions of the chase with a ball of yarn on the floor, simply because it finds pleasure in being active in this way, and not because it is thereby attaining ends essential to selfpreservation, then this is play.

It is generally recognized that the young of practically all animals, of the higher species at any rate, perform many activities that do not appear to be directly and immediately serviceable in self-preservation; and these, Groos shows clearly enough, are for the most part but a more or less exact repetition of the serious activities of the ancestors of the animals at some period in their evolution, Often these activities constitute a rehearsal for the life which the actors will be obliged to live in maturity. The

kitten playing with the ball is perfecting itself in those mental and motor co-ordinations that are involved in the peculiar modes of chase and capture of the feline tribe in its feral state, and so it is getting ready for the serious business of finding its own food when its parents will cease to provide for it. It may happen, of course, that under domestication the kitten will not need to employ the skill it has thus gained; but nature provides against all contingencies by leading the young to rehearse the activities of their ancestors, whatever may be the environmental conditions of the present. Nature seems to have instituted the developmental epoch in ontogenesis for the purpose of recapitulating ancestral development, even though some of the activities recapitulated alienate the individual from the environment in which he is placed at the time. In some cases, of course, an animal not needing to make use of ancestral activities in serious ways will play at them beyond the developmental period. A household tabby, well fed and cared for by the hand of its mistress, will play with a ball of yarn during its entire life; and this is but typical of phenomena that may be witnessed in the conduct of all animals in domestication, and to a lesser degree in that of animals in captivity.

But the point that I want to emphasize is that all activities that can be characterized as work are done under necessity, coercion; the performer does not feel at liberty to discontinue them whenever he chooses. But all that he does over and above what he has to do may be regarded as play. Viewed from the standpoint of the race, it may be that everything the animal does is necessary to the accomplishment of some ultimate end; but, regarding the matter from the standpoint of the individual, we see that he does some things simply because he finds pleasure in the doing of them, and he is not aware that he derives any profit from them. The child playing with the doll may be getting ready for serious activities in maturity, but she is not conscious of any such end, and she feels no necessity of keeping at her play, but continues in her activities merely because of the pleasure they give her.

Now, the situations in which an animal may be placed requir

ing serious efforts in adjustment thereto are, according to Groos, only those in which the somatic well-being of itself or its young is at stake those relating to the obtaining of food and shelter; and in the human species clothing becomes a necessity.

Most of an individual's activities in respect to these necessities will be performed in the spirit of work, while all he does over and above what is required for such adjustment will be play. The activities of courtship, for instance, are not compulsory, as are those which are involved in securing food; so they come under the head of games and plays. In human life all that one does in his intercourse with his fellows for the purpose of obtaining their approbation or good-will or admiration cannot be regarded as work, for he is perfectly free to change his course whenever he elects so to do. Approbation, good-will, admiration are not deep, vital needs like nutrition, and the individual does not feel that he must co-ordinate all his powers in attaining them. If he has time and energy left after attending to serious business, he may amuse himself with these other things; but it is optional with him to do or not to do.

Now, it appears to me that Groos does not attach sufficient importance to the serious character of social situations, in human life at any rate. He fails to allow enough for the necessity of one's adapting himself to the customs and institutions of the society in which he is placed, no matter how little he may thereby gratify any physiological need. It seems that the activities in courtship, for instance, spring out of a necessity quite as profound, whether regarded from the standpoint of the individual or of the race, as that relating to nutrition or to defense against enemies. Looking at this phenomenon as we see it in animal life, we find that the bird, for example, puts forth as much energy, perhaps, in winning its mate as it does in getting its food; it co-ordinates its powers toward the attainment of an end as fully in the one case as in the other. In both cases there is a need, the gratification of which yields pleasure, and in the attainment of which the powers are co-ordinated. It seems probable that the young man goes awooing with something of the same seriousness with which he goes to his desk or his shop,

although the emotional tone of consciousness is not just the same in both instances in the performance of the immediate activities involved. If the young man could get food, clothing, and shelter ready to hand, he would put forth no effort to obtain them; as it is, he is driven by necessity to exert himself to get them; but he can be depended upon to go awooing without any other incentive than the pleasure of the thing itself.

Yet there is really not so much greater freedom in the latter than in the former case, as is illustrated in the instance where a youth is informed by the guardian of his fiancée that he must accumulate a competence before the wedding may take place. He gives himself now to hard labor, which is drudgery in itself, and which he would avoid if he could, just as he is willing to have his father or someone else provide him with food, clothing, and shelter. In neither case do the intermediate activities, the means, give pleasure; but it is the products of these activities that are desired. If certain activities bring valuable products directly, the activities themselves will be endowed with a certain amount of pleasure, and be undertaken in the spirit of play; but if one's efforts are rewarded only at some remote period, they do not partake of any of the pleasurable feeling connected with the rewards, and so they are prosecuted in the spirit of work. A hungry man will set out for his boarding place with as much of spontaneity and joy as he will go awooing, because food is right at the end of the journey; and so, if he could come into the presence of the one he loves without walking five miles of a night, or if he could gain her affections without going to great pains about his attire, it is certain he would give himself no unnecessary trouble. The point is that it is the reward alone in both cases that keeps the attaining activities going; but in desk work this reward usually seems so distant that there is little pleasure in the performance of the drudgery leading thereto; while in the matter of courtship the reward is gained, at least in part, upon the expenditure of comparatively little effort. If interest should be lost in the thing to be achieved, endeavor would cease in the one case as readily as in the other, showing that it is not the endeavor itself that gives the pleasure, but the end to be realized

by it. Again, one would abandon his search for food and shelter about as soon as he would give up his visits to his lady love. Men die for love, and they can do no more for things material. A man will sacrifice comfort at any time for love; he will economize in food and things to keep himself warm in order to purchase things that may make him acceptable in the eyes of one he loves.

Looking now at certain other activities concerned with social adaptation, we find that the author classes them all under play, because they do not minister to any vital need of the organism. Social adjustment in most of its phases is to Groos never as serious and mandatory as physical adjustment; all effort to appear beautiful in the eyes of one's fellows, for example, is looked upon as excessive and playful. Take the matter of dress; we see that much energy is expended by the majority of people in making clothing ornamental, and the author thinks this is all done in the play spirit. A woman puts a good deal more time into the making of her hat than is required to render it serviceable for protection. A very simple headgear would serve this latter purpose rather better than the elaborate affairs now commonly worn, and much of the effort expended on hats is spontaneous, and this gives it the aspect of play. Now, it seems doubtful whether in human society as it is a woman regards the earning of her daily bread as any more serious or requiring greater concentration of powers than the securing of appropriate attire-appropriate in the sense that it must conform to the æsthetic ideals of the community in which she is placed. It is highly probable that it is of greater consequence to have a dress æsthetic than to have it warm or hygienic; it would be easier to put up with cold than with ugly clothing. Who will say that a woman preparing for a ball does not work over her gown in as true a sense as does the woman whose only motive in making a wardrobe is to protect herself from the elements or to earn money? The one woman is not less serious and constrained than the other; the social demand is just as urgent, it seems, as the physical demand, and the individual knows that if he does not heed it he will suffer pains and penalties much as if he had