They have already been active in seeking to secure various privileges, such as special visiting rights, and so forth, from the French Government.

Situations and Governments can change very rapidly, and that it is very important at the same time that we watch missile technologies and developing missile and nuclear capacities that we watch closely the emerging potential and actual threats in the political domain which can be rather readily translated into military threats.

That is obvious, but I could not resist mentioning it.
Senator SNOWE. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Senator.

Staff wrote me a note here when we were talking about the national missile defense system, there is a risk in declaring intent without capability. You might invite the enemy to use the window of opportunity, which is something that I think we could at least consider.

I want to pick up on Ambassador Ellsworth's comments. It is not the intent of the subcommittee in this hearing to indicate that this is a Chicken Little hearing that the sky is falling. It is not. There are clouds on the horizon, but there are always clouds on the horizon, and have been in every decade that we have been a free country, and I do not think we should approach it-this is going to date me considerably-much like that little character in the Li'l Abner cartoon. He used to have a cloud over his head everywhere he went. His first name was Joe, and his last name was very similar to Andy's last name. I think it started with a B, and then it had some consonants in it. But we are not doing that. We are operating in the sunshine.

Let me just go over a couple of dramatic, I think policy directions here. The President has indicated $1.5 billion to help in regards to the antiterrorism effort and $10 billion for the overall effort. That effort will be supported, at least at that amount and perhaps more, by Ted Stevens and Pete Domenici and John Kasich and Bill Young, and our good people on the other side of the aisle as well, because we know that it is an investment.

Each service-it has been my unique opportunity to learn more about emerging threats than I thought I would ever learn. There is an emerging threat every day in front of my doorstep now, if we could only fund the capability from the group that simply brings it to my attention, but each service is stepping up to this with every good intention.

I was just out to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, the intellectual center of the Army, and learning more about their efforts in this, which obviously I will not go into, but with the Army after next, why they are doing that. We are meeting on Monday night, the members of this subcommittee with General Krulak, with the finest fighting force that history has ever seen, in regards to his views as to where we are headed.

We have a national coordinator, Richard Clark, who has already come to visit, and very much aware of trying to reorganize the priorities in the 13 different agencies that are involved in this, and

we are going to try to take a look how we can have an antistovepipe weapon, I guess, that can really coordinate this.

General Boyd here is in charge of a group that is going to make an outstanding contribution, and indicates the significance of Secretary Cohen and the administration to really take a hard look at this.

The eyes and ears of the Intelligence Committee are on the increase. That funding we think is appropriate. I am a member of the Intelligence Committee, and what Ambassador Kirkpatrick said is obviously right on. We are going to get it right.

In the budget situation, Andy referred to it on page 14 of his testimony, and I am going to take the time, and do not worry you can have lunch here, because we are going to close this off, but in that second paragraph the budget problem is made worse, still, as the U.S. military today is afflicted by a condition known as volunteers dilemma. Its primary attributes are a defense program that cannot be sustained by current and projected budgets, and a national security leadership that favors near-term military capability over longterm readiness.

The result is that to resolve the program funding mismatch the Defense Department leaders have continually shifted money programmed for modernization to support the current operations. That is a more succinct way of putting it in regards to those of us on the Armed Services Committee who worried out loud that in many peacekeeping operations we have not been honest in our budgeting, and the procurement and the modernization and the readiness accounts have been lacking. That is the nicest way I can put it.

This committee stood up to that effort in regards to the stress and strain of the military and passed S.4. We are going to have to do some paring back in that regard, but I think there is a growing awareness that we cannot do that any more.

John Hamre said just the other day that if, in fact, we put the ground troops into Kosovo-and that is a mighty big if, and there is going to be serious debate about it in this Congress and a lot of consultation that is $2 billion a year at least, for how many years we do not know, but at least we are coming back with a supplemental where we will have honest budgeting which gets at the problem raised by Andy.

The last thing that I would mention is that I think all of the witnesses have indicated some positive things. Bob Ellsworth with the test bed, and Andy with a whole series of suggestions in his testimony, and we will look eagerly for the report by General Boyd, and there are some political things we are trying to do, and by we I am talking about Congress and the administration.

I remember 2 years ago when Ted Stevens indicated would I like to go to Russia on a trip to see first-hand some of the problems there. I did not know at the time that we were going to also go to North Korea. We were happy to get in. We were happier to get out. Ambassador Kirkpatrick has hit that right on the head. As an alleged expert on agriculture I was there to try and work out something politically to work through a third country to get them accustomed to accepting general trade practices so they would end the famine and end the business, or their real problem of having an ag

riculture that cannot support its people, not to mention the surreal policy decisions by Kim Jung II.

Well, that fell through, but we are still making the effort, and in South Korea they are still making the effort, so there are things you can do politically even in the most difficult cases that can address some of these things.

We are talking about sanctions with India and Pakistan. I am talking about, again, using agriculture as a tool for peace, as a breakthrough with Iran. In Russia we had a program, and the humanitarian assistance that is being provided in China, hopefully a more pragmatic approach, so all is not lost, and it is not going to take a budget-buster to get at these things. It just takes a fresh approach to try to determine where we are.

You have been extremely helpful to us in trying to have us better focus on these priorities, and you have also recommended some very positive things.

This is the get-off line so you can get off to lunch in about 2 minutes, and Ambassador, if you have problems with your battery, why, we will help you crank it up.

Would any of the witnesses like to conclude with any kind of a comment, please? If not, then without objection, all members of the subcommittee may submit questions for the record that we can in turn certainly bring to the attention of the witnesses.

Thank you very much, and the subcommittee is adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

Senator SANTORUM. Ambassador Ellsworth, the administration has been reluctant to relax export controls on encryption technology, technology that scrambles data or communications to keep intruders from gaining access, fearing it could hinder intelligence-gathering capabilities. However, high-technology companies argue that the restrictions hinder their ability to compete against foreign manufacturers. Should the administration keep encryption tightly regulated or allow the export of this technology? If export is allowed, should encryption technology be placed on the munitions list for oversight and control purposes?

Ambassador ELLSWORTH. The national interest no longer requires strict prohibition of the export of technology that scrambles data or communications. Not only are there non-U.S. sources for such technology-which render certain U.S. restrictions less than fully effective but also certain advances on our part make some of these exports less dangerous to our intelligence gathering capabilities. Even so, such exports should be subject to oversight and control under the munitions list.

Senator SANTORUM. Admiral Ellsworth, prevention of WMD terrorism begins with intelligence. In the past there have been problems with a lack of coordination between the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA and the foreign and domestic law enforcement activities of the FBI. Have PDD 62 and PDD 63 solved many of the interagency impediments that existed in the past? If there is still room for improvement, what additional reforms or changes are needed? Would the creation of a shared Government-wide data base on terrorist activities aid in the process of information sharing?

Ambassador ELLSWORTH. PDD 62 and PDD 63 call for greater interagency cooperation and coordination in the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding WMD terrorism. There is much room for improvement, and the test bed program I urged in my testimony would be one good way to begin learning how to deal with the complexities and interdependencies involved. I do not recommend a new, special "Czar" for this purpose.

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 1999

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

INFORMATION WARFARE AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Roberts and Bingaman. Committee staff members present: Todd L. Payne, special assist

ant.

Professional staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV, Pamela L. Farrell, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional staff member, Peter K. Levine, minority counsel, and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier, III, assistant to Senator Santorum; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway, II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and G. Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN Senator ROBERTS. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets today to seek testimony on information warfare and critical infrastructure protection. Let me introduce the witnesses.

General Robert T. Marsh is chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection; Mr. Michael A. Vatis, the Deputy Assistant Director and Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center at the FBI; Mr. Arthur L. Money is the Senior Civilian Official at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; and Major General John Campbell is the Director of the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense.

We are privileged today to hear from General Marsh, whose work on the President's commission laid the foundation for Presidential Decision Directive 63, the administration's policy on critical infrastructure protection.

I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Vatis on the National Infrastructure Protection Center, which was created pursuant to PDD 63, and from Mr. Money on the Department of Defense's (DOD) current progress in securing the defense information infrastructure. As we all know, PDD-63 sets forth an ambitious schedule for protecting the country's critical infrastructures. It sets a goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, with significantly increased security for Government systems by the year 2000.

For its part, the DOD has recently taken a number of significant steps by establishing a joint task force for computer network defense, a defense joint counterintelligence program, a defense computer forensics laboratory, and a critical infrastructure protection plan.

The Department also seeks to transform the defense information infrastructure into a defendable global network information enterprise. The subcommittee looks forward to hearing more about these initiatives.

The subcommittee also looks forward to elevating the adequacy of current funding for dealing with the threat of information warfare and the many other challenges associated with the protection of our critical infrastructures. I am going to place the rest of my statement in the record, and turn to my distinguished colleague for any comments he might like to make at this time.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

The subcommittee will come back to order. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets today to receive testimony on information warfare and critical infrastructure protection. Let me introduce our witnesses for the public portion of our hearing: General Robert T. Marsh (USAF Ret.) served as chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection; Mr. Michael A. Vatis is Deputy Assistant Director and Chief of the National Infrastructure Protection Center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. Arthur L. Money is the Senior Civilian Official at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; and Major General John Campbell (USAF) is the Director of the Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense.

We are privileged today to hear from General Marsh, who's work on the President's Commission laid the foundation for Presidential Decision Directive 63, the Administration's policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection. I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Vatis on the National Infrastructure Protection Center, which was created pursuant to PDD-63, and from Mr. Money on DOD's current progress in securing the Defense Information Infrastructure.

PDD-63 sets forth an ambitious schedule for protecting the country's critical infrastructures: it sets a goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, with significantly increased security for government systems by the year 2000.

For its part, DOD has recently taken a number of significant steps by establishing a Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense, a Defense Joint Counterintelligence Program, a Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, and a Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan. DOD also seeks to transform the Defense Information Infrastructure into a defendable Global Networked Information Enterprise. The subcommittee looks forward to hearing more about these initiatives.

The subcommittee also looks forward to evaluating the adequacy of current funding for dealing with the threat of information warfare and the many other challenges associated with the protection of our critical infrastructures. When the President's Commission completed its report in October 1997, it concluded that: "Federal