Bomb Attack in Saudi Arabia: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, July 9 and September 18, 1996, Volume 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997 - 154 pages Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. |
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actions additional Air Force American antiterrorism assessment blast Bosnia BRARY casualties CENTCOM chain of command Chairman THURMOND CINC combatant commander committee CONGRES CONGRESS THE LIBRARY Department of Defense deployed Dhahran Downing Downing's ensure EXON facilities fence force protection measures funding going Gulf intelligence Iraq issue Joint Chiefs Joint Task judgment Khobar Towers bombing Kuwait leadership LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ment mission Operation Southern Watch OPM-SANG Peay perimeter personnel policies priority question RARY recommendations region request responsibility RESS risk Riyadh Saddam Hussein Saudi Arabia Schwalier Secretary of Defense Secretary PERRY security measures Senator BRYAN Senator EXON Senator GLENN Senator KEMPTHORNE Senator LEVIN Senator NUNN Senator ROBB Senator WARNER Shali SHALIKASHVILI Southern Watch Southwest Asia Staff Task Force terrorist attack terrorist threat Thank tion troops U.S. Central Command U.S. forces U.S. military United USCENTCOM vulnerability
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Page 153 - To this end, the study is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).
Page 150 - He is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is the US military representative for collective defense arrangements in the Pacific.
Page 122 - Wheel-turning monarch ... and a third ; . . and a fourth . . . and a fifth . . . and a sixth . . . and a seventh king, a.
Page 117 - ... also advised the CINCs of the increasingly serious nature of terrorism and have solicited their views for incorporation into this review. It is anticipated that a final report, including a plan of action, will be completed on March 30, 1984. 10. Military Preparedness to Defend Against Terrorism. — The Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education, and training necessary to defend against and counter...
Page 95 - The new directive also implements other new initiatives I have identified elsewhere in this report. • Give local commanders operational control with regard to force protection matters. Under the traditional peacetime command and control arrangements, force protection is the responsibility of the CINC, through the service component commanders, to the local commanders in the field. In the US Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes Saudi Arabia, the service component commanders...
Page 92 - Saudis, were recognized but not considered a threat to American military security. Since our personnel worked on Saudi military installations and lived in guarded compounds, any risks were seen as manageable by maintaining a low profile and following standard personal security practices. Force protection was actively pursued, but in the context of a stable and secure environment Following the November OPM/SANG bombing, that environment was re-evaluated, the threat level assessment was raised to "High"...
Page 94 - And our troops cannot successfully complete their tasks if they are required to live in bunkers 24 hours a day. How then can we accomplish our missions without compromising their success or abandoning them altogether? The answer is that we will require tradeoffs in other areas, such as cost, convenience, and quality of life. This is a tough answer for our men and women in uniform who will live in less comfortable surroundings and spend more time avoiding and defending against terrorism, and it is...
Page 117 - Page 15, the commission concluded that the marines were not trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat in Lebanon.
Page 22 - Staff and military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. Ron's desire as Chief was to "calm the waters.
Page 78 - Defense; (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands; (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands; (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; (6) to provide...