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2. Relationships of the California Fishing Industry to the Fisheries of the United States.
a. In 1972, California led all States in value of landings, and second in volume of landings.
b. In 1972 and for the 24th consecutive year, San Pedro, California, in terms of landing value, was the nation's leading commercial fishing port.
3. Relationships of Tuna to the Fisheries of the United States.
a. In 1972, as to Canned fish products processed for human consumption, CANNED TUNA represented 73.9% of the total value of all such products processed in the United States. In 1941, tuna's share was 13.9%, in 1961, it was 49.5%.
b. In 1972, TUNA values established at four levels: to the fishermen at landing, to the processor at wholesale, to the importer and to the exporter, exceeded One Billion Dollars:
$120, 629, 000
637, 302, 000 246, 845, 000
2, 000, 000
1, 008, 776, 000
(1) In 1972, for the entire fisheries of the United States, the values were as follows:
$765, 000, 000
1, 980, 056, 000 1, 233, 292, 000 19, 757, 000
3, 998, 105, 000
(2) Thus, for 1972, TUNA represented 25.2% of the entire United States fisheries in terms of value at four different levels.
B. ECONOMIC IMPACT IN CALIFORNIA OF THE PETROLEUM ALLOCATION PROGRAM ON THE U.S. TUNA FLEET
1. If the Tuna Fleet is unable to satisfy its fuel needs in California, then landing values for the fleet will fall substantially. This will result in a substantial decline in total landings value for the entire California fishing fleet and in particular for the category designated as "cannery fish".
a. As dollar flow declines for the fleet, other segments of the marine industry become immediately adversely affected, such as canners, ship suppliers, repair facilities and shipyards. In San Diego alone, annual dollar volume for shipyard repair ranges from $20 to $28 million.
b. Economists have advised that the multiple formula applicable to the "new wealth" generated by the tuna landed and processed in California ranges from 4 to 7. Using this range of measurement, the dollar impact of the tuna fleet landings in California in 1972 ranged from about $300 million to $525 million. During the period 1939 through 1970, the total value of tuna landed and shipped into California was $1,511,717,880. Using these same measurement ranges, one could safely conclude that the industry has contributed beneficial impact on the economy of the State for a number of decades.
2. A failure to establish California as a location where tuna vessels can obtain their fuel needs will have a negative impact in this State's competition with other tuna processing centers, such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii and American Samoa. Tuna vessels will tend to land in locations where fuel can be easily obtained. Should California be able to establish itself as a place where fuel needs can be satisfied, then tuna vessels will tend to be attracted to California, unload their catches, repair and supply their vessels and thereby uniquely enrich the economy impact of California fishing industry to the general economy of the State. The fuel crisis provides California with a challenge to either impair or strengthen its position within a world industry that provides the United States with 50% of the World's tuna catch.
AMERICAN TUNABOAT ASSOCIATION,
San Diego, Calif., November 8, 1973.
I. THE PROBLEM UNDER THE PETROLEUM ALLOCATION PROGRAM
Supplies of diesel fuel are needed to "allocate exceptional hardships" to the U.S. Tropical Tuna Fleet on an emergency basis prior to January 1, 1974, and quite possibly in February/March, 1974.
The 1972 base period supply volume attributed to the Tuna Fleet is not realistic because (1) a substantial number of tuna vesels were not in business during the entire base period, and (2) the Tuna Fleet has experienced substantial increase in fuel requirements from the 1972 base period supply levels.
a. In 1973, sixteen (16) new Tuna Seiners have entered the fleet, and seven (7) of these vessels are not scheduled to commence their maiden trip until 1 January 1974, although two (2) vessels are attempting to start their first voyage in November, 1973. (Please see Tab 1, third page)
b. In 1972, fifteen (15) new Tuna Seiners entered the fleet, however, only six (6) of these vessels commenced their maiden voyage prior to April 15, 1972. Therefore, 1972 is not a realistic reflection of the actual fishing year for at least nine (9) other Seiners. (Please see Tab 1, first and second pages)
c. In 1972, about twenty-six (26) Tuna Seiners operated in the South Atlantic from about June-November, 1972, off the coast of West Africa. Therefore, their fuel purchases in foreign countries would not be reflected by utilizing 1972 as a base period for fuel purchases in the various regions established by the Mandatory Allocation Program.
d. Each new Tuna Seiner has a fuel carrying capacity of 200,000 gallons per fishing trip. Each new Tuna Seiner should average three fishing trips per calendar year. Some vessels have made five (5) trips. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for each of these twenty-five (25) new Seiners to consume, on the average, at least 600,000 gallons per calendar year or to project 15 million gallons as the 1974 fuel consumption level for this fleet. Such new requirement was not in existence for 1972.
e. Utilizing the records of the eight San Diego Fuel Facilities servicing the Tuna Fleet, the record reveals that a substantial increase in fuel requirements can be recorded for comparative periods in 1971, 1972, and 1973. (Please see Tab 2)
1971.. 1972 1973.
5, 347, 000 8, 989, 000 11, 288, 000
f. Making an analysis of the days operated from port by the Tuna Fleet for the periods 1971-Sept. 1973 reveals that a substantial increase in fuel requirements over the 1972 base period supply levels can be demonstrated. The InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) duplicates the logbook records of all U.S. flag tuna vessels for a variety of purposes, including a determination of total days absence from port of each vessel. With the assistance of the IATTC we have been able to establish the total days away from port the Tuna Fleet has recorded in their logbooks. (Please see Tab 3.) Thus in 1972, the fleet experienced a total of 36,327 days from port. Although records are incomplete for 1973, mainly because a large number of vessels left for Africa in June and July, the trend for 9 months in 1973 reveal an increase in total days absence. In addition, an analysis of the documentation reveals an increase in the number of large tuna vessels experiencing a longer average annual days absence from port. (Please see Tab 4.) Thus, while the analysis reveals that the entire fleet averaged for 1971, about 199 days at sea, for 1972, about 202 days at sea and for the incomplete trips for 9 months in 1973, about 162 days at sea, the larger Seiners (>400 short tons carrying capacity) have on the average a greater period at sea and therefore, greater annual fuel consumption. For example:
Average annual days absence from port for U.S. tuna fleet, 1971-September 1973
Reference to Tab 5 reveals about a range from 4 to 9 million gallon increase from 1972 to 1972 levels. In 1973, we are estimating an increase of total gallon usage of 2 to 4 million gallons on the basis of such data.
II. SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TUNA FISHERY COMPLICATING THE FUEL
A. The Yellowfin Tuna Conservation program implemented in the Eastern Pacifio Based upon the Yellowfin Tuna Conservation rules recommended by the IATTC and implemented by the Federal Government and the State of California, the U.S. Tuna Fleet will commence its Tuna season commencing January 1, 1974. An annual quota is established for all fishing fleets of all countries on the basis of "first come, first serve". A closure date is established by the IATTC, and any vessel departing after that date is subject to severe production controls. Thus, the pressure is on the U.S. fleet to get to sea ready to fish on 1 January 1974, or lose out to foreign competition. The fleet is in a "time race" for the tunas and also in a race to get into port before the closure date so as to become eligible for the last fishing trip of 1974 free of production controls by the Federal Government. Since 1966, the open season for Yellowfin Tuna has been reduced from about 10 months to less than 3 months, as revealed by the following:
In 1974, the Closure date is expected no later than the first week of March. This is because the growth of the International Tuna Fleet and the limit of the quota to be slightly larger than the carrying capacity of such Tuna Fleet.
Thus, the special circumstances facing the Tuna Fleet that complicates the fuel allocation problem is the necessity for the fleet to respond on January 1, 1974 and prior to the 1974 Closure Date by getting to sea fully supplied with fuel.
See Tab 6, illustrating the Yellowfin Regulatory Area established in the Eastern Pacific by the IATTC.
B. The mobility of the Tuna Fleet requiring inter-regional coordination of cooperation complicated by the requirement of certain vessels in the fleet to obtain fuel in foreign countries
The U.S. Tuna Fleet serves U.S. Tuna Canners in California, Puerto Rico, Oregon, Hawaii and American Samoa. It primarily fuels in California, the Panama Canal Zone, and in Puerto Rico during the Yellowfin Tuna open season in the Pacific. During the Yellowfin Tuna Closed Season, the large tuna seiners in the Tuna Fleet adjust to the conservation program by fishing outside the regulatory area in the Pacific within waters close to Hawaii and by fishing in the South Atlantic.
In addition, under the complicated Yellowfin Tuna regulation program, it is necessary for Tuna Vessels to seek additional fuel during a trip, at the Canal Zone, or in Costa Rica or in Mexico.
The present mandatory Fuel Allocation Program does not apply to the Tuna Fleet in a realistic manner. This is because a California based tuna vessel in 1972 might have been required to purchase more fuel in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, or in foreign ports, yet, fishing conditions might require the vessel to purchase all of its fuel required in California. Uncertainty in fishing conditions caused by the mobility of the tuna fishery may require a tuna vessel to seek fuel from a number of the geographical regions established under the Mandatory Fuel Allocation Program. Thus, to require a tuna vessel operator to look toward 1972 as to where he purchased the fuel and how much would be more than not a unrealistic basis to determine his fuel allocation for the fishing year of 1974.
III. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM
1. Assure the Tuna Fleet sufficient fuel to leave port on January 1, 1974 and on their last "free trip" under the Yellowfin Tuna Regulation Program, whether the vessels fuel in Region IX, Region II or Region IV.
2. Allow each Tuna Vessel that operated from any Region during the entire base period of 1972, 100% of the fuel he purchased during such period, permitting him to make purchases in any Region at any time during 1974.
3. As to Tuna Vessels that did not operate during the entire base period of 1972 either because it was not in business in 1972, or because it operated outside of the 10 Regions established by the Petroleum Allocation Program, to be permitted an annual fuel allocation established jointly by the fuel facility and the supplier.
Tuna vessels have been advised by suppliers of diesel fuel that it was going to be difficult filling the needs of the fleet based on the allocations they are receiving.
If vessels do not sail on schedule, they will not be able to produce the much needed fish which is in short supply. There have been several new vessels added to the fleet during the past year. Thus the fuel needs will be significantly greater than in previous quarters.
Total diesel fuel sales to the San Diego tuna fleet totaled 31.0 million gallons in 1972; 33.8 million gallons (includes estimates) in 1973. Projected sales for 1974 are 40.0 million gallons.
Fish and fishery products serve as an important source of protein food which is now scarce and is expected to become
Total annual days absence from port for tuna vessels based in U.S. ports