TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1987. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE WITNESS LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION INTRODUCTION Mr. CHAPPELL. The Committee will please come to order. Today we will conduct a full day of hearings on the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Department of Defense is requesting $5.2 billion for SDI in fiscal year 1988. This represents an increase of 63 percent over the fiscal year 1987 level. The Strategic Defense Initiative is one of the most controversial programs in the Defense budget due to its high priority within the Administration, the rapid increase in proposed funding, and discussions of phased deployment. The Committee will receive testimony on a wide range of SDI issues today, including Phase I (early) Deployment, the fiscal year 1987 Supplemental, the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, and a number of management issues. The principal witness today is Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, Jr., Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. General Abrahamson, the Committee welcomes you once again this year. We will put your statement in the record at this point, and we would encourage you to summarize as you see fit and give us a chance to get to questions which we think are critical to advancement of this program. [The statement of General Abrahamson follows:] STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON Initiative. Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the Defense Subcommittee today. As the Administration requests funding for the fourth and fifth years of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), it is useful to look ahead at the challenges that remain for this very important March of this year will mark the fourth anniversary of President Reagan's decision to establish the Strategic Defense Initiative. I am pleased to report that in research and technology development, many exciting developments have taken place over these four years. As a result of their active interest and participation in the SDI Program, our nation's scientific, industrial, and academic communities have fostered some of the finest, most sophisticated technological advances of this decade. However, while technological advances have filled us with hope and spirit of what our research might produce, we cannot ignore the fact that some aspects of this world have not changed. As was the case four years ago, and is even more apparent today, the Soviet Union is engaging in a determined, steady buildup of strategic nuclear weaponry improving their capabilities across a wide spectrum of strategic warfare. Moreover, Soviet strategic defenses are extensive and growing. The Soviet Union has the only established anti-ballistic missile system, the only antisatellite system, the most comprehensive air defense system and the most intensive research and development effort in the application of new technologies to ballistic missile defense in the world today - ground- and space-based las ers, particle beams and microwave weapons, interceptors, heavy lift space transportation vehicles, and tracking and surveillance systems. The President has charged the Department of Defense with defining real options for using defense to counter the Soviet progress in improving strategic offensive and defensive forces. SDI could provide a hedge against the real potential for Soviet efforts to exploit emerging ballistic missile defense technologies and possible breakout from the ABM Treaty. The essence of the SDI Program, as directed by the President is to provide effective defense options for a future decision to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses. Since the ballistic missile threat is the most capable of accomplishing a disarming first strike, we are conducting research to find ways to defend against this threat, thereby providing a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening strategic stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies. I must emphasize that the SDI is not a bargaining chip to be given up for arms reduction but instead is a catalyst that encourages meaningful arms reduction, yet remains as insurance against Soviet cheating or breakout. Initially, the SDI Organization (SDIO) based its plan to fulfill our goals on an independent scientific assessment, the Fletcher Commission Study. We designed a vigorous, goal-oriented program designed to ensure that the researchers have a defined target and clear knowledge of the The SDIO was directed to place prin desired capabilities. cipal emphasis on technologies using non-nuclear concepts. Research on nuclear directed energy weapons is being done to develop an understanding of the potential of this technology a hedge against existing Soviet work in this area. and as Despite substantial budget reductions by the Congress, we must continue to strive for a balanced program. We must provide the technologies that yield the defense capabilities needed. This requires that we pursue sensor/interceptor concepts for each phase of the ballistic missile flight, and the battle management and command, control and communications (BM/C3) capabilities to guide and manage the overall system. Balance also requires that we not only validate technology before any decision is made to develop and deploy a defense, but also develop the technology base. Our ability to address the continually increasing Soviet capabilities rests with having a vigorous technology that validates the feasibility of our most advanced defense concepts. ancing these competing needs in a well-defined investment strategy is the essence of the management challenge. Bal To meet our goal, we have defined a basic investment strategy with three major thrusts. First, we are bringing the most mature technologies to the point that if the decision were made to proceed, the job of developing and deploy -3 ing the individual system concepts would be largely one of engineering. Second, we are pursuing the development of emerging technologies that have the potential for major improvements in defense effectiveness. And third, we are ensuring that an investment be made in innovative ideas that hold the promise of great success, although they present a higher technical risk. These innovations could yield a high payoff in achieving a thoroughly reliable defense. Our intent has been to demonstrate technical feasibility of effective strategic defense and to provide a range of effective defense options to the President, the Congress, and the American people. We have made great progress in this regard. But while the Congress has increased SDI funding every year, the differences between what the Administration has requested to conduct a balanced research program and what the Congress has appropriated, are so large that if this trend continues, it will have a very substantial detrimental impact on the Program. Large budget reductions from the FY 1985 and FY 1986 requested levels caused a reduction in the number of promising technologies being pursued in parallel and increased the difficulty of realizing adequate solutions to specific tech nical issues. Additional sizable reductions made in FY 1987 have placed SDIO in a position where simply scaling back some technologies is no longer viable. Specifically, some portions of the SDI Program have been slowed approximately |