MAP MEECN MIL STD MIP MLS MOU MRT MSE MSIP MST MTBF MTM/D MTV MYP Nacelle NASA NASP NATO Navstar NCA NDS NGT NMCC NORAD NWS O&M O&ST OFT OMG OSD OTH-B OUTSIZE OWRM PAA PACBAR PALT PAM-D II PARCS PAVE PAWS PBA PE PLSS PIAS POS PPAC APPENDIX C Munitions Acquisition Plan Modular Control Equipment Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Model Installation Program Microwave Landing Systems Memorandum of Understanding Miniature Receive Terminal Manned Spacecraft Engineer Multistaged Improvement Program Missile Surveillance Technology Mean Time Between Failure The metallic encasement in which an aircraft engine is National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Aerospace Plane North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging National Command Authority Nuclear Detonation Detection System National Military Command Center North Warning System Operations and Maintenance Order and Ship Time Operational Flight Trainer Operational Maneuver Group Office of Secretary of Defense Cargo which will fit into only a C-5 or C-17 due to physical Other War Reserve Materiel Primary Authorized Aircraft Pacific Barrier Radar Procurement Administrative Leadtime Payload Assist Modules-Delta Class II Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System SLBM Radar Warning System Production Base Analysis Program Element Precision Location Strike System PLSS Intelligence Augmentation System Product Performance Agreement Center PRAM RV QSAS QOT&E R&D RF RFP R&M SAC SACDIN SBSS SCF SCPS SCSC SDI SDIO SDS SEAR SECDEF SFW SHF SICBM SII SINCGARS SLAR SLBM SLFCC SOF SRAM II STOL/MTD STP STS TAAF TAC TACS TACMS TARS TDRS TEWS TFW TJS TLCC APPENDIX C Productivity, Reliability, Availability, Maintainability Quick Start Auxiliary Power Unit Qualification Test and Evaluation Qualification Operational Test and Evaluation Research and Development Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Request For Proposal Reliability and Maintainability Strategic Air Command Strategic Air Command Digital Network Space Based Space Surveillance Satellite Control Facility Survivable Collective Protection System Strategic Conventional Standoff Capability Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Support Equipment Acquisition Review Sensor-Fused Weapon Super High Frequency Small Intercontinential Ballistic Missile Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Survivable Low Frequency Communications System Special Operations Forces Short Range Attack Missile II Strategic Relocatable Target Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Satellite Test Center THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1987. NAVY SUBMARINE NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM WITNESSES ADMIRAL KINNAIRD R. MCKEE, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION VICE ADMIRAL BRUCE DeMARS, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF REAR ADMIRAL J. GUY REYNOLDS, UNITED STATES NAVY, SUBMARINE INTRODUCTION Mr. CHAPPELL. This afternoon, the Committee receives testimony on the Navy's submarine nuclear propulsion program, with an emphasis on the SSN-21 attack submarine still in development, but moving into production. The witnesses today are Admiral McKee, U.S. Navy, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, and Vice Admiral DeMars, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. Gentlemen, we welcome you before this Committee today, and offer a special welcome to Admiral DeMars, who is here for the first time. Admiral McKee, your prepared statement will be placed in the record. Please feel free to summarize your statement at this time. Admiral MCKEE. Mr. Chairman, you have my statement. I would like to propose that Admiral DeMars speak first about the military requirements for the submarines military performance. I will then talk about the propulsion plant and the hull and the development of the submarine itself. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DEMARS Admiral DEMARS. To begin, I would like to point out the cost effectiveness of the submarine force, because I think that is important in the sort of decisions that you have to make. Today, our strategic submarines provide about one-half of the ballistic missile warheads in this country's inventory with ten percent of the Navy budget, counting everything, the building of the submarines, the R&D, people, overhauls, and so on. That is 25 percent of the OSD strategic budget. Today we have 97 nuclear attack submarines. Our force level is 100, so we are almost at our share of the 600-ship Navy. That force costs another ten percent of the budget, including the repair the overhaul, people cost, spare parts, et cetera. |