cal information that the Treaty calls for transfer. We can get the information if we will ratify the Treaty.

Second, these evidences of Soviet explosions beyond the limit are very ambiguous, very dubious, and there are lots of explanations. For one thing, the Treaty itself, in the documents that were exchanged at the time, provided that each side might well have an observed explosion that looked larger than 150 kilotons because of the ambiguities, but that if this only happens once or so a year, it is no great problem.

Now, the number of Soviet explosions that have perhaps gone over the 150 limit have not exceeded that number; in fact, they haven't reached it in the years since the treaty.

Dr. BARKER. Except the Soviets have never offered that explanation of what has been observed.

Mr. COLBY. It is looking at it and seeing what the statement exchanged at the time was.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Could I clarify one point? Mr. Colby has, I think, undertaken in good faith to characterize the administration position vis-a-vis a Comprehensive Test Ban, and I think that he may have mis-stated the bottom line. Our position is not that we must get rid of all nuclear weapons before we could contemplate entering into a Comprehensive Test Ban. Our position, rather, is that the security of the U.S. must not depend upon our nuclear arsenal if we are to enter into an argeement that is fundamental inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent.

I, for one, could contemplate a day, a millennium perhaps, when the U.S. no longer needs to have nuclear weapons for deterrence, but may still have them, and it is conceivable under such circumstances a Comprehensive Test Ban could be accepted, but that day is not today, and it is many years off, if ever.

Thank you.

Dr. BARKER. Congressman Chappell, I would like to thank you for holding these hearings and providing us an opportunity to express the views we have expressed this evening. My concern I expressed as someone in charge of the U.S. talks on nuclear testing was genuine and real. I do not view the proposed measure as one which would be helpful to my responsibilities there. I think the amendment offers us the gamble of some future in which we don't know how to operate to maintain our deterrent and our national security. We know we can maintain the reliability of our deterrent under existing circumstances where we can test up to 150 kilotons. Nobody knows whether we can maintain a reliable deterrent at a threshold lower than 150 kilotons under the current circumstances. To me, that is a dangerous step to take in the absence of any testimony from anyone who bears the responsibility for certifying the reliability of our deterrent that we can go to one kiloton and still maintain a reliable deterrent. Those technical people who speak in favor of a one kiloton threshold bear no responsibility for certifying to anyone that our stockpile is reliable and credible and that it constitutes a crediable deterrence. They are all people sitting at the side lines guessing that if they had the responsibility, they would do it in a different way.

But the people with the responsibility are united in saying they need to be able to test up to 150 kilotons in order to maintain a reliable deterrence.

Mr. COLBY. I want to thank you also for having been invited to testify here.

General VESSER. I would like to say that some Member suggested that their proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban would affect both sides equally. I don't believe that this is really the case because of the differences that various witnesses have talked about in both weapons design philosophy and the number and types of weapons that either side has. The Soviets have fewer, at least we believe they have fewer, designs. They are heavier, they are simpler.

We know that our designs are high technology, that they are tailored for specific applications. We believe that over a prolonged period if we were to enter into an arrangement, such as has been discussed today, it could work to our disadvantage because we believe that our systems, because they are more complex and because we try to make them safer, require testing to be certain that they are reliable. We do not feel that we can take any risks with our nuclear deterrent. We believe that it must be credible so that we can keep the peace.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear today.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Gentlemen, let me express the appreciation of the entire Committee for you coming up here on such short notice. We didn't really intend to get into this area or we would have taken it up a little bit earlier, and so we really billed this as a briefing, and we want to thank each of you for your participation.

Mr. Colby, we appreciate you coming up on such short notice. We appreciate all of you trying to give your own straight-forward views, even though they might differ. We think you have done us and the Congress a good service, and so we do commend you for speaking freely. Your have my sympathy in trying to handle your job over there in these negotiations.

Thank you, gentlemen.

We stand in recess until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1987.

ACCESS TO SPACE

WITNESS

HON. EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
INTRODUCTION

Mr. CHAPPELL. The Committee will please come to order. This morning we are going to hold a hearing on various programs which will ensure the Defense Department's future access to space. The Shuttle disaster and the two Titan-34D launch failures have seriously impacted DoD's timetable for launching numerous unclassified and classified satellites. A number of programs are now underway to remedy this situation.

The purpose of today's hearing is to give the Committee an overview of:

One, the status of DoD's recovery of its space launching capability; and

Two, the outlook for the development of and requirements for new launching capabilities.

Topics to be covered at today's hearing include:

The outlook for the Shuttle program;

The potential launching requirements and capabilities of new launch vehicles including the National Aerospace Plane and the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle; and

The current status of various recent initiatives to develop new Expendable Launch Vehicles, ELVs, including:

The Titan IV, formerly called the Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle; and the Delta II, formerly called the Medium Launch Vehicle.

During the first hour of this hearing we will hear testimony on the DoD's plans for launching its various unclassified satellites. At 11:00 o'clock this morning, the hearing will proceed into a "special access" session and we will discuss the outlook for launching various highly classified payloads. This afternoon the Committee will hear testimony from NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

This morning, we have with us a very special guest of our Committee and one with whom we will be working very closely and whose voice we honor and cherish and appreciate. We have asked him to sit in so that we might better understand between us the problems which we have on the space program and how we can all best work together to solve it. We are delighted to have with us Congressman Robert Roe.

This morning's witness is the Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Edward C. Aldridge. Mr. Secretary, if you have a state

ment, we will place it in the record. You may proceed as you see fit.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY ALDRIDGE

Secretary ALDRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I did have a prepared text. However, I would like to depart from that in a more informal manner.

I would first like to provide some background to the Committee on when we talk about various kinds of boosters, what are we talking about so it gives you an understanding of the scope and magnitude of the problem. Then I have a short briefing to explain where we are going in the near, mid- and far term in our space launch capabilities. Then we will have to break into a special access session to talk about payloads which are in the more classified arena. [Chart follows:]

CURRENT LAUNCH VEHICLE ASSETS (U)

Secretary ALDRIDGE. Let me explain with my chart here. This is the stable of launch vehicles that currently exist in the U.S. inventory. Obviously, at the front end of this program is the Shuttle program. We have three vehicles.

TITAN IV-COMPLEMENTARY EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

We designed a couple of years ago a program which we call the Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle. Quite a bit of debate existed between NASA and the Air Force and between the Administration and Congress over whether or not one needed such a capability. That issue has gone away.

This is what we call the Titan IV, the Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle that was designed to have the same payload volume and capacity as the Shuttle. It has a 15 foot diameter by 60 foot length bay and will lift 10,000 pounds into geosynchronous orbit. It is derived from the Titan 34D vehicle. We have tested the solid rockets. We were going to do that for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program.

TITAN-34D

The core vehicle basically is identical to the 34D. The 34D has been the workhorse of the military program flying both out of Vanderberg AFB and out of Cape Canaveral AFS. This is the vehicle that experienced two recent failures. In August of 1985 it failed as a result of the core vehicle liquid engine failure and in April 1986, one of the solid rocket boosters burst. It is now scheduled to begin stacking for a flight this summer.

The Atlas Centaur is still the workhorse, except now it flies on a new launch vehicle. Titan IV has the Centaur stage in it and has been flown for many, many years.

TITAN-34B

The Titan-34B is the core vehicle of the 34D. We just had a successful launch of the 34B on February 11th. That was a major milestone for us because the first failure of the Titan-34D that failed at Vanderberg was a core vehicle problem resulting from a liquid fuel system feeding the engine.

The successful Titan-34B launch showed that we have passed that milestone and now it is successful.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Does that mean you are going to take the other out of the inventory?

Secretary ALDRIDGE. The 34B is essentially out of inventory. The last one flew February 11 and there are no more left in the inventory. We have six more Titan-34Ds left. We are moving up from the 34D to the Titan IV, but Martin-Marietta has indicated that they are going to commercialize the Titan-34D vehicle for commercial purposes. They have, I believe, something like nine contractors, commercial satellite contractors who have deposits with them to fly that vehicle.

The Atlas K is an upgrade of the Atlas. There are no plans to fly that.

TITAN II ICBMS

Congress approved two years ago taking Titan II ICBMs out of the silos, and modifying them for space-launch vehicles. We plan to do that and fly within one year.