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Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with 33 other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

Obligation: All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise "Zapad-81" was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing all the information required in its notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." Since 1981, the Soviets have observed provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in letter, but rarely in spirit. The Soviet Union has a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, and Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. The Soviets have notified all exercises requiring notification (i.e., those of 25,000 troops or over), but have failed to make voluntary notifications (i.e., those numbering fewer than 25,000 troops). In their notifications, they have provided only the bare minimum of information. They have also observed only minimally the voluntary provision providing that observers be invited to exercises, having invited observers to only fifty percent of notified activities.

Mr. GAFFNEY. The version is secret. I hope that doesn't cause a problem. But it seems to me if you want to have an appreciation of the magnitude of Soviet activities that are contrary to their arms control commitments, and a rebuttal from the arms control association, you ought to have the compendium we have provided.

Mr. COLBY. The rebuttal refers only to the unclassified part of that announcement, Mr. Chairman, not to the classified.

We have not seen the classified version.

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT

Mr. AUCOIN. Will the Chairman yield?
Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes. Go ahead.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Gaffney, you have read, I assume, the proposed amendment that the full Appropriations Committee may take up tomorrow. There is nothing in that amendment that would prohibit the United States from being fully prepared to resume its testing in a very robust way. That is fact number one.

Fact number two is that it stipulates that once the Soviet Union has carried out a single nuclear explosion with a yield exceeding one kiloton, and the President certifies that to Congress, then this restraint is off.

So, to go back into the 1960's and talk about how the Soviet Union may have quietly prepared to break out of a moratorium in a robust way has no application whatsoever in terms of the amendment that the full Appropriations Committee may be considering tomorow.

You do understand that, don't you?

Mr. GAFFNEY. I understand your point, Congressman. I disagree with it with respect.

Mr. AUCOIN. You disagree that this amendment has no-I state that this amendment has no prohibitions on the United States from being fully prepared through R&D activities to immediately begin a robust testing program.

Dr. BARKER. May I intervene, please?

Mr. AUCOIN. I am asking the question of Mr. Gaffney first, and then I would be interested in your response.

Mr. GAFFNEY. What I disagree with, Congressman, is not necessarily the explicit words here, but the practical effect.

If I may also, Mr. Chairman, insert for the record, President Kennedy's statement which does, in fact, take place at the end of the moratorium in 1961 at which time he said with considerable feeling that some may urge us once again—I am paraphrasing, now-some may urge us once again to get into a moratorium arrangement of this kind with the Soviet Union, asserting that in a free society we can maintain the capability to respond to a violation, that we can keep people in our laboratories working, waiting for the day when the other side breaks out of an agreement.

And President Kennedy said we have tried this approach, and we have found it not merely difficult but impossible of execution.

I believe, Congressman, that that would be the case today every bit as much as it was in 1961, not necessarily because you prohibit national laboratories from maintaining competent people, but because national laboratories in a free society will not be able to

maintain competent people working on nuclear weapons testing, betting on the outcome that at some point in the future the Soviets will conduct an explosion.

[The information follows:]

In a radio-television address by Kennedy on March 2, 1962, he stated: "On September first of last year, while the United States and the United Kingdom were negotiating in good faith at Geneva, the Soviet Union callously broke its moratorium (emphasis added) with a two-month series of more than 40 nuclear tests. Preparations for these tests had been secretly underway for many months. Accompanied by new threats and new tactics of terror, these tests-conducted mostly in the atmosphere-represented a major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons back into the arms race... Some may urge us to try it (a moratorium) again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top-flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a stand-by basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient-we have explored this alternative thoroughly, and found it impossible of execution."

Mr. AUCOIN. Why wouldn't they be able to?

Mr. GAFFNEY. Because they happen to be among the brightest, competent people in technical areas in this country.

There is a great demand for their services in places where their services can be put to use.

Mr. AUCOIN. Does that mean then that a negotiated treaty by the Administration would have a different effect on the same people in the laboratories?

Mr. GAFFNEY. No. I think if we were to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, it would have the same effect.

Mr. AUCOIN. You oppose a negotiated or legislated-

Mr. GAFFNEY. The President of the United States, under present circumstances and those in the foreseeable future in which we must rely upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, opposes a comprehensive test ban whether it is legislated by you, whether it is negotiated by us. It is not in the national interest.

Mr. AUCOIN. You don't want any kind of a limitation on these tests?

Mr. GAFFNEY. Not if we need nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Mr. AUCOIN. What about the Soviet Union? Wouldn't it be advisable to lessen their reliance on nuclear weapons by forcing them to observe a restraint on testing?

Mr. GAFFNEY. If they had a symmetrical problem in which we posed to them an offensive conventional capability comparable to that with which they threaten our allies, I think conceivably your model would apply, but I don't think it does.

The fact of the matter is we have an asymmetric requirement for nuclear deterrence.

SOVIET MORATORIUM

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me go back and finish my point and then I will yield to anybody.

Let's follow up on the history. I want to know whether, in the past, the pattern of the Soviets has been such that they first went into a moratorium to conduct a robust research and development program, which they then broke out of when they were ready to

test, and then were willing to go back into a moratorium status only to repeat the pattern?

Dr. BARKER. I started to answer that question. The U.S. moratorium occurred between 30 October 1958 and 15 September 1961, almost exactly three years in length.

With respect to Mr. Gaffney's comments, there were hearings before the Arms Control Panel of the House Armed Services Committee last fall. One of the witnesses before that panel was Mr. Robert Thorne from the Los Alamos Laboratory who devoted most of his testimony to the kinds of loss in personnel that occurred at the laboratory during that 1958 to 1961 period.

There was no mandated undermining of the U.S. nuclear design program during that period.

It just happened that the people who are critical to this program in the U.S. are experimentalists, and the ability to compare calculations with real data is what keeps them interested in the work.

In the absence of that environment, critical scientists left. In fact, Mr. Thorne was within days of leaving when the Soviets broke the moratorium.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The moratorium situation is not the thrust for a free government to want to go into a robust R&D program; is that true or not?

Dr. BARKER. That is true.

Mr. CHAPPELL. What did we have to do to catch up?

Dr. BARKER. We indeed conducted a symbolic test within less than 30 days after the initial Soviet test, but then it was literally six months later before we really put together a thoroughly planned test in which we had good diagnostics, so we understood ourselves what had happened, in contrast to the extensive Soviet program which had been thoroughly planned in secret at government level by people had been kept on the job for the test program. Indeed, as soon as the Soviet program was done, they showed up with the idea, let's have another moratorium. At that time, we did not bite and I think that is the period in which President Kennedy made the statement referred to a moment ago.

I think part of that statement Mr. Kennedy referred back to the old bit, once bitten, twice wise, they caught us once, they weren't going to catch us again.

I think the critical thing is that in a free society we cannot keep competent scientists at the laboratories in an environment where the country is saying, "Your work isn't important. We don't trust your judgment about what kind of tests you need to do."

They will go into an industry where the government or the Congress in general views their work as important.

ATMOSPHERIC TEST BAN

Mr. AUCOIN. Two years later, Jack Kennedy entered into another moratorium and within two months, the Soviets and the United States entered into an atmospheric test ban after another moratorium.

Dr. BARKER. Atmospheric. Testing underground was permitted.

Mr. McDADE. It was different. In strontium 90 we had a mutual interest in protecting the children. Nuclear testing in the atmosphere was being condemned around the world.

Mr. AUCOIN. He invoked the name of Jack Kennedy and his hostility to moratoria. He, two years later, declared a moratorium and within that period of time, about two months after the moratorium was declared, an atmospheric test ban was negotiated.

Dr. BARKER. I would not deny the President's concern. However, he did commit the country to an aggressive program of underground testing and when the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed, the Senate of the United States took the initiative to introduce the kind of safeguards that the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel are so important.

Mr. AUCOIN. Jack Kennedy's name was invoked and I wanted to make sure this was spelled out for the record, that the Kennedy Administration, unlike this one and every Administration since, has supported a comprehensive test ban.

This Administration departs from that record.

Dr. BARKER. We support a comprehensive test ban at the time and place when it makes sense.

Mr. AUCOIN. When will the millennium arrive?

SCIENTIFIC TESTING

Mr. WILSON. Will the chairman yield?

Mr. Gaffney, it is kind of interesting to everybody, that is, you are saying that the scientists, the critical skilled scientists are not going to want to stay in the laboratories if we are not actually testing; is that roughly what you said?

Dr. BARKER. May I respond, only because I was one from 1966 to 1973?

Mr. WILSON. That is almost like saying a general in the Army isn't going to stay in the Army unless there is going to be a war. Dr. BARKER. You have to look for expertise where you find it. Nuclear weapon design is a very rarified area of science in which the only experts are those who work at the laboratories.

Mr. WILSON. Do they have to have testing for scientific ability? Dr. BARKER. Nuclear weapon scientists, yes.

Mr. GAFFNEY. This is not a make-work program or a welfare program for highly skilled scientists. We are talking about a fact of life, if you take a scientist or engineer or physicist and say, "You can do computer simulations and modeling, but you can't ever validate your work," I think you will find in any field that the guy will look to do something else where he can get the kind of returns on his intellectual capital investment that he can't get if he is precluded from testing.

This is one of a number of facts of life, a fact of life we have learned once before is a problem.

I would not argue that it is the only reason by any reasons or even the most important reason why the country can't afford to experiment to take risks with its nuclear deterrent, but it is an element of the risks that we have to contemplate taking if we do go down this road.