the gunners cannot be used due to safety constraints. The flinch factor effects that are obtained will be input into the simulation modeling system along with other factors to be used in the overall system evaluation.

The AAWS-M requirement is to develop a training device which will allow gunner training without shooting live rounds. There were no training rounds included as part of the Baseline Cost Estimate. The life cycle cost will be a significant evaluation factor that will be incorporated into the Full Scale Development Source Selection Criteria. As part of the criteria, training devices will be incorporated.

QUESTION. Please be specific. As you see it at this point, what are the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three AAWS-M candidates?

General WAGNER. The three AAWS-M candidates are currently involved in a competitive program. The strengths and weaknesses should not be provided for the record because divulgence of the information would be inappropriate and any release of preliminary information would prejudice the competitive program results.

QUESTION. Not only has the IOC date of AAWS-M slipped, total development cost has risen from $557 million to $685 million. Please explain why.

General WAGNER. The RDT&E cost is expected to be no more than the $557 million. The $685.1 million cost estimate contains a planning wedge in FY 1992 and in FY 1993 to cover contingencies such as P3I to meet the follow-on threat, additional technical data package changes and additional testing, if required.

QUESTION. Does your AAWS-M plan call for a competitive shootoff of candidate technologies?

General WAGNER. All candidates will participate in an 18 missile flight test program at identical targets. There are 12 flight profiles (various ranges, etc.) in the flight test matrix. The first 10 will be with contractor gunners. The last 2 will be with military (Army/ USMC) gunners. To be considered for Full Scale Development (FSD), the candidate must successfully engage 6 of the first 10 target profiles.

QUESTION. If you move from a full fire and forget to a FOG-M, how much unit cost do you save by moving electronics to the launcher instead of throwing them down range with each shot? How much unit cost and unit weight do you add by adding the fiber optic and decoder?

General WAGNER. The information requested is considered to be competition sensitive. The unit cost and unit weight should not be provided for the record because divulgence of the information would be inappropriate and any release of preliminary information would prejudice the competitive program results.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-End of questions submitted by Mr. AuCoin. Questions submitted for the record and the answers thereto follow:]

NEW TACTICAL TRUCKS

QUESTION. The Army is requesting $35.3 million for the Mobility program. This sum consists of $22.8 million to begin development

of a new Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles (FHTV) as a follow-on to the HEMTT, and $12.5 million to begin development of a new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) to replace existing 5ton and 21⁄2 ton trucks. The new Medium program is said to be needed to replace the 5-ton and 21⁄2 ton trucks. Is it true that the Army is considering a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of those trucks? Wouldn't such SLEP's eliminate the need to begin a new Medium truck?

General WAGNER. Yes, the Army is considering a SLEP for the medium fleet.

No. A SLEP program will serve to extend the life of fielded vehicles and stem the rise of overall maintenance costs as our current fleet ages. However, a SLEP Program will not fill existing shortages or replace peacetime losses. Only new procurement will fill these requirements. The Army recognizes the need to care for its existing fleet. After considering the TOA available, the very old 21⁄2 ton fleet and the serious shortages in the five-ton fleet, the Army determined a combination of SLEP and new procurement would maximize the effectiveness of our resources. The SLEP program will not eliminate the need for the new family of medium tactical vehicles, rather it is a complementary program which will enable the Army to control costs of maintaining our existing medium tactical vehicle fleet. With this SLEP program, the Army intends to pursue maximum value by centralizing SLEP management and intensively managing distribution of SLEP's vehicles.

QUESTION. A major consideration appears to be the Army's desire to incorporate a Palletized Loading System (PLS) in the new Heavy vehicle. A major use for a PLS would be the distribution of ammunition. Isn't the new HEMTT being bought, in large measure, for use as an ammunition distribution truck? What deficiencies in the current ammunition distribution system and vehicles will be satisfied by the proposed PLS? If the PLS were developed, over how long a time would procurement and fielding take place? Until a PLS was fully fielded, would the Army have to operate two separate ammunition distribution systems? What would be the tactical implications, and the marginal added cost, of such a dual operation?

General WAGNER. HEMTT's are being bought to support ammunition and fuel requirements largely for M1 Tanks, Apache, Patriot and MLRS. Of our IIQ and POMCUS requirements, approximately 60% are for ammunition, 25% for fuel and 9% for wreckers. Our preliminary COEA analysis suggests that approximately 2,700 HEMTT's could be displaced to perform other roles, such as hauling the ribbon bridge, currently being carried by overloaded 5 ton trucks.

Our recent FDT&E results show that we cannot deliver the ammunition doctrinally required by our Field Artillery units. We would need even greater numbers of existing trucks to meet that requirement. Alternatively, our preliminary COEA results suggest that it is more cost effective to use PLS in that role. We can reduce personnel requirements and displace HEMTT's and MHE in the process. With PLS we can deliver ammunition to the guns, unload the rack and cargo and return the vehicle for additional resupply with minimal disruption to the combat operations. Our tests show

that significant amounts of time are wasted in cues awaiting loading and unloading. Meanwhile the vehicle is an unused/unproductive asset.

From prototype contract to production: (May 1988-1990)..

Production Leadtime.

IPT.

Initial Fielding.

Plan 5 year multiyear (FY 1990-1995)
Should finish fielding in FY 1997
Total approximately

The Army's ammunition distribution system, employing PLS, would require some modification from the current doctrine. Current plans are to field vehicles through the entire Corps ammunition distribution structure. By adopting a strategy to field in Corps sets, there will be no added marginal costs nor tactical implications. This strategy will also eliminate any potential duplication at the Division level that could occur during the fielding transition period, if the PLS were not fielded as a complete Corps package. QUESTION. Have field commanders expressed support for PLS, or are they satisfied with the current ammunition distribution system?

General WAGNER. Field commanders are pleased with the improvement the HEMTT offers over the 5 ton truck. However, realizing that our current doctrine and structure cannot meet ammo distribution requirements, they look to PLS to meet our shortfalls, while offering potential personnel savings.

QUESTION. Has the Army considered putting a PLS on the HEMTT, either as a retrofit or on new vehicles? What would such an approach cost?

General WAGNER. As requested, we have reviewed modifying the HEMTT to be a PLS. First, only the HEMTT wrecker chassis can meet the 16.5 ton PLS requirement. We do not have enough wreckers to warrant conversion, therefore this option is not practical. The wrecker chassis could be extended and made into a PLS in production. We have received contractor estimates that a HEMTT based PLS could cost $255 thousand per copy, on a sole source basis. To competitively procure the PLS from the HEMTT TDP is estimated to cost $15 million for TDP, $5 million for PLS engineering and TDP validation for a total of $20 million. Technically a HEMTT-PLS may not meet all the PLS requirements. Remembering that the HEMTT requires chassis redesign (longer chassis and wheelbase, etc.) it will be essentially a new vehicle. The Army would prefer to compete using a performance specification rather than sub-optimize the PLS design.

WEASEL LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE

QUESTION. Last year, the Congress provided $10 million above the budget for evaluation of the Weasel light armored vehicle.

What steps has the Army taken to implement this evaluation? General WAGNER. The Army informed congressional staff members last year that it did not have any plans to evaluate this vehicle, and therefore could not comment on how any funds for this

project could be spent. That position has not changed; consequently, no actions have been undertaken to implement an evaluation. QUESTION. When will this evaluation take place?

General WAGNER. An evaluation is not currently planned, because an earlier evaluation of this same vehicle resulted in disappointing results. Moreover, there is no current requirement for a vehicle of this type in the Army; therefore the Army cannot justify the expenditure of critically short R&D funding on a project that has no future application toward meeting Army requirements. In this regard the Army intends to formally request, in writing, that these funds be withdrawn.

QUESTION. When will the Army complete its evaluation and submit a report to the Congress?

General WAGNER. Unless specifically directed by the Congress, the Army does not intend to evaluate this vehicle. Clearly, given the congressionally mandated survivability testing requirements for the BFV and similar type vehicles, these funds could be better utilized in support of this type of testing. The fact is that the availability of funds to support directed survivability testing is just not sufficient to accomplish all the test requirements. As a result reprogramming of funds from other high priority programs has been necessary to support this testing.

T-800 ENGINE

QUESTION. The Army is requesting $135.1 million to continue development of the new T-800 engine, which would power the LHX. The T-800 is being designed to provide 1,200 shaft horsepower (SHP), with growth potential to 1,800 SHP. The current improved T-700 engine has 1,560 SHP.

There seems to be a serious question about the cost of this program. Last year, we noted that Army FY 1987 documentation showed total development cost of $813 million, compared with a total shown in FY 1986 documentation of $557 million. When we questioned this increase, General Wagner answered that the problem was a "decimal point error," causing the FY 1992 figure to be $297.98 million instead of the correct figure of $29.798 million.

The FY 1988 documentation now shows total development cost for the T-800 to be $800 million. Please explain this new total. Do we have another decimal point error? Has the cost to develop the T-800 gone up, or has it not?

General WAGNER. This year's budget submission has exactly the same error as last year's. There is an extra digit on the figure in the "to complete" column of the budget estimate submission. Instead of $297 million, the figure should be $29.7 million. The difference is reflected in the "Additional to Completion" column of the budget. The actual total cost of the T-800 engine program is $554.5 million. There has been a slight reduction in the total cost of the T-800 program.

QUESTION. Last year we asked whether the Army could afford to develop the T-800. General Wagner answered that it was affordable at $557 million. Is it affordable at $800 million, a 44 percent increase over last year's claimed total cost? At what price does the T-800 stop being affordable?

General WAGNER. There has not been any increase in the T-800 program cost. It is still very much an affordable program at the actual cost of $554.5 million. If there ever is an increase in the T800 costs the Army will review the program to determine if the new cost is affordable.

QUESTION. Last year, we asked what specific possible applications there were for the T-800, besides LHX. The reply was a listing of commercial helicopters, fixed wing aircraft manufactured in Europe, and ground generators for rock crushing plants and mining sites. If LHX is cancelled, will these other possible applications justify continuation of the T-800? What total quantity of T800 engines do you estimate would be used in these other applications?

General WAGNER. T-800 will be an excellent engine for a large variety of applications. If LHX is cancelled, the first application could be to re-engine the Vietnam era UH-1 and AH-1 aircraft that US soldiers will have to fly well into the 21st Century. The Army has not estimated the number of T-800 engines that might be required in other applications.

QUESTION. The Army justifies the T-800 on the grounds that it will have lower procurement, operating and support costs than the T-700. Thus, the argument goes, the cost of developing the T-800 will be paid back over time. Eventually, a break-even point will be reached beyond which the T-800 provides a net savings.

When will that break-even point be reached?

How many engines, operating in what aircraft, and for what times, are used to calculate that break-even point?

Now that the development cost for the T-800 has gone up to $800 million, how has the break-even point changed?

If LHX is cancelled, how will the break-even point be changed? General WAGNER. Until development is complete, there is no way to know precisely how much the T-800 will cost to buy and operate. The exact number of aircraft to be procured in the LHX program has not been determined. Therefore the break-even point is not known. Since it has not been established, it has not changed. But it can be said with certainty that since the T-800 development costs have gone down, the break-even point would be different because it would presumably be computed in comparison to the T-53 engines currently in the UH-1 and AH-1.

QUESTION. If the T-800 program were terminated effective September 30, 1987, what would be the total termination cost to the U.S. government? If an exact figure is not available, provide an estimate.

General WAGNER. There would be no termination costs, provided the termination would be announced not later than 31 July.

ADVANCED ANTITANK WEAPON SYSTEM-HEAVY

QUESTION. The Army is requesting $28.6 million to begin development of a new weapon, the Advanced Antitank Weapon SystemHeavy (AAWS-H). The stated purpose is to replace the TOW. Why does the Army believe that the TOW must be replaced?

General WAGNER. In the 1988-90s, Warsaw Pact forces will field large numbers of tanks with reactive and other advanced armor.