became an alliance "a la carte," with allies choosing which responsibilities they will accept and which they will leave to others. The Soviets study blitzkrieg warfare assiduously. They are working to operate outside the nuclear umbrella. It is not that I believe Moscow would set out on a war policy, but, as in 1914 and the late 1930s, an intimidation and blackmail policy could lead to miscalculation.

Some critics of the American commitment to Europe and advocates of troop withdrawals contend that the policy makers who took us into NATO never envisioned US forces remaining in Europe almost 40 years after they first arrived. They did not, however, have

as accurate, a net assessment of the 1990s as we do today. In my view, the situation in Europe today requires NATO urgently to bolster its conventional capabilities and eliminate its major vulnerabilities. It is a requirement made more critical by the arms control regime discussed in Rejkavik by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. For me it is an urgent priority both in a less nuclear world or a world of no nuclear reductions but where the nuclear deterrent effect is in decline. If NATO does not act today to bolster its conventional forces, it could confront a more precarious situation in the mid-1990s reminiscent of 1914 or the 1930s. These are my judgments based on my study of history and my projection of trends as we move into the 1990s.

ELEMENTS OF A RESOURCES STRATEGY

1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 1990S

I would like to share with the Committee the rough outlines of my assessment for NATO in the 1990s, because this is the first element of my Resources Strategy. Let me state my basic conclusion at the outset: By the mid-1990s, NATO could be vulnerable to a Soviet attack before allied mobilization and reinforcement are fully effective. Soviet capabilities could also force a pace of combat which NATO cannot match, thereby robbing NATO of many of the conventional options of its flexible response strategy and placing on NATO the burden of escalation to the nuclear level. As General Rogers has said, the Soviets are developing greater flexibility than we.

Several elements of this potential Soviet threat should be highlighted.

First, for some years, Soviet doctrine has stressed the benefits of keeping conflict below the nuclear threshold and developing a conventional war-winning capability.

Second, what is new in the Soviet effort is an increasing capability to fuse its quantity of forces with technological

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improvements and organizational innovations.

Soviet

organizational concepts, for example, are seen as the way

to facilitate the rapid commitment of in-place forces to the battle, minimize pauses between operational echelons, and enable deep and rapid penetration of defenses.

Operational Manuever Groups are an important part of this plan to limit NATO's response capability. They are designed to conduct swift and decisive penetrating operations with targets such as NATO's command-and-control structure, theater nuclear assets, air defenses, and key ground facilities.

As yet another example, the increased Soviet attention to improving their shorter-range tactical ballistic missiles (SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s)

with greatly improved accuracies

and armed with conventional, or chemical or nuclear warheads gives us further concern,`especially for the 1990s. In combination with other offensive capabilities, such TBMs could be used against NATO's critical assets such as airfields, nuclear

delivery systems and storage sites, C3 facilities, and troop

concentrations. We can expect the Soviets to continue to improve the effectiveness of their TBMS, and NATO will have to find smart ways to counter this capability.

Third, the preemptive incentive for the Soviets will be

substantial. The future face of battle will be one that is

extremely destructive and highly resource-intensive.

Sustaining

such a battle over a long period may be difficult for either side. Under these conditions, maintaining effective C3I will assume unprecedented importance. Conversely, early destruction of these capabilities of the enemy will also assume heretofore unparalleled significance. Thus, the incentives for pre-emption

are heightened.

Fourth, the Soviets' growing maritime strength contributes to its potential for preempting NATO's options by outflanking NATO before war ever begins, or before NATO forces go on even simple alert. Improvements in the Soviets' ability to project naval power could afford them a "fleet in being" in the tradition of Mahan, which could possess enormous political utility without even firing a shot. The Soviet Navy has already demonstrated that it could deploy half of the Northern Fleet with 3 days' notice; about 70 percent within two weeks. Soviet exercises show that a submarine barrier can be placed across the G-I-UK gap within three days, and Soviet warships can be in the western approaches to the UK in 8 to 10 days. Trends suggest the Soviets are moving to shorten this time even more.

Even before a crisis, therefore, under the guise of exercises, Moscow could deploy its naval forces astride NATO's vital SLOCS, threatening NATO's ability to reinforce Europe. Successful

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Soviet attacks in the northern region prior to reinforcement could give them control of key airfields and greater capability to interdict NATO's prepared resupply ports, while offering a secure flank for Pact operations on the Central Front.

The net effect of these trends could be to isolate NATO Europe, increasing the likelihood that in-place NATO defense would be overwhelmed. The ultimate impact would be to shift to NATO the burden of deciding to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level at a time when we have lost escalation dominance. If these trends are left unaddressed, the Soviets might conclude in a crisis that they possessed the necessary elements to succeed in a conflict of short duration, confined to the non-nuclear level. If Soviet adversaries recognize this situation, then such military power can be translated into the potential for exerting substantial political leverage in situations short of crisis. I believe that the potential political leverage and the possibility of successful blackmail from such a Soviet conventional advantage would far exceed the blackmail potential from SS-20s or other nuclear capabilities, if only because conventional forces will be more visible and more usable.

This long-term assessment is sobering. It does not, however, justify profound pessimism. Such an unfavorable situation is not pre-ordained if NATO gets its act together. The Alliance has