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noted that our own experience has shown that even one low-yield test can make the difference between having or not having a reliable weapon in the stockpile.

Last September, when President Reagan described publicly

why we need nuclear testing, he stated: "Our highest arms control priority is to get the Soviets to agree to deep arms reductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Soviet emphasis on the

testing issue is a diversion from this urgent task. The House's ban on testing, on the other hand, is a back door to a nuclear freeze, which would make arms reductions almost impossible." Chairman, that statement is as true today as it was then.

Mr.

That said, I would not like to leave this Committee with the impression that this Administration is not committed to certain nuclear testing limitations that, if effectively verifiable and complied with by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, can enhance security for all nations. This is why we have been seeking,

since early in this Administration, to achieve necessary verification improvements to the TTBT and the companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Dr. Robert Barker, who is here with me today,

is the head of the delegation of U.S. technical experts that has met several times in Geneva with Soviet experts in an ongoing effort to achieve Soviet agreement to negotiate such verification measures. As Members of this Committee no doubt are aware, in his January 13, 1987 message to the Senate, President Reagan requested Senate advice and consent to ratification of the TTBT and PNET subject to the condition that the U.S. and the Soviet Union first agree to the necessary verification improvements. He further stated that once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties

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have been ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, he will propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending, nuclear testing.

If the proponents of the amendment under consideration were really interested in practical steps in the area of nuclear testing limitations, they would wholeheartedly endorse the President's efforts in this regard. On the other hand, I can think of no better way of encouraging the Soviets to refuse seriously to address our TTBT and PNET concerns and our clear agenda for negotiations on nuclear testing than to push forward this unsafe, inequitable, and yes -- unverifiable ban.

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Turning now to the proposed legislation to mandate U.S. compliance with parts of the unratified SALT II Treaty, let me again review why this Administration strongly opposes such a step.

SALT II was not a good treaty for the U.S. in the first place. It allowed the Soviets to double their missile warheads since 1979, and it would have allowed further large increases in the future. Yet supporters of this amendment somehow cannot see the contradiction between enshrining as national policy an unratified treaty that provides for such increases and our longstanding efforts at Geneva, which finally are beginning to show real promise, to achieve deep reductions in strategic offensive arms.

Moreover, as the President has certified in his annual reports to Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets have engaged in multiple violations of important provisions of the SALT II agreement. These have included: violation of the strategic nuclear delivery

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vehicles limit; deployment of the SS-25 single-warhead, road-mobile ICBM in violation of the limit of one new type of "light" ICBM (which the Soviets previously had identified as their SS-X-24); violation of the prohibition on concealment of missile/launcher association; and violation of the prohibition on deliberate concealment measures that impede verification of compliance by national technical means. On this latter point that of telemetry encryption it is noteworthy that President Carter viewed the issue with such seriousness that he stated: "Any concealment activity would be readily detectable, and a violation of this part of the agreement would be so serious as to give us grounds to cancel the treaty itself." The Soviets, however, did not correct those violations or otherwise satisfy U.S. concerns despite repeated U.S. requests and demarches in the Standing Consultative Commission and in other diplomatic channels over a number of years.

Given this background, Mr. Chairman, one can only foresee serious damage to our national security and arms control policies if this proposed amendment were ever to take effect. It would convey to the Soviets that their violations will not necessarily result in strong U.S. responses that would deny them the benefits that they had gained through selective observance of an arms control agreement. It could create the expectation that the U.S. would continue to observe those parts of an agreement that the Soviets had not yet violated. In short, it would lead to a Soviet "a la carte" approach to compliance: discarding the limitations that constrained them the most, while perhaps choosing to stay within those that constrained the U.S. the most. This, in turn, would

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increase the military risks to the U.S. and kindle suspicions and instability that destroy the foundation for the deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions that this Administration is working so vigorously to secure.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Gaffney, let me say to all of you, we are in closed session here. We assume, though, that we are dealing with non-classified matters. If we need to go into other areas, then we will, of course, clear the room if some Member wants to do that. Mr. Hawes, if you have a statement, we will place it in the record.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. HAWES

Mr. HAWES. I have no formal statement, I will make a few brief remarks. We recognize that the proposals before us are put forward in a sincere intent to advance the arms control process. We are concerned that their effect will be the opposite.

I think Mr. Gaffney has laid out very clearly what some of the consequences could be. We feel that the U.S. has positive serious arms control proposals both dealing with nuclear testing and with the reduction and limitations of the strategic offensive forces. In both areas, our efforts will be made significantly more difficult by the proposals here before us.

In the area of strategic offensive forces, we are talking with the Soviet Union in Geneva about numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, about numbers of warheads well below the SALT II limits. We are talking about an arrangement which would have constraints on Soviet programs not even envisaged in the SALT process. The Soviets have come a great distance since 1979.

We do not see any advantage in walking back to that point and do not think that action which would, in effect, codify an expired agreement would advance our leverage in the present talks, nor would it seem necessary given the fact that the Soviets have advanced well beyond the SALT II positions.

In our view, the question of nuclear testing is similar. In the nuclear testing area, we proposed to the Soviets last year that we begin discussions on the full range of testing issues and that was understood to mean that we wanted to pick up what the President had several times said was important, improving verification of the existing treaties, that we understood the Soviets had on their agenda moving on to talk about the prohibition of nuclear testing. We said that was fine too. We got the discussion started.

Dr. Barker has now had, I think, four rounds with the Soviets on those discussions. We think there is a clear set of priorities in this area moving from verification of existing treaties through any intermediate steps-the President said in the United Nations last September he was prepared in association with a program to eliminate nuclear weapons to negotiate on intermediate limitationsto eventually consideration of the ultimate prohibition of testing. We do not think that it is wise or proper to impose on that process an arbitrary limitation of one kiloton on our testing program. We think that that will not only have the military and technical effect of crippling our program, it would have the diplomatic effect of robbing us of negotiating leverage as we seek to bring the Soviets to further negotiations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Thank you. I think we would like to hear from you, Mr. Colby. Do you have a statement?