-we cannot be content with leaving the question as open as it is proposed to leave it. What is the position of those colonies which have advisedly, in pursuance of the powers intrusted to them, and in obedience to the dictates of their parliaments, adopted a protective policy? They have created, within longer or shorter periods, vested interests, in which millions of capital are invested-millions of private capital of the citizens of this country. Now, sir, I would be the last to suggest, the last to believe, that a federal parliament, representing Australasia, would ignore considerations of this kind. I would be the last to suppose that they could be guilty, in obedience to any doctrine of economic practice, of what might be termed the crime of sweeping away, at a blow, the protection under which these industries and interests have been built up. I believe that to be impossible. But the question here and now is, not of individual belief, or the belief of this Convention; it is our duty, in a matter of this kind, not to rest upon beliefs, but to obtain guarantees for the preservation of interests such as these. What are the guarantees which can legitimately be asked by those colonies which have established industries under the shelter of protective tariffs? What is the consideration which they can reasonably ask from their fellow-colonists, and especially from that one great colony in which we now stand, which has not yet seen its way to follow a similar policy? Let me say, at the outset, that I, for one, frankly admit that a customs union is a sine qua non of federal union; that without a customs union there can be no federal union in the true sense of the term, and that all our efforts and all our labours must be directed to securing that customs union so soon as it may be compatible with the interests intrusted to us. With that premise, let us ask what might fairly be

demanded, sceing that ultimately, and at no distant date, the question of the tariff to be imposed upon our seaboard must be settled by the people of Australia as a whole, no matter what the verdict of individual colonies may be. That is the goal towards which we are progressing, and towards which we ought not to progress too slowly, but which it would be impossible, which it would be unjust, to attempt to gain at a single bound. I will not venture at this stage to suggest what, in my humble judgment, would be a sufficient guarantee to satisfy those colonies that their interests would not be too soon, too rapidly, too hastily imperilled. I will only indicate that it appears to me that we might safely lay down in the constitution the condition that during the first years of its existence it should only be possible to reduce existing tariffs by a certain percentage in a certain number of years; so that if the first federal parliament should feel bound to reduce duties it could only do so to a certain extent. The people of the continent, as a whole, would be appealed to at least once, if not twice, before protective duties were reduced to revenue duties. In point of fact, the federal parliament on this question should be asked to proceed by steps, to advance by degrees; and the guarantee should be set out on the face of the proposed constitution that those who have embarked their capital in these industries under state encouragement and state sanction, should know the period of time within which they could hope to retain the command of their markets, even if the federal parliament should give its judgment against a protective policy. I need scarcely repeat here that, in my opinion, the federal par liament is in no danger of giving any such verdict. I believe that the portion of the speech in which the hon. member, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, set out the conditions under which protection might be applied,

expresses the opinion of the bulk of the people of this country, and that this is an opinion which, the better it is understood, the more it will find popular favour. Personally, then, I have no more fear than any member of this convention, as to what the ultimate result would be. It will mean without doubt an Australasian protective tariff; but I say it is incumbent upon us not to rest upon individual beliefs in a matter of so much moment to special colonies; we must request and require some such guarantee as that which I have rudely outlined. I would remind hon. members who are apprehensive of such a proposal that we all fondly hope and believe that the union which it may be our privilege to inaugurate, will be an eternal union

a union for all time of the states of Australasia, or into which all the states of Australasia will, within a comparatively brief period, be irresistibly drawn. That being the case, why should a concession of a few years be denied, when the object to be attained is permanent?

Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: The hon. member has no confidence in his own people!

Mr. DEAKIN: The hon. member must pardon me if I do not now see the pertinency of his interjection. I was about to point out that, supposing this principle to be adopted, this guarantee to be given, it does not necessarily imply that nothing should be done in the way of free interchange between the Australasian colonies in the meantime. On the contrary, that would rest with the several colonies themselves; and the sense that at no distant date an absolute union was inevitable, would no doubt prove an argument of considerable weight to induce them to prepare for it by every means in their power. Consequently, the condition which has been suggested would not prove an absolute bar to progress in this direction even during the term of the guarantee; but, on the contrary, it might be reason

ably anticipated that, with such a guarantee, offered and accepted, the several colonies who were for the time-being protected by it would see their way to enter into mutual arrangements for a more or less unrestricted exchange across their borders; and, saving the rights and the vested interests to which I have referred, no one would more cordially support such a policy than myself. With regard to the 4th resolution, I have only to say that the promise which it offers is one of efficiency in the defence of Australasia, an efficiency which I trust will be based upon as small a standing army as is compatible with the safety of the country, and upon as large an extension of the principle of citizen soldiery as is possible with the funds at our command. Then, sir, we approach the article of your resolutions—the first in the second part-which has, up to the present moment, called for the most criticism, and evoked the warmest debate. Your proposition that there should be two houses of parliament has been, so far, accepted with unanimity. Your proposition that the house of representatives should be elected on the popular basis has not been challenged. The proposition that there should be a senate retiring by sections has also been adopted. The one article in this particular resolution which has been challenged is that which, in accordance with the established principles of the British Constitution, endows the popular chamber with the sole power of originating and amending all bills, appropriating revenue, or imposing taxation. Those, sir, who follow your resolution, and adopt it most cordially, have been accused of keeping in mind throughout the existing upper chambers of Australasia, of ignoring the difference between the second federal chamber and the second chamber in the several colonies. But those who have made this accusation have not themselves been precise, nor could they be precise, in indicating Second day.

the particular mode of election which was proposed to be adopted in order to obtain this senate. Some have inferred, it is evident, that the local legislative bodies would elect the members of the senate. Others have vaguely indicated the possibility of an election by the whole body of the people, or by provinces, and others have indicated a mixed method of election. I wish merely to point out from the beginning that, until the method of election is settled, the question in what degree the upper chamber really represents the state which it claims to represent must remain in some doubt.

Sir THOMAS MCILWRAITH: No!

Mr. DEAKIN: It may nominally represent the state, without really representing it. If, for instance-and I do not think it would be an unwise proposition-it is suggested that each colony shall determine for itself the method of election which shall be followed for the proportion of members which it is entitled to claim in the senate-and that would be a liberty which, until I hear reasons to the contrary, I think might be judiciously intrusted to the several colonies-if the several colonies be left free to frame their own constituencies for their own senate, then we shall, not impossibly, have a body which will have differing claims to represent certain states. I shall maintain from now, until I find the principle refuted by much stronger argument than I have heard brought against it, that there is only one means of thoroughly and effectively representing the people, and that is by direct election. No other choice, however it may be based upon the indirect authority of the people, can claim to stand for a moment in comparison with that of men who receive their trust from the hands of the electors themselves, and who speak their sentiments, without the intervention of any other body, or subject to any other influence than the judgment and reason of

the manhood of their colony. I say that, however high the title, however lofty the claims, of the senate, if it derives its origin from an indirect method of election, the representative character of its members cannot equal that of men who face the people directly, and win, in their own person, at the sword's point, and after fierce conflict, the confidence of a majority of the electors.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Why not?

Mr. DEAKIN I say I shall accept that as a first principle until I hear stronger reasoning to the contrary than I have yet heard; and I shall adopt, in this particular, the excellent plan of the hon. the Premier of Queensland, who has interjected, and whose politic practice, throughout the whole of the debate, has been to request his opponents to find plans, and then proceed to criticise them. I think that we who lay down a principle so generally accepted as this, are entitled to ask to be furnished, not with reasons for supporting it, but with reasons why we should not support it, or why we should accept some other principle in its place. Therefore, with all consideration and respect, I return the hon. gentleman's interjection, and invite him to show what method of appointment can claim, in directness of authority, to rank with that of immediate election by the whole body of the people.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Any kind of election!

Mr. DEAKIN : Any kind of election ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITHI: If it represents the state!

Mr. DEAKIN: I cannot conceive of an entity called the state apart from the people whose interests it embodies ; nor can I conceive anything within the state which can claim an equal authority with the final verdict, after solemn consideration, of the majority of its citizens. If the hon. gentleman has any metaphysical entity in his mind which can be placed above

this, I shall be glad to learn its nature; but at present I prefer to rest upon what has been the solid substratum upon which popular and responsible government has been carried on, of which we have had centuries of experience, and which, the more it has been honored, the more it has endowed us with liberty, and all that follows in the train of liberty. Until we have the method of the election of the senate distinctly before us we cannot tell exactly with what degree of authority it should be intrusted. But I will not quibble about words. I will confess that, if elected, it is quite possible and justifiable to intrust it with a very large authority. I would assure the hon. member that, in endeavouring to answer his contention, I shall seek to meet his argument, so far as I understand it, not at its worst, but at its best; to state it, as far as I can, as I conceive he would state it in order to put it in its strongest form; and if I cannot answer it in that form I will not attempt to answer it at all. I merely pointed out at the outset-and perhaps the hon. member's interjection has led me to appear to attach too much consideration to it-that this is a circumstance that will require to be taken. into consideration, which has not yet been taken into consideration, and which those who advocate the intrusting of the federal upper house with extraordinary powers have not yet thought fit to absolutely define. I think that we may fairly challenge them to define the method of election for this senate of theirs, to which they wish to give exceptional powers. To remove any misapprehension, let me say that personally I have no ambition to see a second chamber in these colonies which should be a mere replica of the Canadian Upper House, which is confessedly inadequate for the position which it occupies; nor do I even desire to see a body whose authority would be as capable of variable interpretations as is that of the House of Lords

under the British Constitution. I believe that we cannot have a better ideal for our second chamber than the House of Lords as its functions are now interpreted ; at the same time I will confess to hon. members that in defining its exact position we might possibly have some difficulty. If we follow the lines upon which I believe the British Constitution is now interpreted, we should require a second chamber embracing just such members as you, sir, specified in your opening speech, men of mature experience, of ripe judgment, of high character, qualified to give counsels to the nation with the certainty that they would be received with respect. Of such men should a second chamber be composed, and the powers intrusted to it should be those powers that have always belonged, under responsible government, to a second chamber, namely, the power of review, the power of revision, the power of a veto limited in time. The hon. member, Captain Russell, described in poetic language that I am afraid I would find almost as much difficulty in repeating as I should in imitating, the danger incurred in the absence of a veto. He spoke, I fancy, of the "cyclonic fury" of the popular mind, and conjured up before us the spectacle of a democracy carried hither and thither by violent impulses to opposite points of the compass within short periods of time. If there be such a democracy and far be it from me to insinuate that Captain Russell has had any experience of it-then I fancy that the second chamber which we have in view would prevent and provide against any such possible accident. It would be a chamber speaking with weight, and acting with authority, able to amend or reject all measures other than financial-able to absolutely reject financial measures, though not to amend them, and able by this means to challenge the verdict of the country whenever and however it pleased, and as often as it might please. Will it be contended Second day.

that these are small powers? On the other hand, will it be contended that if that "cyclonic fury" proved not to be the momentary outburst to which reference has been made, but the settled determination of the popular will-does Captain Russell, and do those who think with him, contend that this is to be defeated? On the contrary, he agrees in theory, at all events, with the practice of the British Constitution which we are supporting. So, I take it, did Sir Samuel Griffith himself. He also indorsed the principle that, in the last resort, and after due consideration, the popular determination must prevail, and the attempt of any body, short of that of a majority of the people, to obstruct its execution must be defeated and set aside. This, I understand them to admit; we admit; all admit. It is simply a question, then, of the degree of veto-of the degree of check which a second chamber shall be authorised to present to the execution of what the popular chamber believes at the time to be the will of the people. If we are agreed that the authority to be intrusted to the senate is to be only a limited veto, then I ask how that is to be reconciled with the propositions which provide for a permanent and perpetual veto capable of being imposed by the second chamber. upon measures which might under conceivable circumstances be passed again and again by the first chamber, and be indorsed again and again by the people to whom they had appealed? I think this is another point on which we, who accept our governments as we find them, who rest on the established practice that has come down with the precedents of at least a century, if not two or three centuries, in its support, may say to our opponents, "It is for you to come forward with some new and original defence of this absolute and permanent veto with which you propose to intrust the second chamber. If you contend simply for a limited veto-if

you contend, as the hon. member, Captain Russell, said, simply for such a veto as would enable the body of the people to reflect, to reconsider, and, if necessary, to amend their judgment-then we are heartily with you; and the question of details need not long occupy us." But what we feel to be the real and important point in the proposition of the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, and others, is that they propose to establish—and I wish to impress this upon the Convention-a second chamber, which is to have the power of absolute and continuous veto upon the proposals sanctioned by the popular chamber, and sanctioned by the people. Such is the possibility. Mr. MOORE: No!

Mr. DEAKIN Such is a distinct possibility. With the probabilities I will presently deal.

Mr. BROWN: A veto for one session!

Mr. DEAKIN: If the hon. member says a veto for one session, I cordially agree with him. I go further, and am prepared to make greater concessions to the upper chamber than he asks. What

I say is that the proposal that emanates from the Premier of Queensland, supported by the hon. member, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, in his able speech, is a plea for an absolute veto to be vested in the second chamber. To that I wish to draw attention, for the purpose of clearing the argument. Hon. delegates will perceive, probably, the relation which this bears to the former argument. If the second chamber is to be endowed with an absolute veto, we are bound to ask, what is the constituency of that chamber-from whom does it derive its authority to override all other powers in the state?

Mr. CUTHBERT: From the people! Mr. DEAKIN: We will ask, how from the people? What proof shall we have that the senate has the approbation of the people?