remarks that you were in favour of the ultimate power, that is, the final decision in regard to the finances, being in the house of representatives. I know that my hon. friend, Sir Samuel Griffith, went in another direction, though not very clearly; but you, sir, were very clear upon this point. Sir Samuel Griffith, while practically agreeing with the President with regard to these views, appeared to me to be surrounded by doubts and difficulties. I was sorry that he did not try to solve those doubts himself, because it is scarcely fair to us who have not studied this matter from the legal point of view, as the hon. member has done, to have submitted to us a number of riddles which we are asked to solve.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITHI: I thought I did solve them!

Mr. MUNRO: Well, if the hon. member solved them, as far as my listening to him was concerned, and my reading of his speech a second time this morning, I really saw no solution-none whatever. As far as I could gather he favoured a constitutional government; but he doubted whether constitutional government would work-and whilst he informed us that he had grave doubts as to constitutional government working under our peculiar circumstances, he did not indicate to us what sort of government would work, and that is the difficulty which concerns me in this matter. If he had said to us, "Well, I feel sure, after giving full consideration to this matter, that a constitutional form of government will not work with a senate and a house of representatives-the senate representing the states, and the house of representatives representing the whole of the people that constitutional government and responsible government will not work," it might have been different; but I found no solution of the difficulties in the hon. gentleman's remarks. He informed us that he thought the senate

Mr. MUNRO: I admit that the form of amending was by veto-that is, separating one portion from another, vetoing one portion, and allowing another portion to pass. At the same time, it is purely an amendment. To omit a clause from a bill is to amend the bill quite as much as to insert a clause. The hon. gentleman pointed out that, in his opinion, we were to get over deadlocks by giving the senate power to amend money bills by discriminative veto, if I may so call itthat they were to have a veto in connection with money bills. The experience of the past, however, tends entirely in a different direction. It is entirely in the direction of showing that if the upper house or senate has the power of amend ing money bills it makes deadlocks more certain than would be the case under any other circumstances, because if we did not give power of amendment to the senate, eventually the house of representatives must of necessity prevail, because the people will insist on their views being carried out. But if you give the power of amending money bills to the senate, the result will be that it is not the view of the people that will prevail, but the views of a section of the people. The hon. gentleman was good enough to point out that, supposing two of the larger colonies were in favour of the expenditure of £1,000,000 on an arsenal, or on defences, or anything of that kind, and a majority of the smaller colonies combined against them, unless the senate had the power of amendment the result would be that the will of the majority of members would prevail. Let us take the reverse of that. Let us take the case of 2,500,000 people who ought to be taxed for a particular purpose, and 250,000 people, representing some of the Second day.

smaller states, are to have the power of preventing them being taxed in a certain direction. What will the result be? The power of preventing taxation in a certain direction must absolutely result in taxation in another direction; and the result would be that the minority would govern the majority. That would be the practical outcome of the proposal. If the states, through the senate, are going to be empowered to veto the proceedings of the house of representatives, so far as money matters are concerned, and prevent the imposition of taxation in a given direction-if the minority can prevent that, the result will be that if you are to carry on government at all, as you must impose taxation, you must impose that taxation in accordance with the will of the minority. Surely that is not what we wish to be done; surely this Convention has not met for the purpose of giving a power to the minority of the people of this grand dominion to impose taxation on the majority against their will. That will be the practical result of Sir Samuel Griffith's proposal. One side or another must give way; and if the majority are bound to give way, the result must be that the minority will rule. Surely that is a state of affairs to which my hon. friend does not wish to bring us. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: What is the use of the senate, then?

Mr. MUNRO: I will come to that in a moment; I am only dealing with the question of finance at present. The hon. gentleman also puts it that he does not think the government or the executive should be responsible to the house of representatives.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: No, no. I said nothing of the kind. I said I did not think it should be a rigid rule of the constitution that it must be responsible to one house only. I repeated that about ten times, and I thought I had made myself clear.

Mr. MUNRO: I admit that that is clear enough; but to whom is the executive to be responsible? Is it to be responsible to both houses; will it be absolutely necessary to have a vote of want of confidence in both chambers to remove a government? Is that what is proposed? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: No, no!

Mr. MUNRO: I really want to understand where we are, and what is meant. If the vote of the house of representatives is not sufficient to dislodge a government, what is sufficient? What is to be the process by which a government is to be dislodged. What is to be the process by which a government is to be removed if the house of representatives has not the power to remove them? Whilst the hon. gentleman submitted a number of conundrums to us, he did not clearly show us how to get out of the difficulty. I followed the hon. gentleman very closely, and I read his speech very carefully this morning in order that I might understand what he really means; and it appears to me that he brings us into this difficulty. He says, "I do not want this constitution to provide that the executive shall be responsible to the house of representatives; I want the responsibility to be divided between the two chambers." But he has not indicated how that is to be carried out; how the two chambers are to act with the view of either appointing or removing the executive. That is the difficulty submitted to us, the difficulty which we do not get over.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I propose to leave to the future the avoiding of these difficulties, and that we should not make difficulties in advance!

Mr. MUNRO : I understand our duty as delegates to the Convention lies in this direction that we are to form a stable and workable government. We are to form a constitution which will be so workable that all interests in this grand dominion

will be as fairly represented as possible. We must have the instrument sufficiently pliable to enable us to carry on business in a proper manner. If we do not carry this out we shall probably form an institution which will be something like the congress which was originally formed in the United States, before they formed the Constitution which now exists, and in regard to which this is said in "The United States, its History and Constitution," by Alexander Johnston, page 79:

The "Articles of Confederation," adopted in 1777, were thus calculated for the meridian of the state legislatures which were to pass upon them. The new government was to be merely "a firm league of friendship" between sovereign states, which were to retain every power not "expressly" delegated to Congress; there was to be one house of congress, in which each state was to have an equal vote, with no national executive or judiciary; and congress, while keeping the power to borrow money, was to have no power to levy taxes, or to provide in any way for payment of the money borrowedonly to make recommendations to the states, or requisitions on the states, which they pledged their public faith to obey. The states were forbidden to make treaties, war, or peace, to grant titles of nobility, to keep vessels of war or soldiers, or to lay imposts which should conflict with treaties already proposed to France or Spain. Important measures required the votes of nine of the thirteen states, and amendments the votes of all. Congress had hardly more than an advisary power at the best. It had no power to prevent or punish offences against its own laws, or even to perform effectively the duties enjoined upon it by the articles of confederation. It alone could declare war; but it had no power to compel the enlistment, arming, or support of an army. It alone could fix the needed amount of revenue; but the taxes could only be collected by the states at their own pleasure. It alone could decide disputes between the states; but it had no power to compel either disputant to respect or obey its decisions. It alone could make treaties with foreign nations, but it had no power to prevent individual states from violating them. Even commerce, foreign and domestic, was to be regulated entirely by the states, and it was not long before state selfishness began to show itself in the regulation of duties on imports. In everything the states were

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to be sovereign, and their creature, the federal government, was to have only strength enough to bind the states into nominal unity, and only life enough to assure it of its own practical impotence.

Surely we are not going to impose a form of government of that kind. Surely we do not want to have a government which will not have the inherent power in itself, and a constitution which will not give the whole of the dominion, to carry on their inherent power to those who represent the own business. If we are to divide that power equally in connection with questions of finance, between the senate and the house of representatives, the result would absolutely be want of power to carry on business at all.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: How about the United States?

Mr. MUNRO: The United States are in a totally different position. In the United States the real executive power is in the senate, because the senate can veto the appointments made by the President, and there is no responsible government. We are now dealing, I understand, with the idea of having responsible government in this dominion of ours. I, for one, believe in responsible government. It is the only form of government with which we are familiar, and under which we are best able to do our business. But how can you have responsible government if you have a governor calling in an executive as his advisers, and if after that executive has submitted financial measures to the house of representatives, and shown that they are absolutely necessary for the good of the country, the senate vetoes the measures. Where, then, does the responsibility lie? The responsibility must lie in the senate, not in the house of representatives, because if the senate is to prevent the house of representatives carrying out financial operations the result is that the senate is supreme. And that is the difference between what we are proposing to do, and Second day.

what has occurred in the United States. I quite admit that the United States system suits them; and if we are simply going to form a republic, and to establish an institution in which the executive will not be in Parliament, and will not be responsible, the state of affairs will be totally different. But I am contemplating that this Convention has in view the formation of true responsible government. Now, I quite admit that in the Australian colonies we have never had true responsible government. We have what is called responsible government, but we have not responsible government in reality. If we had responsible government we should never have had the troubles we have had in the past in regard to our two chambers. If our ministers occupied the positions they ought to occupy under a dominion government, and such as are occupied by the British Government

Mr. GILLIES: Have there been no troubles in England under responsible government?

Mr. MUNRO I admit that they have had troubles there and everywhere else. There are troubles wherever human beings exist; but I say that whilst there may be troubles, we are not called upon to create them ourselves by bringing new parties into the contract who will be bound to cause troubles amongst us. The hon. member, Mr. Fysh, takes a more hopeful view of the situation, and whilst leaning, in some respects, towards giving some power to the senate, he honestly admits that the ultimate decision must be with the house of

representatives; and without that I do not see how we are to form a proper constitution at all. I was well pleased indeed with the tone of his remarks in that direction. I thought, he being a member of an upper chamber, that his leaning might be strongly in another direction.

Dr. COCKBURN: There is no analogy between a senate and an upper chamber!

Mr. MUNRO: There is a little analogy; they are not the same, I admit.

Sir THOMAS MCILWRAITH: The hon. member's argument is founded on the fact that they are the same!

Mr. MUNRO: Oh, no! I shall come to that matter directly. I am only dealing at present with the question of finance; I am only dealing with the fact that some one must be responsible for the finances. You cannot arrange the finances of a country by having co-ordinate jurisdiction in two chambers. While I state what I have stated with regard to the remarks of the President, with which I have already stated I was very well pleased indeed, I am not so well pleased with the resolutions. While you, sir, seemed to be very clear as to your own ideas of what sort of constitution we ought to have, the resolutions submitted to us do not seem to be quite so clear in that direction; and looking carefully through them it appeared. to me that there was something wanting -that is, with regard to the first series of resolutions; I do not mean with regard to the second series of resolutions. The first series of resolutions states:

That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing colonies shall remain intact, except in respect to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and authority of the national federal government.

Of course we could mould a constitution upon a resolution of that sort in any direction we might think proper. There is a certain amount of vagueness about it which,

perhaps, is necessary at the commencement, but which, probably, will require to be amended in Committee. I do not intend to submit an amendment, but shall merely state my view as to how the resolution ought to read. Instead of the 1st resolution I would say:

The powers and authority necessary or incidental to the federal government shall be set forth in the constitution. The powers not dele.

That is the wording of the latter part of one of the clauses of the Constitution of the United States, and it puts the matter very clearly as to what powers are given to the federal government, and there is no difficulty in understanding it. Then with regard to the 2nd resolution:

That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be absolutely free.

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I may say that there is some doubt in the minds of some of the delegates with regard to what is intended by this resolution. can clearly understand that it would be impossible to give effect to this resolution until the federal parliament has passed a law giving effect to it. That is my view with regard to it; but others are of opinion that it is intended to put this in the Constitution, and the result would be that there would be intercolonial freetrade before the federal parliament had power to deal with the tariff at all.

HON. MEMBERS: No!

Mr. MUNRO: Of course that would be impossible, and consequently I thought that this form would suit better:

All customs duties shall be uniform throughout the federated colonies, and the power and authority to impose such duties shall be vested in the federal house of representatives. All laws imposing customs duties shall be subject to the provision that trade and intercourse between the federated colonies shall be free. That would be provided by the law to be passed by the federal parliament after it had met, instead of being in doubt as it is at the present time. With regard to the trade being free as between the colonies, of course we who here represent a colony which has for many years established a protective system must be guarded in the action that we take in this matter, because under our system very important

ments have been created, and unless we take some means to secure that they shall not be ruthlessly dealt with, and shall not be deprived of their position. without having any power to resist the action that is taken with regard to them, I think we should fail in our duty. We are here undoubtedly to concede all that we possibly can with a view to have a proper constitution for the federated colonies; we are here for the purpose of establishing a thorough dominion, and for the purpose of conceding all that we possibly can; but I do not think we should be justified in allowing any doubt to remain upon this question that is, on the question whether the intercourse between the colonies should be free prior to the federal parliament having power to form its own. tariff. I think that that question should be put beyond any doubt. I, for one, am quite sure that we should be perfectly safe with the federal parliament; I am quite satisfied on that point, but others are not. Others hold a different opinion, and, of course, we shall have considerable difficulty in getting our constituents to agree with us in allowing the federal parliament to deal with this question; but we shall have far greater difficulty in reconciling them to the change if we are not clear in telling them that prior to any free-trade existing between the colonies the federal parliament will be enabled to form its own tariff and pass its own laws. We ought to be able to give them that assurance, and I am quite sure that that is the intention of the delegates here present, but we ought to have it put in such a form that there can be no doubt about it. With regard to the military and naval defence of Australia being intrusted to federal forces, of course no one can object to that; in fact, one of the reasons why this Convention has been called into existence, and why it is necessary to have the dominion at all, is Second day.