"Curt, what is going on in your country? You told us that this was a technology program between our two countries to build stability, to build transparency, and, now, without consulting us, you are cutting the funding on it."

I said, "I don't know. I will get you the answer."

I said to my colleagues this morning-and I interact with the Russians frequently-that I haven't received a letter yet from Mr. Lukeem on the Missile Defense bill; perhaps, I will, because I know they have concerns about missile defense, and, by the way, I am going to go over to Russia to meet with Duma and Lukeem and to share our reasons why we are doing this. But I did get a letter from his on the MEADS Program; that letter came last week, and I have gotten calls from Academician Savon.

Now, I know you have a plan, and I respect that plan. You have a list of alternatives and you will describe them today, but, again, we canceled the RAMOS project. I think while there may have been some technical reasons, I think, also, in my own opinion, it was probably budget-driven.

I can understand that all programs have to be rigorously reviewed and that weaker programs get pushed to the end of the line, but when the R&D budget declines so precipitously, many important programs are reduced or shut down, not due to technical difficulties but to overall lack of funding. It is especially egregious in ballistic missile defense programs. When BMD is one of the most critical deficiencies in our military today, and we consider it one of our three top challenges: missile defense, use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorists incidents, and cyberwarfare, the use of information systems to attack our information systems.

I am delighted to have General Martin with us today, because the Air Force is the only service which has really stepped up to funding some of the more important BMD efforts on its own. Thank you, General, for that effort. Yet, the shortage of R&D funds hits the Air Force in the same way. The Air Force, for example, is fully funding the Airborne Laser (ABL) which I believe will be an important part of our theater missile defense architecture and has stepped up to the plate on the Space-based Laser (SBL) program with additional funds and a responsible program that will embody technical advances developed over the next several years.

But I am extremely concerned that the Air Force has to some extent-not to some extent, has arbitrarily cut funding and slowed the Space Based Infared System (SBIRS) High Program which is important to NMD and TMĎ. I have been convinced-and, perhaps, you will correct me in the record-I have been convinced that we can move up SBIRS High two years earlier than what is currently called for. It is not a technical issue; it is not a technical challenge; it is simply a dollar issue, and I would ask you in your response to respond to that concern. I think the reduction was more of an apparent need to free up funds for other purposes in Fiscal Year 2000. The delay has literally no programmatic basis and, in fact, will end up costing the Air Force and the American taxpayer $0.5 billion in increased program costs and years of delay.

Nor am I satisfied with the way the Air Force dealt with Congress on this matter. It is not acceptable to inform after the fact that the contractors has been ordered to slow work in Fiscal Year

1999 because of a proposed cut in Fiscal Year 2000. After all, it is the Congress that raises the funds, not the Administration. We are the ones that tax the people; we are the ones that provide the funds for you all to spend. We think we should be consulted before the contractors are told to do something based on a decision that may or may not occur in the following fiscal year. This approach denies us the prerogative to review DOD actions and address those it finds to be unjustified.

I am looking forward to the testimony today. I do have the highest respect for you; you all know that. General Lyles, there was some misperceptions a few years ago, and you know publicly I said, I think you have been a stellar leader on behalf of our country, and I restate that today. Dr. Gansler, I have been very impressed with the thought process you use and the approach you take under very difficult circumstances. We are not here to be adversaries to you; we are your friends. We may have disagreements on technologies, but we are here to assist you, and, General Martin, I would say the same for you. I would also like you, at some point in time, to, in your discussion, talk about Arrow and Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) and our cooperation with Israel; extending cooperation to the Middle Eastern countries beyond Israel to include the Gulf States which I think is important because they are so concerned about the growing threat of medium-range missiles.

So, we have an aggressive agenda today, and I apologize for having my opening statement take so long, but we only get to see you publicly a few times a year, so we have to kind of fit it all in at that opportunity we have.

With that, I will turn to my good friend and colleague, Owen Pickett.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Curt Weldon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses here this morning but still would like to take a few moments to make some comments about the missile defense programs.

First, I couldn't agree more with the markup that we just concluded of H.R. 4 dealing with the deployment of a national missile defense, because I think it is today's reality and a very obvious thing for this Congress to be doing at this stage of the process.

And, second, I am increasingly concerned about whether or not we are spending our missile defense dollars wisely. You have already mentioned, Mr. Chairman, what the Air Force has done on the Space-based Infrared Systems High, SBIRS High Program, in order to meet other priorities. But when we look at the current proposals for NMD, SBIRS High and Low, THAAD, Navy Area, and Patriot PAC-3, there is a common thread running through all of these that is quite troubling. In each case, when program risks have increased the solution has been the same: slow it down and push it to the right. Mr. Chairman, these programs are already too late and cost too much. This kind of decision making dramatically

increases costs and makes a bad situation worse. In my judgment, this approach is not consistent with spending our dollars wisely.

Third, I sense an increasing unwillingness to allow challenging R&D efforts to mature. We must learn to become more patient with the science of hitting a bullet with a bullet for if we are to achieve the near 100 percent reliability that is required, we must allow this science and technology to mature. I believe we need to stay the course and resist the temptation to write report cards on each of these programs after each test.

Fourth, I think we need to guard against successive concurrence between and among the various missile defense programs. If we do not sequence these programs, we risk having four or five major programs simultaneously starved for funds and limping along at inefficient and costly rates.

And, fifth, I think the programs, Mr. Chairman, should be structured in such a way that we reward success in these programs and allow programs that move along quicker than expected technologically to get the funding they need to maintain that acceleration.

And, finally, I think all of us charged with oversight responsibilities need to become more vigilant. We must guard against decision making that is not based on what is in the best interest of the overall missile defense programs-and here I am including all of them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome our witnesses today. Mr. WELDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Pickett, and before we turn to our witnesses, I don't see the chairman or the ranking member of the Full Committee here. Just one other piece I would like to insert into the record, a letter we just received from Academician Savon, also from Russia, relative to the transparency issue between U.S. and Russia.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 117.]

I think it is important to read into the record—and I know you received a letter, Dr. Gansler, or you got a letter from Mr. McKelov who is the leading administrator of atomic energy, and he tells us he hasn't received a response yet on this matter. And I quote, "The danger of not funding RAMOS by the Department of Defense and U.S. Congress cause very concerns on the Russian side, because this work was always viewed by both sides as a possibility to start and further develop joint efforts in securing a strategic stability. Furthermore, we also feel it is important to mention that the joint RAMOS team which consists of Russian and American specialists in the area of space-based early warning systems, the trust and mutual understanding achieved in the course of joint work is a very good foundation for the development of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of spaced-based systems of early warning." And that is from Academician Savon, just received by me on the Administration's issue, and we will discuss that.

And one final point-we, I think, try in a very bipartisan way to approach these issues on the facts and on what is best based on the threats that we see. What really irritates me is when the American media distorts what this whole debate is all about. Nothing could have incensed me more than Tuesday of this week when the head of one of the largest institute's in Russia, the Kachartoff Institute, Dr. Yageni Vilikov was in my office. We were discussing

joint programs, many of which this Administration proposed and which I support, to allow us to engage their scientific community. He said, "Congressman, I understand what you are doing in the area of missile defense to protect your people and your troops, but you have to understand that some of the outrageous statements in your country and the media in your country drives a different message in Russia." He didn't mention that what the Congress is trying to do is doing that, but he specifically picked up Time magazine, February 22nd, 1999 and opened up to that insert, "Star Wars, the Sequel." And what is really outrageous to me, and it was also to Dr. Vilikov, as we are trying to find common ground and trying to create stability, that Time magazine would insert a story about building stability between two countries and missile defense systems, will have an insert in the corner-and let me read this, for the record-"Destroying Russia-arms control advocates, not the Pentagon's top secret plan for waging war; 1,200 warheads hit 800 targets." And it has the targets that supposedly we would take out. Then, it goes on to say, "Killing zones: the vast spread of radiation would wipe out more than 20 million people. Exposure to 600 REMS in 24 hours would cause certain death within weeks. This is what has been broadcast all over Russia today, Time magazine's outrageous abuse of a legitimate debate and discussion between America and Russia over a new way to move our relationship forward, and, to me, it is absolutely disgusting.

With that, I would turn to our three distinguished panelists; allow you whatever time you would like to speak. Your statements will be entered into the record, without objection, and we welcome you again to the hearing.

Dr. Gansler.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACQUES S. GANSLER, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary GANSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, first of all, say that we appreciate this opportunity. We think it is a very productive and fruitful discussion, and it is a two-way dialogue very clearly, and I strongly agree with you about that article, by the way. That was clearly inappropriate.

I think we all have statements that we would appreciate you just reading into the record. What I would like to do is actually just go briefly through some charts that I put together to try to set the stage, sort of the overview for national missile defense and then ask each of the Generals to give some details.

Do you want to put the next chart up?

[The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.]

Well, I thought it would be appropriate to do, and I don't need to do this for this group, but to recognize that we recognize the totally new threatened environment. I mean, these are just-and I think you have a copy of these charts; I know some of them are going to be hard to see from your desk. I hope you all have them. If not, we will make sure you get them. But it clearly is a new threat environment, whether it be the information that you received earlier, as you were referring to, Mr. Chairman, from the

CIA, or the news that is out for everybody all over, it is an environment in which we are seeing ballistic missiles and cruise missiles around in increasing ranges and increasing capabilities. I even show on here, for example, what General Tulelli in Korea is worried about, about the hundreds of missiles facing him in North Korea.

Next slide.

[The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.]

The overall ballistic missile defense area, as we are going to be describing it here today and as we have been focusing on it for the past few years, has the three pieces associated with it: the family of weapons that we talk about for the theater missile defense, including the MEADS Program which I will come back to; the national missile defense program, including the space portions of it, and then the technology-base that includes things such as the Space-based Laser Program and also things like the RAMOS Program are being funded out of this technology base.

Next slide.

[The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.]

The total dollars that we have in the program and as presented to you in the 2000 budget, as you can see, is in the range of $4 billion a year covering these three categories. I would argue that all three of these are critically important. It is not a priority question at all. We have the troops being threatened today, so we need the theater capability; we have advancing missiles coming along against them, so we need the upper-tier associated with it; we have the national missile defense that we are now committing to-and I will come back and talk about each of these three--and then we have the technology base that we have to continue, because the threat is continuously evolving, in fact, as was pointed out, very rapidly.

Next slide.

[The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.]

In the theater missile defense family of systems, I think you are familiar with all of the pieces of it. One of the things that I would try to highlight is the importance of the integration-the Battle Management and Command and Control system. One of the things that we will highlight during our discussions is the fact that you can gain a great deal of effectiveness through a combination of a number of these systems.

For example, while it has been well advertised that the THAAD hasn't been successful on its missile portion of it, the radar portion has been extremely successful. That radar could be used to help in the discrimination for the Navy Upper-Tier System, for example. So, we might be able to get an integration of these systems much more effectively than any one individual system.

Again, it shows the MEADS System. By the way, I would correct you, Mr. Chairman. We have not canceled the MEADS-terminated the MEADS System, and I will cover in detail what we are doing with regard to MEADS. In the same way, we have not termi