forts and be able to respond to emerging threats, the technology budget should go no lower than it is today and may need to rise, as fraction of the BMDO budget, in the future.

Mr. WELDON. How will BMDO protect its advanced technology funding against other very high priorities?

General LYLES. We in the Department presently are exploring ways to protect the technology budget from future MDAP cost growth. Our current technology budget of approximately $239M includes advanced technology efforts; innovative science and technology work; the Space-Based Laser program; the Small Business Innovative Research Program, other statutory and mandated programs and all associated management and support costs. Currently, only about $80M of this funding is discretionary to be applied to high-payoff technology development and cost reduction initiatives to address the future threats.

Mr. WELDON. How does BMDO plan to interface with the services and other agencies to leverage other technology programs?

General LYLES. As I mentioned briefly in my testimony, our Advanced Technology program has become more focused through a new, more formal technology planning process which we implemented last year. The BMDO Technology Master Plan (TMP) is our guiding document for planning and executing a coherent Missile Defense Advanced Technology Program. The TMP relates our technology programs directly to threats, MDAP needs and operational capabilities. It is developed in coordination with the services, other government agencies, our allies and industry. Two key objectives of the TMP are to increase the participation of the missile defense community in the BMDO Technology Program and to maximize the leveraging of existing programs to satisfy BMDO's needs for technology.

To ensure service involvement, we established the Joint Technology Board (JTB) as a joint partnership between the BMDO Leadership and the Service Technology Directors. The JTB oversees the TMP process and reviews areas where BMDO and the Services can better coordinate technology efforts, share resources and leverage off each other to develop an integrated technology program. Service representatives are active participants on all our TMP Technology Planning Teams.

As we begin developing our second update to the TMP, we are continuing to involve other government agencies in the plan. For example, my Director for Advanced Technology recently initiated two technical interchange meetings, one with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and one with the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). We briefed both on the TMP and our programs. The NRO briefed us on some of their programs and agreed to future meetings. DARPA has shared their programs with us and offered to have us participate in "DARPA Tech,” their annual series of meetings to decide what technologies to pursue. In both cases, we are working to determine possible cooperative efforts to include in our TMP in the future.

Our TMP process continues to grow and mature. With each iteration, we have expanded our data set of "leverageable" technology programs available to meet BMDO's technology needs. We continue to make great progress toward our goal of a technology program optimized to achieve maximum benefit from each defense dollar spent.

Mr. WELDON. How would you assess the ballistic missile threat in the Middle East? Has the nature of the threat changed since last year?

[The information referred to is classifed and is retained in the committee files.] Mr. WELDON. What is the current status of the Arrow program overall? Are any further tests scheduled? When might the system be deployed? Has the U.S. learned anything of value from this program?

General LYLES. The design of the Arrow Weapon System is almost complete and we expect Israel to declare an initial operational capability in late CY99 or early CY00. The Arrow Weapon System successfully completed an integrated flight test on September 14, 1998, which demonstrated the capability of all elements of the Arrow Weapon System to operate effectively. This test, a non-intercept fly out against a simulated target, completed the Arrow Continuation Experiments program and was the first flight test for the Arrow Deployability Program. The next Arrow Deployability Program integrated flight test later this summer will be an intercept test against a ballistic target. The U.S. has, and continues to receive technical data, risk reduction information, and lessons learned from the Arrow missile development efforts that are used in development of U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts. As an example, the Arrow program successfully demonstrated missile interception using a new type of infrared seeker, called an Indium Antimonide focal plane array. The U.S. Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the U.S. Navy Area Defense System (NADS) programs are both currently testing similar seekers.

Lessons learned from our theater missile defense interoperability efforts with Israel will be particularly useful when we establish similar interoperability with other allied nations.

Mr. WELDON. Last summer Iran tested the Shehab-3 ballistic missile, and reports show that Iran is continuing work on the longer range Shehab-4 and -5. The Rumsfeld report, a recent CIA report on proliferation, and other sources all point to widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. How would you assess the ballistic missile threat in the Middle East? Has the nature of the threat changed since last year?

[The information referred to is classifed and is retained in the committee files.] Mr. WELDON. For nearly a decade, this Congress has supported cooperation between Israel and the United States on the Arrow program. Last year, most of the Members of this Committee signed a letter in support of the Arrow program. What is the current status of the Arrow program overall? Are any further tests scheduled? When might the system be deployed? Has the U.S. learned anything of value form this program?

General LYLES. The design of the Arrow Weapon System is almost complete and we expect Israel to declare an initial operating capability (IOC) in late CY99 or early CY00. The Arrow Weapon System successfully completed an integrated flight test on September 14, 1998, which demonstrated the capability of all elements of the Arrow Weapon System to operate effectively. This test a non-intercept fly out against a simulated target, completed the Arrow Continuation Experiments program and was the first flight test for the Arrow Deployability Program. The next Arrow Deployability Program integrated flight test later this summer will be an intercept test against a ballistic target. The U.S. has, and continues to receive technical data, risk reduction information, and lessons learned from the Arrow missile development efforts that are used in development of U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts. As an example, the Arrow program successfully demonstrated missile interception using a new type of infrared seeker, called an Indium Antimonide focal plane array. The U.S. Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the U.S. Navy Area Defense System (NADS) programs are both currently testing similar seekers. Lessons learned from our theater missile defense interoperability efforts with Israel will be particularly useful when we establish similar interoperability with other allied nations.

Mr. WELDON. In 1996, the U.S. and Israel signed an agreement to complete Arrow development. The U.S. share of the program specified in that agreement was $48 million or $12 million annually over four years above the previously planned budget levels. This agreement was to lead to a high degree of inter-operability between U.S. and Israeli systems. Why has the Administration chosen not to fund Arrow as required by the agreement for the past three years?

General LYLES. In 1998, the Department of Defense agreed to amend the baseline 1996 Arrow Deployability Program international agreement to increase the U.S. cost share by $48 million for this task over FY98-01, specifically contingent upon Congressional increases to the budget for this program. Congress did increase the Arrow Deployability Program's budget by $12 million in FY98 and by $9 million in FY99. The remaining $27 million for the FY00 through FY01 U.S. cost share is unfunded. While I fully support the need for this enhancement, the non-availability of out-year money prevented me from identifying funds for this added work. With continued Congressional support, I am confident the Arrow enhancement effort can be successfully completed.

Mr. WELDON. Could the schedule for an SBL readiness demonstrator be accelerated responsibly?

General LYLES. With sufficient funding, limitations on its advanced technology content, and modified acquisition and management plans, the flight of the Space Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL IFX) (formerly known as the SBL Readiness Demonstrator) could be accelerated. The Department of Defense does not believe this is the prudent approach to the SBL program.

BMDO and the U.S. Air Force are in the process of planning for an IFX launch in 2012 as part of an overall operational system development plan. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has given permission to conduct an integrated ground demonstration (IGD), and the USD (A&T) directed BMDO, "[w]orking with the Air Force as the executing agent, [to] structure a program leading to an SBL integrated flight experiment in FY12." Approval for the SBL IFX is to be sought after the advanced technologies have been demonstrated.

While several of the required technologies at the component level of a SBL demonstrator were developed and demonstrated over the past 15 years, integration of the hardware and software into a configuration that can be launched and tested in

space is a significant challenge. To achieve a launch date much before 2010 the program would rely on the current SBL technology and design efforts. The program would also require a substantial increase in near term funding to meet the much earlier schedule.

Mr. WELDON. Could the schedule for an SBL readiness demonstrator be accelerated responsibly?

General MARTIN. The present program schedule could not be accelerated appreciably without introducing unacceptable risk into the SBL flight experiment. The SBL RD, now called the SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (or SBL IFX), will integrate SBL technologies into a spacecraft configuration to demonstrate the technological feasibility of performing missile defense from space. The content of the SBL IFX program has been augmented in response to recommendations by Independent Review Teams chaired by Gen (Ret) Welch, the most recent being IRT-3 on 29-30 December 1998, and recommendations by Dr. Gansler. Accordingly, the SBL IFX program includes early risk reduction efforts, cooperative technology development efforts, and an architecture study to ensure that the IFX addresses the critical risk areas that affect control system performance, operability, and affordability of an operational system. The resulting schedule for the IFX launch and on-orbit experiments and demonstrations are currently projected for the 2012 timeframe. A major thrust of the IFX program includes the demonstration of critical technologies prior to a preliminary design review (PDR) for the IFX program. Examples include successful testing of an uncooled high-power laser resonator that is required for lowjitter space operation of any high-power laser, and demonstration of segmented deployable optics at a scale that is traceable to an operational SBL.

To significantly accelerate the present SBL IFX program, would change the moderate risk of the present IFX program to that of high risk. A very undesirable outcome of acceleration may be the purchase of long lead items whose performance specifications end up being wrong from having been selected too prematurely. Another undesirable outcome would be to bring about the creation of a large "standing army" who end up burning funds while "marching in place" due to an unresolved technical problem. It is viewed as being significantly more sensible to drive down risks early and prior to further ramping up of funding levels. A program approach has been developed to balance making the desired progress to a flight experiment and the needed technology risk reduction. The current program follows this approach and is being fully funded through the FYDP by the Department.

By seriously limiting the advanced technology content of the planned IFX, modifying acquisition and management plans, and sufficiently increasing the funding, the SBL program could launch a flight experiment sooner than 2012. One example of limiting the advanced technology content would be launching the experiment without including lightweight, deployable optics into the IFX system. However, large, lightweight, deployable optics is considered a key technology for achieving an affordable operational system. `IRT-3 concluded that integrating deployable optics in the IFX system is "important enough to warrant the additional investment of time and money (recently accomplished in the Air Force and BMDO budget) for the IFX and will, in the longer run, save both time and money." Ultimately, not integrating deployable optics on the IFX would significantly increase the risk and potentially delay the schedule of a future operational system.

Mr. WELDON. How much operational legacy is the SBL RD expected to have? How much relevance can an SBL RD have to a future operational system that wouldn't be deployed for another 10-15 years?

General LYLES. [The information referred to is classifed and is retained in the committee files.]

General MARTIN. The primary purpose of the Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX) (renamed from the SBL RD) is to demonstrate the feasibility of placing and holding a lethal laser beam on a distant target in a space environment. Demonstrating the ability to integrate the key functions required to accomplish this is considered more important than demonstrating specific technologies in space. Wherever possible, however, technologies that are likely to be used in an operational system will be employed in the IFX as this provides the greatest advancement toward the eventual operational capability. Some technologies such as large lightweight deployable optics, wavefront control, and jitter control-are likely to be applicable to any operational system. Other technologies such as specific laser components and subsystems may not be applicable to all possible eventual systems.

Mr. WELDON. How sensitive is the SBL RD and the technologies it will embody to the possible architectures of an operations SBL system?

General LYLES. The most critical issues to be resolved by the SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL IFX) (renamed from the SBL RD) for an operational SBL system are integration issues. However, based on the priorities of the Department

of Defense, and in an attempt to put the operational system on a path to be launched using a planned launch vehicle, the USD (A&T) and I believe it is prudent to demonstrate more advanced technologies on the SBL IFX, which might provide significant improvements in the areas of performance, cost, weight, and volume. We decided to maximize the legacy of the SBL IFX to the advanced concept operational system. While this approach will delay the schedule of the SBL IFX, it will reduce the overall risk of deploying an operational system launchable on a planned booster. As a result, BMDO and the Air Force will structure a program leading to an SBL IFX in FY12, but we will develop advanced technologies and conduct an integrated ground demonstration (IGD) before committing to the flight experiment.

General MARTIN. The most critical issues to be resolved by the SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL IFX) (renamed from the SBL RD) for an operational SBL system are integration issues. However, based on the priorities of the Department of Defense, and in an attempt to put the operational system on a path to be launched using a planned launch vehicle, it is prudent to time the SBL IFX to exploit the advanced technologies that could provide significant improvements in the areas of performance, cost, weight, and volume. We decided to maximize the legacy of the SBL IFX to the advanced concept operational system. While this approach will somewhat delay the IFX schedule, it will significantly reduce the overall risk of developing an operational system. Furthermore, ensuring we are on a path to an affordable architecture is the reason we are conducting a Space High Energy Laser Affordability and Architecture Study. The results from this study will help guide the SBL technology development path and IFX as well as other Science and Technology efforts.

Mr. WELDON. Is the SBL RD fully funded?

General LYLES. The Space Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL IFX) (formerly known as the SBL Readiness Demonstrator) is fully funded through the FYDP at $139M/yr ($75M/yr from BMDO PE 63173C and $64M/yr from AF PE 63173F). The current estimate to fund the SBL program during FY 06-12 has been allocated in the Department's extended planning estimates.

Mr. WELDON. Is the SBL RD fully funded?

General MARTIN. The SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX) (renamed from the SBL RD) is fully funded through the FYDP at $139M/year ($75M/year from BMDO and $64M/year from the Air Force). The current estimate to fund the SBL program during FY06-12 shows that an increased funding level will be required past the FYDP to launch the IFX in 2012.

Mr. WELDON. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMBO) identified the JSTARS Radar Technology Insetion Program (RTIP as one that may improve attack operations effectiveness. Is RTIP fully funded? What impact would additional funding have on program risk, schedule, and system capability?

General MARTIN. Yes. RTIP is fully funded on a 'deliberate' pace that will provide 5 RTIP equipped Joint STARS by late 2010.

Additional funding would have little to no impact on program risk and system capability. However, additional funding could accelerate delivery of the 5 RTIP equipped Joint STARS by up to 2 years.

We are confident that RTIP development has low program risk. We have already spent two years in detailed planning and risk reduction activities and have already invested $22M. We have also invested $125M in RTIP enabling computer architecture for advanced signal processing in the Joint STARS aircraft (with minimal software revisions).

Mr. WELDON. How much funding needs to be restored to the program to protect the SBIRS high schedule?

General MARTIN. The SBIRS High cannot be restored to its previous FY02 first launch. The results of the Joint Estimate Team (JET) to determine a most probable cost for the restructured SBIRS High program will form a solid baseline from which an accelerated schedule and cost requirement could be defined. In Feb 1999, the Air Force estimated that $330 million of additional FY00 funding over the submitted President's Budget would be needed to return to the previous SBIRS High launch date. However, the Air Force does not have much confidence in this figure given we have passed the date at which we could have reverted to the previous schedule.

Mr. WELDON. After what date is the Air Force decisions to slow work on SBIRS High irreversible?

General MARTIN. The decision to delay the FY02 launch of the first SBIRS geosynchronous satellite was irreversible on March 30, 1999.

Mr. WELDON. Why was Congress informed only after the decision was taken to slow the program?

General MARTIN. Following the final decision to delay the SBIRS High program, immediate contractual slowdown action was required to maximize savings in FY99.

These FY99 savings were necessary to minimize budgetary requirements in the FY00 budget request.

Mr. WELDON. Why would the Air Force penalize itself with increased cost within its own future years defense plan?

General MARTIN. Higher priority requirements required funding to fit within a constrained fiscal year 2000 budget. The SBIRS High program delay provided FY00 budget resources for these higher priorities but did result in cost increased to the program in later years.

Mr. WELDON. How does the Air Force intend to support the engineering team and prevent a production break in the SBIRS High sensor suite?

General MARTIN. A SBIRS High Joint Estimate Team (JET) is assessing the restructed SBIRS High program to determine a most probable cost estimate for the restructure. The JET assessment will include recommendations to minimize costs which would include minimizing production breaks.

Mr. WELDON. How does the Air Force intend to address the $100 million shortfall for the scaled back SBIRS High Program?

General MARTIN. The Air Force has submitted a fully offset budget amendment to the Department of Defense based on our current budget estimate. This budget amendment was forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget on April 14, 1999, and will correct the FY00 budget shortfall. The Joint Estimate Team (JET) will finalize a most probable cost estimate for the restructured SBIRS High program. The JET estimate will be used to update the budget amendment in FY01 and out as necessary.

Mr. WELDON. Was BMDO involved in the decision making process? At what level? General MARTIN. The BMDO Director was briefed on the Air Force's approach before the slowdown of the SBIRS High program was contractually implemented. The BMDO Director did not have any objections to the Department's approach.

Mr. WELDON. When did the Air Force know the demonstration programs were over cost and behind schedule?

General-MARTIN. The first cost growth on the Flight Demonstration System (FDS) occurred in the November 1996, timeframe. The Low Altitude Demonstration System (LADS), awarded subsequent to FDS, began showing cost overrun in the June 1997, timeframe. The February 1999, decision to terminate both programs resulted from an assessment of both programs which showed they had reached a point of diminishing return given their newest cost overrun predictions of mid-January 1999. This most recent estimate revealed that FDS required more funding than that appropriated for FY99 and both programs would run out of funds in early February 1999.

Mr. WELDON. When did the Air Force have the data providing the proofs of principle necessary to proceed with SBIRS Low without the demonstrations?

General MARTIN. The cost growths on both demonstration programs that were first reported to the Air Force in January 1999, forced a reevaluation of the program that determined that the point of diminishing returns had been reached.

The efforts of the Flight Demonstration System and Low Altitude Demonstration System, prior to their termination, had resulted in significant risk reduction progress particularly in the areas of sensor production and integration. Also, onorbit phenomenology data is now available from the Midcourse Space Experiment, launched in FY96, and the Miniature Sensor Technology Initiative, launched in FY97. By coupling the above information with an expanded Program Definition/Risk Reduction phase, the government believes proof of principle and risks will be well understood at EMD start (Summer, 2002). Further, a Defense Science Board Independent Review Committee is reviewing this strategy to ensure risks are adequately reduced.

Mr. WELDON. What requirements were not being met that limited the operational legacy of the demonstration systems? Why is the Air Force confident of that assessment without having completed program definition?

General MARTIN. The demonstrations did not meet a variety of requirements expected for the operational SBIRS low satellite. For example, they would not be able to meet duty cycle (on-time) nor be able to provide real-time downlink and on-board processing sufficient to meet the expected SBIRS Low requirements. The SBIRS Low demonstration satellites, due to these technical limitations, could not be operationalized.

Mr. WELDON. Why is the restructured program lower risk than proceeding with the demonstrations?

General MARTIN. Because the funding required to support the overruns of the two demonstrations would remove funding necessary to perform requirements definition and initial design of the operational SBIRS Low system. Further, the schedule delays of the two demonstrations were encroaching on the Milestone II decision