nated the RAMOS Program. In both of these, we have had redirections of them, but not termination of them. Next slide. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] The overall triad, if you will, that we are dealing with here in the theater area covers the full spectrum, from the near-term, short-term systems that are already here to the longer-term ones. The system defenses that we are now putting together for it, naturally, cover this full spectrum as well. In the boost phase, which is the most desirable place to intercept, if you can, any weapons of mass destruction, are over enemy territory. We are working here on trying to do it with the Airborne Laser System (ABL). And then the ascent phase, the Navy System-if the ship is in the right place; has an accurate atmospheric capability against it, and then we get into the upper-tier systems with THAAD and Navy Theater Wide, and then the lower-tier systems down here for the terminal phase with MEADS, THAAD, Navy Area, and Patriot. Next slide, please. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] I am doing this to try to set a perspective on the overall program, and that is the reason for just kind of going through these quickly. Within the theater missile defense area, you see the major funding categories for the PAC-3, the Navy Area Systems, the Navy Theater Wide, the THAAD. I will cover in a minute the restructuring of the Upper-Tier Program but also the Airborne Laser and the MEADS Program. I should emphasize that these are not the inclusive costs, because on the Navy programs, the ships and the radars and the launchers and so forth are those associated with the ship program, but this does cover the software associated with the radars, the missiles, and other portions of it. That is why it is not an exact one-to-one comparison between, say, the Navy systems and the Army systems. You will notice the MEADS Program, we did restructure this program; we have put in a $150 million for the critical technologies that we feel are necessary for a mobile system defense. In other words, the MEADS requirement is a mobile system. This is one that we are now in discussions with our Italian and German allies. Hopefully, they will take part in this. We have suggested to them— and we feel strongly for the United States-that what we want is a low-risk program that will satisfy the mobile requirement. We think using the PAC-3 missile minimizes the risks and the costs associated with this mobile requirement, but we still need to have a mobile launcher; we still need a radar that will go 360 degrees against the advanced threats, and that what these developments are for. We are anticipating that the Italians and the Germans will participate in this program, and we are now working-we hope to get Congressional and Administration support for the continuation of that program, a long-term program. Mr. WELDON. Dr. Gansler, for the record, your small footnote down there is important for members to understand. You have included, basically, Air Force funding for ABL Secretary GANSLER. Yes. Mr. WELDON.—which is really not a BMDO line item, isn't that correct? Secretary GANSLER. That is a very important point, Mr. Chairman. What I am presenting here is the Department of Defense integrated picture, and some portions of it are being funded by Air Force; some portions of it are being funded by BMDO, and so forth. Mr. WELDON. Members need to understand that, because in past years there have been, in fact, separate budgeting processes by the Services, so when you create the perception that there is a stable funding line or, perhaps, an increase, in effect, if you compare it to past years in the budgeting process, there would be a decrease, because that ABL line would be in the Air Force's budget and not in the BMDO budget. Is that correct? Secretary GANSLER. No. This is not the BMDO budget. Mr. WELDON. No, but when we look at the BMDO budgetSecretary GANSLER. Yes, if you were to look at two separate budgets, you would see differences. I am trying to give you the overall Department of Defense Mr. WELDON. Right, but up until last year, we always dealt with the BMDO budget separate, and that is the point I am making. I don't want to give people the false impression that we are putting more money into BMDO than we actually are. Secretary GANSLER. And I don't want to either. Mr. WELDON. Okay. Secretary GANSLER. What I am trying to do is to explain that I think it is better to look at the total program Mr. WELDON. Okay, I understand, and I agree. Secretary GANSLER.-but there are some portions of it, for example, the Space-based Laser, that are actually being shared by the Air Force and BMDO. So, to have two separate budgets I don't think would present the overall picture properly. Mr. WELDON. Mr. Pickett. Mr. PICKETT. Quickly, could you explain the Navy Theater Wide and the Upper-Tier? You have got zeros and then you have got― Secretary GANSLER. Yes, that is my next chart, sir. Mr. PICKETT. Okay. Secretary GANSLER. Just let me get-in fact, why don't we move into that, because it might be easier to see that. What we did-in fact, maybe you can put that one back for a minute when we had last year's program, what you would have seen here on the Navy Theater Wide is a much lower level program, because a decision had been made a few years ago, before my time, that we would stress the THAAD Program as the first system to be deployed, and then we would keep the technology going on the Navy Upper-Tier Program, and that would be out beyond the 2010 time period kind of deployment. And, so you would have seen a very different picture here. Now, what we are trying to do is to restructure it to try and get a much earlier capability with either or both the THAAD or the Navy Upper-Tier, and that is what this next slide is. Can I see that now? [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] So, what we were facing in putting together the 2000 budget to submit to you was the fact that, clearly, the medium-range threat is growing rapidly, and, clearly, we would like to field something as soon as possible. We were also facing the fact that THAAD not only had cost growth but has had five out of five quality failures recently, and so if everything were equal and you had no growing threat, you would probably say, "Well, gee, that program is not very successful. Maybe we ought to even think about canceling it and doing something differently or trying to redirect it significantly." Because of the fact that this threat is so imminent, we felt that it was really important to continue on with this program but to give us some alternative in the event that it continued to fail. We were very concerned that we had no choice. If that system didn't work, what would we do about this growing threat? So what we decided, given the schedule slips, given the quality of problems and the cost growth we have on that program, we felt that it was necessary to develop an alternative to get something quickly, and that is why we decided to accelerate the Navy Theater Wide System, to add significant money into that program so that we had a choice with the programs. Now, that one, we had previously, as I said, funded at a very low level. We have now created a program which had previously been our technology effort, and these two are now running essentially in parallel. The idea would be that if both worked, we would then try to continue both of them. If one doesn't, we have an alternative. In the event that one is earlier than the other, we can take advantage of that. In fact, we could even go to the extreme, perhaps, of using the Navy on land with that radar that I mentioned earlier from THAAD that works well. So, we have a variety of alternatives now that we didn't have before, and the idea would be to try to get something early through this competition and using competition, also, to reward success and to encourage the contractors to stop this continuous quality, cost, and schedule problems that we have been running into. Next slide, please. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] So, what we have created here is an Upper-Tier Program that has both the THAAD flights continuing on with the current systems. They have built missiles that were, in fact, built in the 1994 and 1995 time period. These are the ones that had quality problems. They have gone back and tried to improve the quality of those, so that hopefully we will learn from those flights. We are going to go ahead with those flights, and we have accelerated the Navy Program so that we will also have those flights. If, in fact, these THAAD flights work, we are then in a position to have a review and decide, okay, we can move out rapidly with it. On the other hand, we have now got an alternative, which is the Navy Upper-Tier Program, so that we can make a decision as to where we are going to spend those dollars that I showed on the earlier dollar chart between them. There is enough money in there to continue both programs but not at an accelerated rate. And, so what we are competing in a sense for is the accelerated dollars rather than for the total dollars. Next slide, please. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] Now, let me move quickly on to the national missile defense side, and we can come back and talk in detail about the theater missile defense as well. The mission as we see it-of course, there has always been the Russian and Chinese missiles. There we have the deterrents as the primary threat-I mean, to prevent the use of them. But with the rogue nations, with the limited capability that we see coming up, we need some limited capability against those, and, therefore, our intent was and is stated here, by the year 2000, to be in a position to make a deployment decision against primarily this rogue threat, but if we had a system, it may also have some backup capability against an inadvertent launch by somebody else. And the idea was to have as open an architecture as we could so that we could continue to evolve it against the evolving threat. Next slide. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] The national missile defense is also a complex system made up of many parts, as we showed with the theater missile defense system, and, again, a space-based system. I will show you this in a subsequent chart, but we have the current defense warning systems, and SBIRS High is the development of the follow-on to that. The SBIRS Low that we just talked about briefly is the compliment to that for more sophisticated targets. The SBIRS Low is particularly geared now at the advanced threats. We have the radar systems, and I will show how these are all used. The key element here is the kill vehicle; that is the major technical challenge, the intercept vehicle itself. And then a major second challenge is that of integrating all of this through the Battle Management Command System. Next slide. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] How these all work together, I think you are familiar with, but let me just briefly show. As you can see at the bottom here, the total time we have here is in seconds, you know, a 15-minute type of operation. It is not a long time period to go through first detection with the space system, then tracking and prediction with advanced radar systems, and then the terminal phase where we have the radars tracking, predicting, and then, finally, the intercept, and all of this has to be done in the presence of discrimination among various sophisticated pieces of the booster as well as possible decoys. Now, the assumption for the early periods is that it is a relatively unsophisticated threat that we are trying to shoot down. Next slide. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] This system, as described here, has been under development since about 1984, but with increasing intensity, as is shown by the marks on this chart, and the most critical point I wanted to high light was that in April of 1998 we then awarded a systems integration contract to try to put all of this together, and that is the focus of this effort that Boeing is now integrating these systems together with. The critical testing period is out here in 1999 and 2000. Next slide. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] The dollars here are showing last year's presidential budget and the proposed budget that we submitted to you to give you a feeling for the change that the Chairman pointed out. We have significantly increased the resources here. We have done two things here that I think are important to point out: one, we did increase the R&D, you will notice, particularly, in the out-years; that is gone now, so that it is much more significant, but in the early years to try to increase the R&D significantly, and this, of course, is where we are taking full advantage of the dollars that you provided in the supplemental, the $1 billion. Now, in addition, what we have added in is the procurement, so that if we make a decision in the year 2000 to deploy or in 2001 or when we make it, it would be appropriate for us to have the dollars there. That was the one major difference between what we said before when we had a 3+3 Program but no dollars shown in procurement. We now have the procurement dollars shown, so that if we make the decision to deploy, we have the resources to actually do it against this threat. Next slide, please. [The Charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] And the major milestones here that I thought it was appropriate to try to highlight, we are here now on the program. We have a major decision point here for deployment review in June of 2000; that was the original date that we had talked about. You will see at that point what we will have, though, is these four flights to base it on; not very many, in other words, and they will not be with the production booster which will be tested down here. This will be the first production booster flight, and the first interceptor production flights are out here shown in the green, so that what we can do at this point is clearly make a deployment decision in terms of site location, and that is important. We have these environmental studies shown down here for both Alaska and North Dakota going on now. We can make a decision on site location. If we decide at this point that we have not had sufficient technical credibility demonstrated, we can then decide and, perhaps, more realistically, in 2001, that we will then have had the first production booster tested; we will have the results of all of these flights, and we can begin site construction at that point. It also gives us this plan, at least a year here, for the negotiations that we are going to be having with the Russians if any treaty requirements take place. When we get through the first production demonstration, we can then actually decide to go ahead with the intercept vehicle. If we have more success before that, we can decide earlier. What we did was to try to put sufficient dollars in for what we thought was still a high risk but realistic program which would yield an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2005 |