of given portions of the territories of a belligerent Power." The British Government were "anxious to extend the benefits of neutrality as widely as should be found practicable, but they felt it to be absolutely necessary to insist on such provisions as should secure that, if parts of the territories of a belligerent were to be respected, as enjoying immunity from hostilities, they should in no sense and in no degree be capable of serving as a base of operations for the forces of such belligerent.' France and Portugal, "while admitting that it was natural that such provisions should be demanded, felt that it would be inconsistent with sovereign rights to accept them"; it was impossible to reconcile the contending views; and consequently all that was accepted was a declaration that the Signatory Powers would use their good offices, in case of a war in which one or more of the belligerents should hold territory in the free basin, to obtain a neutralisation of such territory during the war, by special arrangement; "under these conditions Great Britain, if she should be at war, could consent to the neutrality of belligerent territory in the free zone, but would be empowered to make her own terms by Convention." "The result of the provision is, that opportunity is given to provide for special neutralisation, but that the rights of the Sovereign State and freedom of the belligerent Power are fully reserved."

As regards States whose entire territories are in the free zone, such as the newly formed Free State of the Congo, the British delegate explained that the engagement of the Signatory Powers to respect their neutrality "does not involve a guarantee, but it entails a moral obligation." 1

"Art. XII. In case a serious disagreement originating on the subject of, or in the limits of, the territories mentioned in Article I. and placed under the free-trade system, should arise between any Signatory Powers to the present Act, or the Powers which may become Parties to it, these Powers bind themselves, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more of the friendly Powers.

In a similar case the same Powers reserve to themselves the option of having recourse to arbitration."

1 The quotations are from Sir E. Malet's letter to Earl Granville, dated Berlin, Feb. 21, 1885.

"Buffer" Zones are of quite recent origin1 as a political creation; ie. where their object is to establish upon the territory of two contiguous States a strip or Zone on either side of the frontier which the respective States agree to regard as neutral, on which the parties undertake to erect no fortifications, and to maintain no armed forces but those necessary to enforce the ordinary rights of government. The word "neutral" does not correctly describe the character of the zone. It is not neutral in

the sense of being recognised as such by any third State, and it necessarily ceases to be neutral in case of war between the States concerned. The word "buffer" comes nearest to the object, but even this term implies more than is meant.

The "buffer" zones between European and native possessions outside Europe differ according to their different purposes. Thus 8 kilometres on either side of the frontier were established by an agreement of April 12, 1882, between the King of Cambodge (under French protectorate) and the Governor of Cochin-China for the purpose of repressing a number of iniquities. Under this treaty the police authorities of both parties were allowed free access to exercise their jurisdiction throughout the zone. Between Spain and Morocco a treaty of March 5, 1894, established between the Camp of Melilla and Moroccan territory, a zone within which no new roads were to be made, no herds to be allowed to graze, no land to be cultivated, no troops of either party, or even private persons carrying arms, to set foot, no inhabitants to dwell, and all habitations to be razed. The zone between Burmah and Siam, established by an agreement between Great Britain and France, dated January 15, 1896, declared "the portion of Siam which is comprised within the drainage basin of the Menam, and of the coast streams of a corresponding longitude," neutral as between them. Within this area the two Powers undertook not to "operate by their military or naval forces, except in so far as they might do so in concert for any purpose requisite for maintaining the independence of Siam." They also undertook not to acquire within that area any privileges or commercial facilities not extended to both of them.

“Buffer" zones might fulfil a useful purpose even in Europe. They would obviously react against the well-known feeling known. as "esprit de frontière," and diminish the danger of incidents arising out of this feeling, and might attenuate the rivalry of neighbouring counter-armaments.

These considerations no doubt led the Swedish and Norwegian governments in their settlement of September, 1905, to establish a "buffer" zone of 15 kilometres on either side of the frontier

1 The institution of "buffer" zones in a more strictly correct sense of the term is of very ancient origin.

One is mentioned in the annals of China two centuries before our era, between the territories of the Huns in the west and those of the Tunguses in the east-a vast area of some 300 or 400 miles, on the opposite margins of which the two peoples kept watch. In Europe, bands of territory from time to time have been made desert to better establish separation. The Romans and Germans protected themselves in this way. In the Middle Ages the Teutonic Order established a frontier belt on the side of Lithuania. Later on, Austria dealt in the same way in her policy in regard to Turkey in the organisation of a "military frontier."

See Nys, Droit International, Brussels, 1904, i. p. 418.

between the two States in question. Within these 30 kilometres all existing fortresses are dismantled, no new ones are to be erected, and no armed troops to be maintained; any question between the two States relative to the provisions respecting the "buffer" zone to be decided by arbitration. There are other provisions in the Swedo-Norwegian Treaty, the object of which is to render armaments as between them unnecessary.

1 it was stipulated that the dismantling should be controlled by a technical Commission. of three officers of foreign nationality, to be chosen, one by each of the contracting powers, and the third by the two officers thus appointed, or, in default of an agreement on their part, by the President of the Swiss Confederation. The dismantling of the forts in question has now been carried out. The Commission was composed on the part of Sweden of an engineer on the staff of the Austrian army, and on the part of Norway of a Colonel in the German army, and, by agreement of these, of a Colonel in the Dutch army.

dismantled, and no other vessel of war shall be there built or armed.

"If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

"The naval force, so to be limited, shall be restricted to such service as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.'

"And whereas the Senate of the United States have approved of the said arrangement and recommended that it should be carried into effect, the same having received the sanction of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Britannic Majesty.

"Now, therefore, I, James Monroe, President of the United States, do, by this my proclamation, make known and declare that the arrangemer.t aforesaid, and every stipulation thereof, has been duly entered into, concluded and confirmed, and is of full force and effect." 1

1 See J. M. Callahan, The Neutrality of the American Lakes, etc. Johns Hopki Press, 1898.