Dr. Arthur M. Bueche is the General Electric Company's vice president for research and development. He directs the GE Research and Development Center in Schenectady, New York, a centralized company activity employing 625 scientists and engineers (plus a supporting staff of more than 1000) working in the general areas of electronics science and engineering, materials science and engineering, and physical science and engineering. As a corporate staff officer, he also has responsibility for monitoring the company's total effort in R&D, which is conducted by more than 15,000 engineers and scientists in facilities around the world.

Born in Flushing, Michigan, in 1920, Dr. Bueche received his Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry from the University of Michigan in 1943 and was awarded his Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Cornell University in 1947. After serving as a research associate at Cornell, he joined the staff of the General Electric Research Laboratory as a physical chemist in 1950. Following a series of managerial assignments, he was named to his present position and elected a vice president in 1965.

Dr. Bueche was elected to membership in the National Academy of Sciences in 1971 and the National Academy of Engineering in 1974. He also serves on advisory committees to the National Science Foundation, the National Research Council, the National Bureau of Standards, the National Governors' Council on Science and Technology, and the U.S. Air Force. He is active in a wide variety of professional and civic activities.

3/17/75

Dr. BUECHE. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Science and Technology, my name is Arthur M. Bueche, and I am vice president of research and development for the General Electric Co. and president of the Industrial Research Institute. But the views I express this morning are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of either organization.

Your committee, through its studies and hearings, is doing the Nation a great service in providing a forum for examining the role of one of our major resources in our national life and for exploring alternatives for organizing science and technology in the Federal Government.

Let me state at the beginning that I support the broad objectives of the proposed National Science Policy and Organization Act of 1975. My comments will focus on the question of how the provisions of the act can best serve the stated objectives. My perspective is that of an R. & D. manager who is concerned with many of the issues this committee wrestles with, but in an industrial context. From that vantage point I would like to look first at the substantive elements of work in the executive branch required to insure effective generation and use of science and technology in the United States. Next, I will comment on the organizational principles that should be applied, and I would then like to comment specifically on some of the aspects of the proposals currently under consideration.

Basically the question we're addressing is: What does the chief executive of a large, complex, highly diverse organization need in the way of inputs from science and technology to insure that his organization performs effectively in establishing and achieving its objectives? From the point of view of the chief executive, the most important aspect of his work is the formulation of policy. The formulation of objectives, the determination of posture with respect to issues, and the development of priorities provide the framework by which any large organization-be it governmental or industrial-marshals its resources and focuses its efforts.

The supporting work in this area should provide the chief executive with realistic options. The implications and probabilities of success for each option should be carefully analyzed. At the Presidential level these options of necessity are multidimensional and may involve economic, technological, political, social, and diplomatic considerations, just to mention some of them, in varying combinations. The implications and ramifications of each dimension must be explored and evaluated.

Now, although I'm a member of the scientific community. I don't believe I am stating an unduly partisan position in saying that science and technology considerations pervade most aspects of national policy issues: national security, international relations, economic growth, social amenities, the use of our natural resources, the protection of the environment, or making tradeoffs among these various areas. Thus, a process for developing policy which does not include attention to the science and technology implications of the alternatives cannot be re

garded as complete from the standpoint of the President's needs. However, this does not require placing the formulation of science policy close to the President, presumably in order to insure that science policy receives the status and influence that it warrants.

I believe past experience has shown such a view unnecessary and even at times counterproductive. This point of view first originated at a time when it was widely accepted that the potential impact of science and technology greatly exceeded the available resources and institutions. Consequently, it was felt that specific Federal policies were needed to create a change in the trajectory, to foster a massive growth in the resources available for science and technology and strengthen the institutional framework supporting science and technology. These policies had the desired effect, but I think that time is now past.

For those who are concerned with the adequacy of science policy, I point out that an emphasis on incorporating science and technology considerations into general policy formulation need not mean that science policy itself will be neglected. To the contrary, knowledgeable people with a technical background will be in a position to see that science policy is addressed when the need arises.

Another aspect of policy formulation which must be important to the President is the development of ad hoc responses to new problems. No organizational structure, or institutional arrangement, or portfolio of policies can be 100 percent successful in anticipating all future problems. Consequently, the Chief Executive Officer needs resources and mechanisms for mobilizing ad hoc responses in order to evaluate needs, resolve disputes, propose methods of attack on new problems, and so forth. Competent staff work can help reduce the need for responses of this kind, but the President does need capable trusted people available to whom he can turn with unexpected problems that don't fit neatly into the existing structure. These issues frequently involve science and technology considerations.

After policymaking, a second major category of work important to the President I would label "administrative" staff work, coordination and oversight. This work is focused on insuring that the machinery of Government operations proceeds smoothly and effectively. The pervasiveness of science and technology, which I mentioned earlier, requires that effective administrative staff work include knowledgeable technical inputs on a large variety of subjects, evaluating the technical implications of legislation, reviewing the research and development programs of the agencies and departments, allocating R. & D. budgets, evaluating the effectiveness of Federal agencies in performing R. & D., making technology assessments, reviewing regulations and administrative rules which affect science and technology. The President needs staff capability to perform this work from a technical point of view, along with expertise in fields such as law, economics, politics, State and municipal governments, and so forth.

Most of the components of the executive branch now have missions which require the generation and use of science and technology. For such operating work, I believe strongly in the advantages of decentralization. R. & D., especially development, are most effective when performed and managed as closely as possible to the organization which will use the output. While much remains to be done. I believe

admirable progress has been made in strengthening the performance and management of research and development, and even more in strengthening the role of science and technology in the program planning of Federal agencies and departments. The contrast with 20 years ago is quite dramatic. This progress affects the magnitude and caliber of the administrative staff work required in the Executive Office to provide oversight and coordination.

We now have increasing numbers of able people throughout the executive branch who have made career commitments to science and technology. They're effective advocates for the science and technology required to accomplish their assigned missions. To further insure a more general advocacy for science and technology, the National Science Foundation should continue to receive strong support.

I would like to turn now to a consideration of some principles of organization.

All organizational structures have some inherent limitations. If a structure is very effective in providing coordination, it's likely to be ineffective in stimulating initiative. If an organizational arrangement is particularly effective and efficient in moving toward a particular objective, it's likely to be inflexible in switching effort from one objective to another. A key aspect of successful organization planning is to identify as explicitly as possible the weaknesses intrinsic in any proposed structure so that compensating mechanisms or influences can be created.

A second guideline is the necessity of avoiding the mixing of responsibilities for review and evaluation on the one hand with operation and advocacy on the other. These two different responsibilities require different points of view, and different managerial skills. Credibility is lost when one tries to be both advocate and judge.

A third guideline is the desirability of keeping separate the responsibility for long-range policy-oriented work from short-range administrative staff work. Some contend that if policy-oriented work is too detached from daily life and the time pressures and constraints of the real world, it tends to become detached from reality. However, the same pressures which provide realism also tend to dominate the time and resources available. We all recognize that short-range work tends to preempt long-range work.

The important question to explore is: What compensating steps can be taken to retain realism in policy formulation if it's kept separate from administrative staff work? And I believe there are two important ones. The first is direct involvement in the policy formulation process itself, rather than consultation from the sidelines. Policy formulation is not all long range and carefully scheduled. It's often required and paced by events which don't permit lengthy scholarly analysis. Furthermore, the multidimensional nature of the process means that the expertise of each participant is confronted and challenged by that of other participants.

The second is insuring rotation of people among those participating in policy formulation. New members introduce a fresh point of view; they can challenge old arguments; and propose new alternatives. Rotation of membership has the added advantage that it's easily controllable by the Chief Executive. The combination of these two mechanisms can, in my view, substantially counteract the inherent weak

nesses associated with separating policy formulation and administrative staff work.

With this as a background, I would like to turn now to consideration of the bills which this committee has under review. I don't intend to make a comprehensive point-by-point analysis, but rather to concentrate on a few key features, particularly titles II, III, and IV, including some responsibilities that may not be adequately addressed by any of these titles.

Title II, section 201. provides for the creation of a Council of Advisers on Science and Technology of five members, with the Chairman being a member of the National Security Council.

Now, this latter provision is impressive evidence of the committee's appreciation of the pervasive nature of science and technology, and also recognizes the changing character of national security policy. Since World War II, national security has been viewed principally in terms of military preparedness and diplomatic relationships. There is growing awareness that economic and technological considerations are also critical elements of national security.

Furthermore, as my earlier remarks indicate, I am heartily in sympathy with the need to insure that the inputs of science and technology are incorporated into policy formulation. However, I believe it's possible in this respect that your committee has moved more rapidly than other elements of the Government, and perhaps of the general public. in its recognition of the importance of science and technology in formulating national security policy. Enlarging the National Security Council in a manner which carries implications of changing the concept of national security could be a major step which warrants both extended deliberation and careful preparation, which I haven't done. A possible alternative and perhaps interim arrangement would be to name the Chairman of the Council of Advisers on Science and Technology to the Domestic Council. Such action would reflect the expanding role of science and technology in civilian agencies over the past 10

years.

The question of the exact makeup of the science and technology policy group is, it seems to me, an organizational detail which should be left up to the President. Either of the arrangements now under consideration is a workable starting point. The proposal in the administration bill to make extensive use of ad hoc advice from the entire science and technology community is, in my view, a very desirable feature.

The success of this science and technology policy mechanism will obviously depend on the competence of the people chosen to staff it. The principal criteria should be breadth of experience, demonstrated capability in marshaling scientific and technical skills to attack problems, and capacity both to judge the scientific soundness of analyses and recommendations and to present technical recommendations to nontechnical people in terms which make clear the significance of those recommendations. In my view, both the academic and industrial, and I should say, Government communities contain some highly qualified potential candidates for those positions.

The substance of the items 1, 2, and 6 under section 202 on the duties and functions of the Council focuses on what I would term "science policy," rather than general policy formulation. Items 3 and 4 con