-2 clear agreement on its responsibilities and duties. From that base, the organizational arrangements fall into place naturally. I hope that the final legislation will explicitly specify the responsibilities of the new apparatus, as is done in HR 4461. Definition of responsibilities is critical since the new apparatus will have a statutory base and the permanence that goes with it. apparatus has a recognized role and mission, it could become merely a figurehead. That would be the worst of all possible outcomes, namely, the illusion only of bringing science and technology to bear for national purposes. Unless the new I have testified before this Committee on the importance of defined responsibilities and what they might be. So, let me confine my remarks to comments on President Ford's bill submitted to the Congress on June 9, 1975, and on HR 4461. President Ford's bill proposes a single Director of an Office of Science and Technology Policy who will also serve as the President's Science Adviser. I prefer this arrangement to the Council proposed under Title II of HR 4461 because the simpler structure will be easier to staff and manage. Councils and commissions tend to be unwieldy and less effective than individuals. However, the President's bill does not, in my opinion, give adequate scope to the Director's function. The functions outlined under Title II of HR 4461 remedy this deficiency with one exception. Namely, the budgetary review and reporting assigned under Section 302 of HR 4461 belongs, in my opinion, in the Executive Office of Science and Technology Policy. Otherwise, the Depart ment envisioned under Title III will have a conflict of interest similar to that currently attributed to the NSF in its coordinating role for federal R&D. With the above exceptions, I would support Title II of HR 4461. -3 Let me now address Title I of HR 4461. The idea of a statutory declaration of science policy is an interesting one. It seems to me, however, that a statutory policy is likely to lack the flexibility needed for adapting to changing requirements. For example, Title I does not mention encouragement of private innovation though there are several implied references to this goal. The point is that policy emphasis must fit the temper of the times and depends on subtle nuances which are difficult to communicate immutably. Perhaps an alternate to Title I would be to ask the Science and Technology Policy Office for a yearly statement similar to the Presidential Message on Science and Technology submitted to the Congress on March 16, 1972. Title I might be modified to specify such a yearly report and to delineate the essential subjects to be addressed. Title III establishing a Department of Research and Technology Operations addresses an important issue. In my testimony on Reorganization Plan #1 in June 1974, I recognized the importance of an advocacy point in government for science and technology. I said that such a point was one logical justification for a Cabinet department including NSF, NASA, ERDA, NBS, and NOAA, but that I was still opposed. Now I have changed my mind. As defined in Title III to include only these R&D-intensive agencies and with the significant addition of the Smithsonian Institution, the concept is supportable. I now believe that it is wise to establish a rallying point for those in our society that believe science and technology are prime resources for advancing this nation's welfare. Additional benefits would come because agencies within the Department would view their roles and missions with new perspective, as AEC elements in ERDA now do. I understand that Title III goes well beyond the subject of science -4 advice per se, but I think such a governmental focus for the rational problem Finally, with respect to the Science and Technology Information and Utilization Corporation, I believe the functions outlined are beyond question. Generally, I favor a self-supporting organization to carry out these functions. Indeed, in the same sense that advice cannot be impressed on an unwilling subject, neither can information. It can be made available but there is no way to forcefeed it. Furthermore, making information a "free good" would decrease the likelihood of use and bring unjustifiable costs. NTIS has done a fine job in marketing federal information at a reasonable price, and I see no reason why NTIS could not be self-supporting as a quasi-public corporation, rather than being part of a Cabinet department. Society is becoming more informationintensive, as is portrayed in Daniel Bell's post-industrial society caricature. Thus it is a propitious time to make the move to a quasi-public corporation. Mr. Chairman, I hope that the thrusts of President Ford's initiative and this Committee's excellent work can come to fruition in a truly effective governmental science and technology apparatus. The necessary elements are at hand, and I trust that the President and the Congress can agree on legislation soon. # # Dr. DAVID. I would be happy to answer any questions in connection with my statement. Mr. HECHLER. We thank you, not only for your helpful comments, but also for the long and continued interest that you have displayed in this field, for your assistance to the committee to help us formulate the legislation and for appearing today. Are there any questions? The CHAIRMAN. The bill that Mr. Mosher and I introduced last year, this was one that a lot of people worked on. It was merely a base to work from. Obviously, the administration bill is considerably different. Are we making a good step forward if we just pass the administration bill instead of trying to work out the many differences in the two bills? Dr. DAVID. To achieve an effective organization, you could quickly pass a simplified bill, but that would be a mistake in my opinion. The country does need scientific and technological advice at the highest level. I know that President Ford feels this way very strongly. However, advice can be made available temporarily on an informal basis. It is more important to pass a bill which can stand on its own for a considerable period without modification. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. MOSHER. As a matter of strategy, do you think that by statute this should be made effective as of 1977 rather than immediately, considering where we are? Dr. DAVID. I think it would be a wise move. I suspect, however, that, given the natural pace of legislative machinery, including the inevitable conflicts and scheduling difficulties, that the coming legislative effort will not become effective until that date in any case. Mr. MOSHER. I recognize the lack of time. There are a lot of questions that we could ask, but I think we have to move along. Based on your own experience as a science adviser to the President, you heard the brief discussion that Dr. Revelle and I had about the broad delineation, or the specific delineation, of the responsibilities the science adviser should have. Dr. DAVID. Yes. Mr. MOSHER. Would you say, in a practical operation, that this strengthens the adviser's hand, that this gives him, or that this would be very helpful in his relationship to the other advisers to the President and the rest of the White House apparatus, if we should be rather explicit in delineating the responsibilities of the adviser; that is, so he could refer to the statute and legislative intent. Of course, we all recognize it depends on the President as to how much advice it is that he will accept. Wouldn't it strengthen the adviser's hand to have this spelled out in the statute in terms of his relationships with other competing advisers? Dr. DAVID. Undoubtedly that would strengthen his hand greatly. It would make his operational tasks more definite and understandable by other elements of the executive branch. He would have a clear document which specifies his task. Mr. MOSHER. Would you say, on the basis of your own practical experience, that the role delineated in the President's proposed bill is not quite adequate, that this should be expanded? Dr. DAVID. In my opinion, the proposed bill is too narrow. I would prefer to see a much more tangible list of responsibilities. Mr. MOSHER. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions to ask of the witness? Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask one thing concerning a matter, and considering your opinion, that we are dealing with too narrow a concept in the suggested legislation. Is there the danger that we might be slipping into blue ribbonism or one of the great folklores that American Government comes up with? That is, to label a particular thing, sir, such as science and technology adviser or adviser's office, and then that is the end of it. Is that part of your fear when you say it is too narrow, Dr. David? Dr. DAVID. Yes; very much so. This office and the adviser will be established by statute. I think that this permanence is a great danger. You have stated it very well. I would be quite reluctant to see a statute go into effect without the tasks and the duties of the office and adviser being clearly specified and agreed upon as being useful to policymaking and execution. Mr. HAYES. When we generally embark in Government on this kind of thing, I think that you are correct in stating that this is one of the dangers, and the literature of Government is replete with examples of it. Would it be wise for the Congress to mandate the executive branch to furnish a plan, or at least, to mandate it to furnish its thinking to be approved by the Congress concerning, perhaps, the rate of technological growth, perhaps a science and technology version of the Ford Foundation energy policy study. This is so, in effect, that we would see the administration's approach to science and the technological planning and the growth for the Nation. We would understand it a bit more fully, and perhaps, in that way, school the executive to understand the goals. Dr. DAVID. I think that could be accomplished through yearly reporting requirements. You are asking, perhaps, for something akin to an industrial strategy for the growth of a corporation or an enterprise. While I think that is quite appropriate, say, for industry, it is much more difficult for the Government. There are so many contending elements in the Government that must be considered. In spite of the common impression, the Executive Offices of the President do not control the departmental agencies of Government in detail. In addition, the executive branch does not control the Congress, nor the judicial branch of Government. The overall strategy for science and technology depends upon elements that are well beyond the absolute control of the Executive Office. I do think, however, that the regular production of documentation stating the policies for science and technology as seen from the execu tive side would accomplish much of what it is that you are asking for, Mr. Haves. Mr. HAYES. Thank you. Mr. HECHLER. Thank you. Mr. MYERS. Am I to understand that you feel that the most important thing that we should do is go slow and make sure that we set up |