A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK

President Nixon's reorganization of the White House science and technology mechanism is not an isolated event. It is the latest in a series of developments over the past 100 years beginning with the establishment of the National Academy of Sciences, a private organization chartered by the Congress in 1863 to serve as an official adviser to the federal government on any question of science or technology

The present generation of Presidential science advisory mechanisms was introduced by the famous letter from Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt prior to World War II calling his attention to the far-reaching implications of the discovery of nuclear fission. Alerting the government to new developments in science and technology having potential for major impact on governmental policies has often been initiated by individuals outside of federal departments and agencies. It continues to be one of the most valuable contributions of outside consultants despite the growing scientific and technical sophistication of the government agencies.

The Einstein alerting function was institutionalized by World War II, which cemented the relationship between science and government through the mobilization of the nation's scientists and engineers under the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The OSRD was established within the framework of the Executive Office of the President. Its director, Dr. Vannevar Bush, was, in effect, the first Presidential Science Adviser. He had access to the President and met regularly with the heads of the Armed Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After World War II, the military services continued to call on outside scientific and technical advice on a large scale. This pattern has since been followed by other federal agencies having strong science and technology orientation. The extensive and systematic use of outside scientific advisers by agencies of the US government is a distinctive characteristic of the US. science and technology scene.

Dr. Bush's influence continued beyond the war years. His report, "Science the Endless Frontier." led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation, the only agency of the government having the mission of furthering the advancement of science and science education. In creating the National Science Foundation, the Congress declared its intent "to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity and welfare, and to secure the national defense. The same Act of Congress established the National Science Board to set policies for the Foundation and to recommend and encourage national

policies for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences. This farsighted legislation was born of a wartime crisis with conviction that the U.S. should never again be dependent for its security on basic scientific research conducted abroad.

Another crisis, the Korean war, brought about the next institutionalization of science policy in government as the result of a debate over whether the nation's scientists and engineers should be mobilized under civilian leadership in a national emergency. This time it took the form of a Presidentially appointed Science Advisory Committee to the Office of Defense Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President. With the passing of the Korean crisis, the committee languished without an assignment. Early in the Eisenhower Administration, concern over the threat of surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers resulted in a Presidentally initiated assignment to the Science Advisory Committee. In an exhaustive study, the committee examined military technology in a 10-15 year perspective and presented its findings to the President at a formal meeting of the National Security Council. Its recommendations to accord an exclusive "highest national priority" to the intercontinental ballistics missile program and to develop the famous U-2 very high altitude aircraft, among other far-reaching recommendations, firmly planted the science advisory mechanism at the Presidential level.

By the mid-1950's, there were repeated suggestions that there was need for a full time Presidential assistant for science and technology, with responsibilities for advising on a broad range of issues going well beyond national security questions. These suggestions were countered at the time by those who felt that the President would seldom see or call on such an assistant, and that advice on scientific and technological questions could be channeled more ef fectively through the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization who was a member of the National Security Council and met with the President on a regular basis.

Still another national crisis the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in the fall of 1957-marked a major step in the evolution of the White House science advisory func tion. Faced with severe public reaction to this unexpected Soviet achievement, President Eisenhower appointed Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. as the first Presidential special assistant for science and technology. The President also reconstituted the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) reporting directly to him as a component of the White House organization.

The Eisenhower years could be characterized as the golden age of the White House science and technology mechanism. Its first efforts provided the President with a framework for planning the nation's outer space program. and led to the decision to house the space program in a new civilian space agency, building on the strong technical foundation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The White House science advisory mechanism was also instrumental in establishing the top-level post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. The decision to create the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can be traced to the White House science and technology mechanism,

which provided the initial assessments of the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban.

The effectiveness of the science and technology mechanism in the immediate post-Sputnik period can be attributed to the special circumstances of the times:

(1) the open channels to the President and the National Security Council, together with explicit Presidential interest and encouragement,

(2) the nationwide concern about our scientific and technological leadership;

(3) the unusual status and credibility enjoyed by scientists and engineers;

(4) the problems of greatest national concern and urgency involved the sophisticated technology of military and space programs, compared to the less clear-cut role of science and technology in dealing with the civilian domestic problems of later years; (5) the scientific and technological capabilities of the federal departments and agencies were relatively weak, and the receptivity of White House offices to scientific and technical advice was strong.

The Kennedy years sustained the high degree of involvement of the White House science and technology advisory mechanism in the arms control, space and military programs. At the same time, there was a significant broadening of its tasks. A study by the President's Science Advisory Committee resulted in the creation of a functional office for science and technology in the Agency for International Development. The Science Adviser stimulated initiatives in international science cooperation. such as President Kennedy's proposals to the UN General Assembly. which launched the Global Atmospheric Research Project for improving long range weather prediction. As the result of meetings between President Kennedy and the heads of foreign governments, studies were made of the problems of water logging and salinity in West Pakistan and of measures for dealing with hoof and mouth disease in Argentine cattle A report of the President's Science Advisory Committee on the use of pesticides in the spring of 1963 recommended the exploration of biological alternatives to the use of hard pesticides such as DDT Studies of innovation and experiment in education resulted in legislation to create regional educational laboratories, and led to the Model School concept for dealing with the special educational problems of culturally deprived and segregated students.

The close relationship between the President and his Science Adviser, characteristic of the Eisenhower years, extended into the early part of the Kennedy Administration.

It is pertinent to note that communications between the President and his Science Adviser were at their best in the early part of each Administration. This reflects the flexibility of organizational relationships between members of the new Presidential teams which gradually stratify as jurisdictional lines harden and the staff power structure becomes more firmly established But there were certain changes that began to affect the vitality of the White House science and technology mechanism and diminish its influence

In 1962, the Office of Science and Technology was established in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan to provide a statutory base for the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Although this move was intended to shield the science and technology staff from political change and make the Science Adviser accessible to the Congress, in later years it tended to change the image of the Office which was increasingly perceived as a special interest group. Having no Presidentially delegated authority to review programs and policies, it was without a strong constituency or interested customers. The Office was viewed indifferently by the Congress as a creature of the White House without direct responsibility to the Congress.

The emergence of a strong policy staff in the National Security Council, headed by a Special Assistant for National Security, changed the relationship of the Science Adviser to President Kennedy and his successors in dealing with national security problems, eroding his direct contact with the President.

The expanding breadth of matters before the President's Science Advisory Committee, together with the rotation and increasing diversification of its membership, weakened the committee as a deliberative body. The focus of its activities shifted from the committee to specialist panels. leaving the committee with less sense of corporate involvement and responsibility.

Nonetheless, during the Johnson Administration, a series of important reports and actions continued to emerge from the White House science and technology mechanism: (1) the first comprehensive governmental report on the quality of the environment in 1965;

(2) also in 1965, an encyclopedic report assessed the status of a wide range of energy technologies including the resources and environmental aspects of energy:

(3) a study of the post-Apollo space options set the stage for Executive and Congressional consideration of a long range outer space program beyond the manned lunar landing.

(4) a PSAC study on the effective use of the sea provided a head start for the National Commission on Marine Resources and Engineering Development in 1966; (5) in 1967, it prepared the first definitive report by the U.S. government on the world food problem.

In the first months of the Nixon Administration, the Science Adviser served as Executive Officer of a newly created Cabinet Committee on the Environment chaired by the President. He also organized the work of the Space

Task Group under the Vice President which provided the basis for President Nixon's proposals for a balanced program of space exploration in the 1970's. The first Presidential message on energy was drafted by the Office of Science and Technology in 1971, followed by the establishment of an Energy Policy Office within the Office of Science and Technology. In addition to its contributions to the Space Task Group, an OST study in 1971 influenced the final configuration of the space shuttle proposed by the Administration A second and more detailed study of energy technologies in 1972 provided a principal building block for the report to the President by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and for subsequent Presidential proposals to the Congress. A series of ÖSTinspired initiatives in the international sphere was continued in the Nixon Administration, including the creation of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation agreed to at the Summit Conference in 1972. On the national security front, recommendations by the Science Adviser, backed by consultant studies, contributed to strategic weapons developments and to the accelerated application of sophisticated weapons in Viet Nam A study by the President's Science Advisory Committee led to the Presidential decision to propose an international ban on biological warfare.

Of comparable impact on science and technology programs and policies was the day-to-day influence of the White House science and technology mechanism on White House and Executive Office activities. Actions to cancel or redirect research and development programs were taken by the Office of Management and Budget on the basis of analyses by the Office of Science and Technology. Although the coordination of federal research and development programs was relatively weak in the absence of "top-down" management authority, influence was exerted by the OST in the course of the annual budget preparation and in daily meetings of the Science Adviser and his staff with key White House personnel and policylevel officials of the departments and agencies. The OST exerted constant pressure on the federal agencies to improve their scientific and technical programs and to recognize policy implications. In sum, the Office of Science and Technology served to keep alive a diversity of viewpoints and an adversary process in White House deliberations involving science and technology.

As noted, the Science Adviser post, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Office of Science and

Technology were terminated by President Nixon during the first six months of 1973. The stated reasons for this action centered on the President's desire to streamline the Executive Office of the President and reduce the size of its staff by eliminating "specialized functions" The White House statement pointed out that the Director of the National Science Foundation was capable of discharging evaluation and coordination functions involving nonmilitary research and development. It was further stated that the mission departments and agencies were able to take greater initiative and responsibility in science and technology.

Undoubtedly, other factors contributed to this Presidential move, such as:

(1) the weak communication between the President and his Science Adviser and insufficient understanding by the top White House Executive Office staff of the functions and utility of the White House science and technology mechanism;

(2) the changing character of national priorities, with greater emphasis on domestic problems where the contributions of science and technology are less unique, less clear, and more complex; (3) the perceived focus of the science and technology advisory mechanism on science and technology per se and its seeming inability to relate scientific and technological considerations to economic, political, and institutional factors;

(4) the concern that the science and technology mechanism was not fully supportive of the President, particularly the political repercussions of its nonconcurrence with Administration positions, as in the case of the SST;

(5) the cumulative effect of the years of strain between the White House and the academic and intellectual community over the Viet Nam war.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

This has been a retrospective look at the White House science and technology advisory function. It has been said: "What is Past is Prologue." Past experience provides sound guidelines for the provision of scientific and technological counsel to the President.

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The White House and Executive Office of the President can profit immeasurably from having a special capability for scientific and technological analysis and judgment. Where this nation stands in the years ahead in its economy and world trade, security, health, transportation, agriculture, environmental quality, and in its energy and materials posture - depends importantly on the wise development and utilization of our scientific and technological resources. These are national problems deserving highest level attention in the Executive Branch. By the same token, the Presidential staff and decisionmaking processes must be capable of addressing these problems in all of their ramifications including the scien

tific and technological dimension. Thus, the science and technology advisory function must be an integral part of the Presidential policy and decision-making processes. To be useful, its analyses must recognize the essential interdependence of science, technology, and fiscal, economic, social, political, and institutional factors in developing policy alternatives.

Thus, the crux of the organizational question to be faced in the reintroduction of a science and technology function in the White House structure is how it can be effectively coupled with the principal staff offices of the President. These include the Office of Management and Budget, the Domestic Council, and the National Security Council.

Presidential Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1970 established the Office of Management and Budget to prepare the annual budget and to oversee its execution, emphasizing program evaluation and coordination and serving as the President's principal arm for the exercise of his management functions. It also established the Domestic Council to assess national policy needs, develop forecasts to help define national goals and objectives, identify alternative ways of achieving objectives, and recommend "consistent, integrated sets of policy choices." Since 1970, the OMB has, in practice, strongly influenced policy choices and program objectives through its authority over budget preparation. Meanwhile, the Domestic Council has largely been preoccupied with one of its functions: to provide rapid response to Presidential needs for policy advice on pressing domestic issues. The longer range policy orientation of the Council was reemphasized last February in a Presidential memorandum announcing that the Vice President will serve as Vice Chairman of the Council and oversee its work.

Both the Office of Management and Budget and the Domestic Council need strong in-house staff competence in science and technology whether or not a science and technology advisory mechanism is reestablished in the

White House. Unquestionably, this is the most effective way to integrate scientific and technological considerations and analyses in the day-to-day staff processes of those offices. Such resident scientific and technical staff capabilities are also needed if there is to be meaningful two-way communication between those offices and outside scientific and technical organizations and individuals.

The strengthening of OMB and Domestic Council scientific and technical staffs, while necessary, is not sufficient to serve the needs of the President. A separate science and technology staff mechanism reporting directly to the President could complement and deepen the technical content of their analyses without being constrained by the parochial interests of the various federal agencies both at operating and Presidential levels. Its assessments could provide a resource and common frame of reference for program evaluation and policy development. For example. decisions on major research and development projects taken by the OMB in the course of the annual budget cycle necessarily involve assumptions as to long range policy and program objectives which are of principal concern to the Domestic Council. Conversely, examination of longer range policy options by the Domestic Council must take into consideration effects on ongoing programs of direct concern to the Office of Management and Budget.

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Since the demise of the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee, the National Security Council has convened several panels of outside consultants and has built a technical capability. Nonetheless, a separate science and technology mechanism concerned with national security policy questions could perform a valuable assessment function because of the inseparability of policy and program considerations and the special perspectives it could contribute to Presidential-level discussion of national security issues.

It is clear that the examination of the role of science and technology in, the White House must cover the entire process and organization for policy and program formulation in support of the President. An isolated science and technology advisory function is not viable. It must have strong and accepted linkages to the principal Executive Office staff agencies on which the President relies, particularly the OMB, the Domestic Council, and the National Security Council. More broadly, it should be part of a new long range policy research and analysis capability that can interrelate the interests of all of the White House staff entities within a common analytical framework Lack of such a framework constituted a barrier to the effective use of the White House science and technology mechanism in dealing with domestic problems. The likelihood that its studies would result in prompt follow-on actions was greater in the national security area where long range concepts and planning mechanisms and methodologies have been highly perfected. By contrast, its extensive reports on the environment resulted in little action until we were faced with a nationwide crisis. It is pertinent to note that, in its report on Energy and National Progress in 1965, the Office of Science and Technology called attention to several deficiencies that have only recently been responded to: lack of a long range, integrated plan for civilian energy research and development; delay in

initiating essential research with distant payoffs; insufficient support of systems whose promise has not been demonstrated; and neglect of certain "old" resources.

It is simplistic to say that these examples point to the need for longer range program planning and a national willingness to commit scientific and technological resources today to provide options for tomorrow. The question is more basic: how to change political attitudes and institutional arrangements to deal with longer range issues in the face of day-to-day pressures of domestic problems. In a society that distrusts long-range planning, how can we avoid the myopia born of planning on the basis of annual budgeting and "crisis management"? The Congress has symbolized its concern about the lack of better maps to guide our future policies by creating the Office of Technology Assessment. No corresponding step has yet been taken at the White House level to develop a professional capability to analyze and assess program and policy options from the vantage point of the President.

A strong consensus is developing that steps should be taken to restore scientific and technological advisory capability in the White House. Bills have been introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate that would create a Council of Science Advisers in the Executive Office of the President (H.R. 4461 and S. 32, Ninety-Fourth Congress). This approach was recommended in a 1974 report by the National Academy of Sciences entitled Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking. It has since been endorsed by the Board of Directors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Society for Public Administration, and the Federation of American Scientists.

There are, of course, other possible organizational arrangements, such as the reinstitution of the Office of Science and Technology or the appointment of a Presidential Science Adviser with a small staff. Most interested parties will agree that the organizational form should conform with the President's concept of White House staff organization and his style of operation. But it should be more than a token capability. A core staff of competent professionals together with resources to enlist outside experts are essential to effective engagement with a broad range of complex issues.

This is not a matter of arranging science and technology boxes on a government organization chart. Nor is it merely a question of whether science and technology should have a

voice in the highest councils of the land. In bald terms, the nation's future is at stake. A few words of the last resident White House Science Adviser, Dr. Edward E. David, sum up the reasons why we must continue to search diligently for more effective ways to provide thoughtful scientific and technological counsel to the President:

"Can we be sure that science and technology will find the answers? Can we be sure that solutions to our problems exist? No, but we can be sure that nothing but science and technology can find them if they do exist.

"To put it as bluntly as possible: science and technology must answer our problems. If they don't. nothing else will."

The point may be overstated, but the issue for the American people is clear.