alpa APPENDIX 3 AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION 1625 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (703) 689-2270 On behalf of the Air Line Pilots Association, I am enclosing five copies of our statement in support of H.R. 5200, The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. We very much appreciate that this statement be made part of the record for the joint hearing held on July 26, by the Subcommittee on Aviation and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Thank you for your consideration. PLH:sf Sincerely, Paul Hallisay, Director Honorable Dante B. Fascell STATEMENT OF HENRY A. DUFFY, PRESIDENT AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION JOINT HEARING SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION COMMITTEE ON HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 5200, THE AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1990 JULY 26, 1990 The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), representing 42,000 airline pilots who fly for 50 commercial airlines, is pleased to submit comments on H.R. 5200, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. ALPA commends the sponsors of H.R. 5200 and the two committees for their interest and desire to improve the security of aviation for the U.S. air traveller. As the committees are aware, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was established by the Department of Transportation, in October, 1989, and since its institution has been meeting regularly and deliberating on needed improvements to aviation security procedures, equipment and technologies. ALPA has been an active participant on the ASAC and we strongly endorse the objectives of that group. As such, we believe that Congress should consider delaying the implementation of its proposed security improvements until such time as the ASAC has had adequate opportunity to review and comment on all of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. AIRLINE EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION ALPA supports the overall effect of this bill which essentially gives aviation security much greater emphasis and increased visibility both within the government and industry. However, we have noted a significant omission that we would like for Congress to seriously consider. On April 23, 1987, FAA issued a memo instructing airports to revise and improve their airport identification systems by providing for enhanced accountability, controllability, accuracy, currency, scope of authority, renewal criteria, and other attributes. Under the stipulations of this memo, airports must also perform basic background checks prior to issuing this identification. Airports were required to revise and reissue their identification, not later than December 31, 1988, through a change to their individual airport security programs. Subsequently, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 107.14 was enacted which further improved airport access control. This regulation requires airports to institute computerized access controls, or their equivalent, designed to prevent unauthorized entry to airport secure areas. Unfortunately, neither of these requirements have been made of the airlines. Although some airlines have, on their own, made strides to accomplish the kind of identification quality prescribed for airports in 1987, others have not been so industrious. As an example, several member pilots have complained that they have not been issued new picture identification for as many as 20 years. Others hold two, three or more pieces of airline identification, all recognized by the carrier as valid, because the company has not required old identification to be turned in as the new is issued. As a result of these types of problems, ALPA members are not able to place confidence in the validity of airline identification and are fearful that air operations access could easily be compromised due to a stolen, lost or outdated identification used by someone of illicit intent. Airports have echoed these same concerns to ALPA. It should be noted that in the performance of their groundrelated duties, cockpit crews are required to walk around the restricted airport ramp utilizing company identification and a uniform as proof of authorization. With such lackadaisical identification criteria and procedures in force, we believe that a dangerous access control breach is a distinct possibility. To address this problem, ALPA urges Congress to instruct FAA to require that: (1) airlines institute the same type of identification controls and improvements required of airports per the above-noted 1987 memo; and, (2) combine this identification with access control capability, as specified in FAR 107.14, so as to obtain the same level of security for airline employees as is prescribed for airport employees. EQUIVALENT SECURITY ON ALL SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR CARRIERS We would also strongly encourage Congress to address a longstanding inadequacy of the FARS as concerns prescribed security measures based upon size of aircraft. AS FAR 108, Airplane ALPA Operator Security, currently reads, scheduled passenger operators of aircraft with more than 60 seats are required to implement a full security program. Smaller scheduled passenger carriers using aircraft with 60 seats or fewer are only required to provide such security measures as the FAA may deem appropriate (as specified in the carrier's operations specifications). has long held that such a dichotomy should not exist; passenger carrying commuter aircraft are hijacked, receive bomb threats, carry unruly and dangerous passengers, and experience all the other security problems of the major carriers without benefit of an FAA security program. We urge that this bill be amended so as to instruct FAA to require all scheduled passenger operators to have a security program. It should be emphasized that, in many cases, it would not be necessary to have the same depth of procedures, equipment and training for smaller carriers as for large. However, a scaled-down and economically feasible program to incorporate security training and standardized procedures for flight crews would be of great benefit to the industry and the travelling public. NEW GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY POSITIONS Our comments on some of the bill's provisions are provided as follows. We endorse the objective of establishing an office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security and Intelligence. We also support elevating the FAA's Security Directorship to an Assistant Administrator post. However, we have questions, which are currently under discussion by the ASAC, about the feasibility or even need for Federal Security Managers at high risk airports within the U.S. We are uncertain as to how this function would operate within the current FAA hierarchy. Would it assume all of the responsibilities and liabilities of the FAA's security field office for a particular high-risk airport? Would the creation of such a post aggravate FAA's current problem with non-standardization of regulatory interpretation and implementation? Many other concerns also need to be resolved on this issue prior to instituting such a position. CHECKED BAGGAGE The bill refers to the prescription of strengthened controls over checked baggage including "measures to ensure baggage reconciliation." ICAO has established as a Standard under Annex 17 that a passenger/baggage reconciliation is to be conducted on all international flights. U.S. airlines have not yet complied with this Standard; FAA has only proposed a rulemaking to establish a requirement for compliance with the Standard. We would suggest that this bill be amended so as to expeditiously require all U.S. airlines to come into compliance with international standards for passenger/baggage reconciliation. Because of the current lack of a technology that can efficiently and effectively detect the smallest amounts of explosive capable of destroying a commercial aircraft, we urge Congress to order FAA to improve x-ray screening of checked baggage. This should be accomplished by requiring the use of currently-available, enhanced imaging x-ray technology that is capable of detecting, through the use of color and human interpretation, non-metallic explosive materials. Such equipment is available at a fraction of the cost of Thermal Neutron Analysis devices and, while still reliant on human decision-making, is a vast improvement over standard x-ray equipment currently permitted for this use by the FAA. It should be noted that conventional x-ray equipment, while being used for screening checked baggage, was not designed to, nor is it capable of, accomplishing this purpose. SCREENING OF MAIL AND CARGO Although this bill's emphasis is on aviation security, we would note that hazardous materials carriage on aircraft can be just as destructive and deadly as an explosive device. One example of this was an American Airlines flight in 1988 which, while executing an approach to the Nashville, Tennessee airport, caught fire due to improper packaging and handling of certain chemicals. Fortunately, the aircraft was close enough to the airport that the fire did not impair the airplane's controllability and no one was injured, although the aircraft sustained substantial damage. Because of the commonality of the procedures used to prevent hazardous materials and explosive devices from being shipped on commercial aircraft, we would suggest that the bill's provisions concerning screening of mail and cargo be tied to the ground work already laid in this area. ALPA has been encouraging the Postal Service (USPS) to improve upon its hazardous materials regulations and although the Service has accomplished some of our recommendations, the most important area personnel training - - and procedures has not progressed to our satisfaction. The USPS has also revised certain pertinent documents concerning the screening of material carried by air, but we believe that more can be done to improve safety and security. In order to accomplish the bill's provisions for keeping hazardous materials, including explosive devices, out of a "sealed against inspection" container, (e.g., mail bag or freight pallet), the training for this screening must be provided to the USPS counter employee. Further, inspection of mail and cargo |