Chairman Oberstar, as you know, when the Commission began its inquiry in November of 1989, we attempted to come to grips with the magnitude of the disaster of Pan Am flight 103. How could it have been that so many people lost their lives so quickly and so tragically over the skies of Lockerbie? What could possibly have gone wrong, we asked. Surely some one thing must have happened, some security screening machine failed to function or some specific breakdown occurred in the system.

Sadly, the Commission discovered that terrorists were able to place a bomb on Pan Am 103 not because some one thing failed but because the aviation security system was badly flawed. It did not provide an effective defense against sabotage, even though there were many warning signs.

You've asked that I summarize a few of our principal findings and recommendations and I'd like to do that now and have my full statement available for the record.

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, the full statement will be included in the record.

Ms. MCLAUGHLIN. First, the tragedy of Pan Am 103 may well have been preventable. The Commission reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

Stricter baggage screening could have prevented an unaccompanied bag from being loaded on the flight at Frankfurt.

Stricter passenger screening procedures could have increased the likelihood of intercepting any dupe who may have unknowingly checked the bomb aboard the flight at either airport.

The Commission found no evidence that Pan Am at Frankfurt briefed or trained its screeners or took any other special measures to look for a bomb, a special type of bomb, even though West German police and the FAA had warned Pan Am and other carriers of the seizure in Frankfurt of a Toshiba cassette radio configured as a bomb for use against an airliner. It was indeed such a bomb that destroyed flight 103.

Second, the Commission found that Pan Am's poor security performance at Frankfurt existed not only for months before the tragedy but incredibly continued to exist for nine months after that tragedy occurred.

Now, in part, as a result, the Commission recommended that fulltime, on-station Federal security managers be located at all overseas and domestic high risk airports. We made this recommendation to ensure that the breakdowns in communications and accountability illustrated by our findings are never repeated.

Third, the Commission found that our security research and development program is several years behind the terrorists'. In this area, as in many others examined by the Commission, the FAA reacts to events rather than anticipating them.

FAA launched a multimillion dollar bomb detection development project before asking the threshold question: How much explosive material does it take to cause catastrophic damage to commercial passenger aircraft? The thermal neutron analysis machine [TNA] developed under FAA contract will not reliably detect small plastic bombs like the one that destroyed Pan Am 103.

Nevertheless, the FAA had announced a program to require U.S. airlines operating internationally to purchase 150 of these ma

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chines and install them at 40 international airports at a total cost of $175 million.

The Commission's inquiry repeatedly found overwhelming evidence of the need for major reforms in aviation security policies, programs and regulations.

Now I would like to just highlight the major recommendations. The enactment of legislation to create a permanent position of Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security and Intelligence. This position should have tenure to give it a measure of independence. The office would have direct access to security and intelligence reports from the field; would be accountable to the President and to the Secretary of Transportation.

By also recommending that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency designate an intelligence officer to serve in the Secretary of Transportation's office in senior capacity, the Commission sought to provide the Secretary with an immediately available source of highly credible intelligence advice, one recognized within the intelligence community.

The elevation of the Security Division of FAA to a position that reports directly to the FAA administrator. This enhancement of priorities should be welcomed by the thousands of men and women who work in the rank and file of the public and private sectors of the aviation security system.

Next, the creation of the position of Federal Security Manager as the responsible and accountable authority for security at major domestic airports and for the security operations of U.S. carriers at major international airports.

The transmittal of airline manifests to the State Department immediately following aviation tragedies. In order to further facilitate notification of next of kin, manifests should contain passport numbers and emergency contacts.

Additionally, for the benefit of the Aviation Subcommittee members, let me mention that my written testimony does contain highlights of the aspects of our report that are of specific concern to the Foreign Affairs Committee, about which I did testify on May 17.

But here I will emphasize that the Commission believes the position of Coordinator for International Aviation Security, with the rank of Ambassador, should be created in the Department of State. The Coordinator would intercede when negotiation impasses are encountered. This would enable the United States to elevate the security element to the highest level of Government.

It should be emphasized that this recommendation does not reduce in any way the urgent need for the assignment of additional FAA personnel abroad.

Finally, this Commission concluded that the national will of the American people and the moral courage of their elected leaders to exercise that consensus are the ultimate means to defeat terrorism. It was the exercise of national will, not metal detectors at airports, that stopped the aircraft hijackings of the 1970's. Hijackings stopped when most nations of the world made it clear they would no longer give refuge to hijackers. Terrorism must be confronted at its source, and not only after terrorists have exacted their bloody toll.

While many should draw comfort from the recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and while there is some lessening of conflict between traditional state antagonists, there is absolutely no evidence that terrorism is any less the political weapon of choice for a large number of radical and reactionary groups. In fact, to the contrary, some in the intelligence and defense communities have predicted there well may be an increase in such activity.

The Commission recommends a more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pursues and punishes terrorists, but also makes state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions.

The more vigorous policies should include planning and training for premptive or retaliatory military strikes against terrorist hideouts in nations that harbor them. Where direct actions are inappropriate or undesirable, covert operations should be conducted to prevent, disrupt or respond to terrorist acts.

The United States must not be held hostage by a handful of outlaw nations who harbor and sponsor international criminals who seek to murder American citizens.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would, of course, be happy to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McLaughlin follows:]

STATEMENT OF ANN MCLAUGHLIN

FORMER CHAIRMAN

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM

BEFORE A JOINT HEARING OF

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND

AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS AND

TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

JULY 26, 1990

Chairman Fascell and Chairman Oberstar, I am pleased to testify today on the Report of

the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which we presented to

President Bush on May 15, 1990.

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As you know, the commission included two members of the House of Representatives -Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Jim Oberstar of Minnesota and Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt of Arkansas who is the Ranking Minority Member of the House

Committee on Public Works and Transportation. We were also privileged to receive testimony from the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, at our public hearing on March 9, 1990. I appreciate the ongoing support these and other members of the House have shown for the Commission's work by introducing and moving forward HR 5200.

The Senate members of our Commission were Senators Frank Lautenberg of New

Jersey and Alfonse D'Amato of New York, who have introduced similar legislation in the

Senate. The other Commissioners were Mr. Edward Hidalgo, former Secretary of the

Navy, and General Thomas Richards, USAF (Ret.).

As I testified, on May 17, 1990 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Commission's Report includes more than 60 specific recommendations. Some of them require legislation by the Congress in order to be implemented. But I am pleased that