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23. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, the February 2004 report of the ICRC indicates that the abuses revealed in the Taguba Report were consistent with allega

tions of abuse collected by the ICRC in the course of some 29 visits to 14 internment facilities in central and southern Iraq during the period of March to November 2003. The ICRC report makes clear that since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq, the ICRC regularly brought concerns about the ill-treatment of detainees to the attention of coalition forces. In addition, ICRC President Jacob Kellenberger has said that he met with senior administration officials in May 2003 and January 2004 to discuss issues related to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. How many times since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq were ICRC reports brought to the attention of coalition forces? Please provide any written reports provided by the ICRC to coalition forces concerning the treatment of detainees.

General SMITH. While ICRC reports are not classified documents, they must be handled as such. The information contained in these reports pertains to ongoing military operations and identifies facilities, practices, personnel, and detainees, including_by_name. This information is sensitive and requires protection. Staffers within DOD have worked closely with staffers of the congressional committees. The staff and members of the SASC have been briefed on this issue and DOD has made available all of the relevant ICRC reports to the committee members.

24. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, who in CENTCOM was aware of the ICRC's reports of prisoner abuse throughout 2003? What action was taken in response to these reports and why wasn't it more successful in addressing the underlying problems?

General SMITH. I was not personally aware of the ICRC reports of prisoner abuse throughout 2003. Based upon further inquiry, I have learned that only one ICRC report, dated 12 May 2003, was ever addressed to this command. This predated my assumption of duties by approximately 5 months. All other such reports have been addressed to subordinate organizations or officials at the Pentagon.

Our subordinate commands will hold accountable those who failed in their duties and they will ensure that the necessary training will be conducted to curtail future incidents. New leadership at the confinement facility is clearly aware of the need to heighten their vigilance to prevent any possible mistreatment of Iraqi detainees. Additional training on the Geneva Conventions has been conducted for the new units that are taking over detention operations to ensure the new soldiers are aware of their duties and responsibilities. Additionally, the reported allegations prompted Lieutenant General Sanchez to request the immediate provision of a team to conduct additional training on confinement operations, with emphasis on treating detainees with dignity and respect. A single senior officer with proper authorities and support to oversee all aspects of detainee operations has been appointed. Maj. Gen. Geoff Miller has been in place since 15 April 2004 and is properly focused and making a positive difference.

25. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, did CENTCOM keep senior administration officials informed of the ICRC's concerns about the ill-treatment of Iraqi prisoners? If so, at what level and on what occasions were they informed?

General SMITH. With one exception, ICRC reports and concerns were handled at the CJTF-7 level. CENTCOM did not receive ICRC reports. Had I known about the abuses as outlined in the ICRC reports which have now been furnished to this command, senior administration officials at the Pentagon would have been promptly informed. In fact, as soon as the abuses at Abu Ghraib were reported to CENTCOM, that information was immediately passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

26. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, on how many occasions did senior DOD or administration officials meet with representatives of the ICRC and when did these meetings occur?

Secretary CAMBONE. There were four such occasions-May 27, June 27, October 15, and December 19.

27. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, were any investigations, changes in policy, or other actions initiated as a result of these meetings?

Secretary CAMBONE. The Department of Defense has already launched no less than 12 separate investigations into the ICRC's allegations of prisoner mistreatment:

a. MG Ryder, the Army Provost Marshall General, launched an investigation to assess ongoing detention and corrections operations in Iraq. MG Ryder completed that assessment on November 6, 2003, and a copy of the

b. MG Miller, Commander of the Guantanamo facility, launched an assessment of intelligence and detention operations that was completed on September 5, 2003. A copy of the Miller Report was provided to Congress..

c. MG Taguba's administrative investigation of detainee operations and the 800th MP Brigade was completed May 6, 2004, and a copy was submitted to Congress.

d. VADM Church completed a review of procedures at Guantanamo and Charleston on May 11, 2004.

e. LTG Jones and MG Fay are currently reviewing military intelligence and contractor interrogation procedures of the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib.

f. LTG Mikolashek, the Army Inspector General, is currently performing an overall assessment of doctrine and training related to detention operations.

g. BG Jacoby is currently reviewing detainee operations and facilities in Afghanistan.

h. Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered an investigation to collect authorized interrogation practices in the all DOD detention facilities used for the war on terror and to ensure that all appropriate policy guidance is being followed.

i. BG Formica is currently performing an administrative investigation into detainee abuse by CJSOTF-AP.

j. COL Ertman is performing an Army Reserve assessment of Reserve training with a focus on military intelligence and military police.

k. Hon. Schlesinger is leading an independent examination of detainee issues for the Department of Defense.

1. Finally, there are the criminal investigations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and other detainee deaths while in Coalition custody.

m. To coordinate these various investigations and ensure a coherent policy response to their recommendations, the Department of Defense has created a new position, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs. This position will allow a single office to ensure compliance with DOD policy directives and coordinate with the ICRC. As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to ensure that all ICRC reports (which formerly went only to officers in the field) are submitted directly to the Pentagon. The Departments of the Army and Navy are currently taking steps to launch criminal investigations into each instance of abuse alleged by the Red Cross.

28. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, the February 2004 ICRC report indicates that during a mid-October 2003 visit to the Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, ICRC delegates witnessed "the practice of keeping [detainees] completely naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness, allegedly for several consecutive days.” In response to ICRC inquiries, the report states that "The military intelligence officer in charge of the interrogation explained that this practice was 'part of the process'" for obtaining confessions and extracting information. In response to the allegations documented by the ICRC in mid-October 2003, or any other ICRC reports, what specific steps were taken to correct the situation at Abu Ghraib or any other detention facilities run by coalition forces and when were they taken? General SMITH. My expanded answer to question 24 responds to this question.

29. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, what was the extent of the ICRC's access to the facilities at Abu Ghraib and did it include the part of the facility where the abuses depicted in the photos are alleged to have occurred?

General SMITH. During the period in question, ICRC visits were coordinated by CJTF-7. I will defer to those military officials to provide any details responsive to your questions.

30. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, whom did the ICRC brief about these alleged abuses?

General SMITH. The ICRC exercised its prerogative to brief at the levels they thought were appropriate. The ICRC did not brief anyone in HQ, CENTCOM, to in


31. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, in an interview with The New York Times, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, the new commander of American prisons in Iraq, stated that the roughly 50 techniques the military officially uses in prisoner interrogations include hooding, sleep deprivation, and forcing prisoners into "stress positions." An unclassified December 12, 2003, Situation Update to Major General Miller is included as an annex to the Taguba Report. The document describes interrogation techniques permissible for use in the Iraqi theater of operations, and reportedly it includes a process allowing for the use of sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer than 30 days, and dogs. Were you personally aware that permissible interrogation techniques in the Iraqi theater included sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer than 30 days, and dogs?

Secretary CAMBONE. The USD(I) did not know what specific interrogation techniques were being used in the Iraqi theater. The techniques used in theater were developed and approved in theater without any USD(I) involvement.

32. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, who within the Army or DOD authorized the use of these additional techniques and were they specifically authorized for use in Abu Ghraib?

Secretary CAMBONE. Development of interrogation policies consistent with the standing guidance was within the authority of Combined Joint Task Force-7 and did not require higher-level approval.

33. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, what steps were taken to ensure that interrogation techniques complied with the Geneva Conventions?

Secretary CAMBONE. Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Commander, U.S. Central Command, prepared Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003-V. Appendix 1 to Annex E of OPLAN 1003-V specifically addressed the treatment of the operational plan annex on enemy prisoners of war, retained persons, civilian internees, and other detainees. It outlined responsibilities, policies and procedures with respect to the handling of detainees, and provided specific guidance that the Geneva Conventions applied to all persons held by U.S. forces. This means of promulgation is consistent with the usual manner in which commanders provide guidance to their subordinate commanders. The subordinate commands would review the OPLAN and draft their own orders. For instance, the CJSC EXORD itself does not specifically address the Geneva Conventions; rather, it refers back to OPLAN 1003-V.

In addition to the promulgation of this OPLAN and its Annexes, commanders were responsible for ensuring that detainees were treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and applicable international law and that measures were implemented to ensure the forces were aware of and complied with the Law of War.

34. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, who within DOD made the legal determination as to whether these interrogation techniques comply with the Geneva Conventions, including the requirement of Article 31 of the Geneva Conventions that "No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties" and to whom was that determination briefed?

Secretary CAMBONE. I understand that the CJTF-7 policy issued on October 12, 2003, titled "Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy," included interrogation approaches contained in existing_interrogation doctrine (e.g., Army Field Manual 34-52), reflected longstanding DOD interrogation practice, and was issued after consultation with the CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate and lawyers within the U.S. Central Command.

35. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, what role did your office play in developing DOD policy on interrogation in Iraq?

Secretary CAMBONE. My office did not play any role in developing DOD policy on interrogation in Iraq.

36. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, did your office provide direction on interrogation guidelines to either General Abizaid or General Sanchez? If so, when and to whom?

Secretary CAMBONE. The USD(I) did not provide direction on interrogation guide

37. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, did you provide direction on guidelines to either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz? If so, when and to whom? Secretary CAMBONE. The USD(I) did not provide direction on interrogation guidelines to either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Wolfowitz.

38. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, at a May 14, 2004, DOD press briefing, senior military officials stated that since last October General Sanchez had approved 25 requests to hold detainees in isolation for more than 30 days, but had not approved the use of any other interrogation technique requiring commanding general approval. General Sanchez also reportedly announced that he would deny requests to use other harsh methods that required his explicit approval. How many requests were made since the issuance of the Interrogation ROE for permission to use the interrogation techniques requiring General Sanchez's approval?

Secretary CAMBONE. The number of requests is unknown. However, the "Interrogation Rules of Engagement" were a graphic aid prepared by the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. This aid is not a policy document and was not prepared or approved by Combined Joint Task Force-7. Lieutenant General Sanchez signed an "Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy" document on 14 September 2003. Revised policies were published on 12 October 2003 and 13 May 2004. Some of those policies required certain specific interrogation techniques to be approved in advance by Lieutenant General Sanchez on a case-by-case basis and after a legal review.

39. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, besides the 25 cases mentioned in the May 14 briefing, are there any other cases in which the use of these techniques was granted in the Iraqi theater?

Secretary CAMBONE. The only restricted technique that was approved for use was segregation in excess of 30 days. The figure "25" mentioned in the 14 May briefing was an estimate. Records at Multinational Force in Iraq Headquarters (successor to Combined Joint Task Force-7) indicate Lieutenant General Sanchez approved fewer than 20 segregations.

40. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, did General Sanchez suspend the use of these techniques as a matter of policy, or has a determination been made that they are not compliant with U.S. international obligations?

Secretary CAMBONE. Of the techniques that required his approval, only segregation in excess of 30 days was ever approved and used. Whether any of the other techniques could, as a hypothetical matter, have been approved under any specific set of circumstances is uncertain. However, both policy and law can be factors in reviewing the suitability of various interrogation techniques depending on the status of the detainee and the manner in which the technique might be employed.

41. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, in your testimony, you promised to provide a comparison of the command-level guidelines for the use in interrogation for detainees in Guantanamo and Iraq. Please provide this comparison.

Secretary CAMBONE. Attachment prepared by Detainee Task Force on 28 Septem

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