PRISON GUARDS 7. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba, is it now, or has it been, administration policy that prison guards should "facilitate" detainee interrogations? If so, how were they instructed to do this? Secretary CAMBONE. This matter has been investigated in several of the reviews the DOD initiated when the abuse allegations came to light. It is my understanding that the matter was addressed by those investigations during briefings to SASC members or staff and during hearings covering those investigations. General SMITH. Prison guards are not to take an active role in detainee interrogations. A passive role such as observing and reporting is permissible. General TAGUBA. The U.S. Army is the executive agent for EPW and Detainee Operations in accordance Army Regulation 190-8, and also Army Field Manual 319.40. There are no provisions outlined in these documents where prison guards should facilitate' detainee interrogations, nor do I know of any administration or command policy that directs it. PERMISSIVE CLIMATE OF PRISONER ABUSE 8. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba, in Secretary Rumsfeld's May 7, 2004 testimony, he testified that the Abu Ghraib prison personnel followed the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and that the Geneva Conventions were posted for all prison personnel to see. General Taguba has stated that neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's area of responsibility. Would this supervisory error not contribute to a permissive climate of prisoner abuse? Secretary CAMBONE. Posting of camp rules and the applicable Geneva Conventions is required by the conventions and service regulations. Detention facilities have posted Geneva Conventions rules both in English and detainee languages. In addition, I understand that it is standard operating procedure within MNF-I that the rules regarding both detention and interrogation, including the principles of the Geneva Conventions, are routinely briefed at shift changes and guard mounts. General SMITH. If the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were not posted at 800th MP Brigade Facilities, this would be in error. However, the failure to post does not excuse individual instances of prisoner abuse. All MPs should have received training in the Geneva Conventions and Law of War prior to receipt of their military occupational specialty designation. General TAGUBA. In accordance with Army Regulation 190-8, the Geneva Conventions are required to be posted in English or in the language of the detainees and must be available to the detainees. Guards and interrogators must also have general knowledge regarding the requirements of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and be trained on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. It is possible that non-compliance with the requirement to post the Geneva Conventions and have them available for detainees and guards could be a contributing factor to a permissive climate of prisoner abuse. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS REQUEST 9. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba, the ICRC has stated that it repeatedly asked U.S. authorities to take corrective action with respect to the treatment of prisoners in Iraq. Which U.S. authorities were asked and why did they refuse? Secretary CAMBONE. The DOD's internal reviews concluded that we needed to improve our handling of ICRC reports to ensure that the concerns raised by the ICRC are reviewed by the proper authorities in the chain of command. It should be noted that the ICRC did, however, report their own concerns to responsible commanders at various levels and how those concerns were addressed is under review in the ongoing investigations we initiated after those allegations came to light. General SMITH. During the period in question, ICRC reports were normally handled at the CJTF-7 level. I will defer to those military officials to provide any relevant details responsive to your questions. General TAGUBA. I do not know specifically the U.S. authorities to whom the ICRC repeatedly requested that corrective actions be taken with respect to the NUMBERS OF DETAINEES 10. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba, how many persons do we currently have detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere as part of the wars there and the war on terror? Secretary CAMBONE. Although the figures vary daily as persons are released and others are interned, as of 29 August there were 5,405 persons under the control of MNF-I in Iraq, 476 persons under the control of CFC-A in Afghanistan, and 586 persons in Guantanamo Bay. General SMITH. Although the figures vary daily as persons are released and others are interned, as of 6 August 2004, there were 9,416 persons under the control of MNF-I in Iraq and 454 persons under the control of CFC-A in Afghanistan. General TAGUBA. The investigation covered the period of June 2003 to January 2004. Since there were no specific or common detainee accounting system in theater utilized by the 800th MP Brigade, the estimates of detainees in U.S. custody were from 11,333 as of June 2003 to 11,699 as of December 2003 in the four detention camps I mentioned earlier. I do not know the detainee population in Afghanistan or elsewhere. PROSECUTION OF CIVILIAN OPERATORS IN ABU GHRAIB 11. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba, interrogation specialists from private defense contractors were operating inside Abu Ghraib and may have taken part in these atrocities. Given the UCMJ has been amended by the Military and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, do you intend to prosecute the contractors who allegedly abused prisoners and committed other atrocities under the UCMJ? Secretary CAMBONE. The Department of Defense is taking a wide range of actions to address the abuses at Abu Ghraib, including criminal investigative action. Such investigations can result in charges being brought against military members under the UCMJ, and against DOD civilian personnel and DOD contractors under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-778) (MEJA). The MEJA extended Federal criminal jurisdiction to misconduct committed by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States. This includes civilian employees of both the Department of Defense and of contractors of the Department of Defense. Of course, authority to initiate prosecutions rests with the Department of Justice (DOJ), not the Department of Defense. Additionally, the Fay investigation's review of the role of contractors at Abu Ghraib is now complete. The report includes' recommendations to forward its findings to Army General Counsel and the DOJ for determination of appropriate action. General SMITH. Culpable persons who abused prisoners will be referred to the relevant judicial authority system for appropriate action. General TAGUBA. The U.S. Military does not have jurisdiction to prosecute civilians under the UCMJ except in time of war as officially declared by Congress. That is not the situation in Iraq. The criminal prosecution of U.S. civilians could only be effected by the host country or by the U.S. Department of Justice in coordination with a U.S. Attorney's office for violation of U.S. laws that have extra-territorial application. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS GRAVITY OF INITIAL ABU GHRAIB PRISON ABUSE 12. Senator COLLINS. General Taguba, did you see any indication that the initial reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison were not taken seriously by investigators or the DOD chain of command? General TAGUBA. I believe the initial reports of detainee abuse were taken seriously by the CG, CJTF-7 and Commander, CENTCOM. Upon being made aware of these abuses, Lieutenant General Sanchez almost immediately requested that the CENTCOM commander appoint a two star general to investigate reports of detainee abuse and other matters relating to the 800th MP Brigade. The CENTCOM Commander, through his Chief of Staff, then directed the CFLCC Commander, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan to appoint such an investigating officer. ABU GHRAIB CHAIN OF COMMAND 13. Senator COLLINS. General Smith, please describe the chain of command beginning with the alleged abusers. Who in that chain of command was aware of the initial reports of abuse of Iraqi prisoners? General SMITH. The initial reports of abuse were reported to CID by a soldier stationed at Abu Ghraib. CID informed the suspects' commanding officer who in turn made notification through the operational chain of command. The Commander of CJTF-7, Lieutenant General Sanchez, promptly reported the matter to General Abizaid, who in turn quickly advised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers. Other reporting may have occurred through both Service and CID channels. Those alleged to have committed the abuse are assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade. The brigade commander was under the tactical control of the Commander, CJTF-7 and the Operational Control of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN MILLER REPORT 14. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, in early September 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, led a team to review current ability to rapidly exploit internees in the Iraqi theater for actionable intelligence. It has been generally reported that General Miller's team recommended that military police in Iraq be used to set the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees. Why was General Miller sent to Iraq, what were his specific orders, and who recommended that he be sent and why? Secretary CAMBONE. MG Miller was dispatched to Iraq via joint staff message to advise CENTCOM and the Iraq Survey Group on detainee operations in Baghdad, including interrogations. Dr. Cambone was involved only to the extent that he was interested in having MG Miller help improve the flow of intelligence information to CJTF-7 and back to the subordinate commands. MG Miller had no directive authority in that visit. He was in Iraq from August 31 to September 9, 2003. 15. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, who in the Office of the SECDEF was briefed on General Miller's recommendations and who approved these recommendations? Secretary CAMBONE. The USD(I) was never officially briefed on MG Miller's report and only received a copy of the report April 2004. 16. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, when and how were General Miller's recommendations conveyed to commanders at CJTF-7? Secretary CAMBONE. Major General Miller conducted briefings to the staff on 3 and 7 September 2003 during the course of his visit and concluded with an exit briefing on 9 September 2003. 17. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Cambone, does the DOD agree with General Taguba's conclusion that MP should not be involved with setting "favorable conditions" for subsequent interviews? Secretary CAMBONE. The Department agrees with the statement General Sanchez made before the SASC on 19 May: "MPs were involved in passive enabling of those operations and had no involvement in the conduct of interrogations. Those were the orders in the SOPs that remained after General Miller's visit." 18. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, according to the Washington Post, General Sanchez is reported to have issued a memorandum on October 12, 2003, calling for a "harmonization" of military policing and intelligence work at Abu Ghraib to "maximize the efficiency of the interrogation." Did General Sanchez issue this memorandum based on the recommendations of General Miller's report? General SMITH. The 12 October memorandum was the ĈJTF-7 Command Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. To the best of my knowledge, it was issued, in part, based upon Major General Miller's recommendations. END STRENGTH AND TRAINING OF THE 800TH MP COMPANY 19. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, it appears all MP functions at Abu Ghraib were performed by Reserve MP units, at least during the period in question. The Taguba Report noted that the units of the 800th MP Brigade are greatly under strength, as Reserve component units do not have individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual soldiers. Why was an inadequately staffed, inadequately trained, and unprepared unit sent to handle such a critical task? Who bears responsibility for this staffing decision? General SMITH. This Reserve Brigade's purpose was to fulfill the mission for which it was assigned. Brigade leadership was expected to fulfill its mission by adapting and utilizing soldiers who were supposed to be trained to accomplish mission requirements. As the Taguba Report notes, there are only two MP (Internment/ Resettlement) Battalions in the Army, which have corrections training on their Mission Essential Task List (METL). The Taguba Report also noted that the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade did a poor job of allocating resources. The Commander also did not train her soldiers in confinement operations after it became clear that the mission of her soldiers was to change after the fall of the former Iraqi regime. Adapting to the mission is expected of commanders, especially senior commanders. Some of the "staffing decisions" were dictated by the limitations in specific resources available; a situation which the U.S. Army has identified and is taking steps to correct. 20. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, is this a problem faced by Guard and Reserve units throughout Iraq? General SMITH. Guard and Reserve units deployed throughout Iraq are expected to be trained and ready to perform their missions. Training and readiness are responsibilities of the Service components and are issues currently under review by those components. 21. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, have there been any changes in the training of the MP units and personnel since the detainee abuses were first discovered? If so, what changes have been made to date, and when were they made? General SMITH. Training and readiness are the responsibilities of the Service components and I would defer to those officials to report on changes made. TAGUBA REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 22. Senator LEVIN. General Smith, General Taguba's report contained a number of recommendations with regard to the situation at Abu Ghraib detention facility. To what extent have the recommendations contained in the Taguba Report been adopted and implemented? Please address each of the specific recommendations in the three parts of the report. General SMITH. The attached summary of MNF-I actions is responsive to this |