Armed Forces Intelligence

Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground, sea, and air forces of the country. This is often referred to as OB. It is concerned with

• Strategy-military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics, and politics.

• Tactics-military deployments and operations doctrine.

• OB-location, organization, weapons, strengths. • Equipment-analysis of all military materiel. • Logistics-procurement, storage, and distribution. • Training as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.

Organization-detailed analysis of command

structures.

• Manpower-available resources and their con

ditioning

Political intelligence

Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect military operations. Its subcomponents are

• Government structure-organization of departments and ministries.

• National policies--government actions and decisions.

• Political dynamics-government views and reactions to events.

• Propaganda-information and disinformation

programs.

• Policy and intelligence services-organization and functions.

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• Subversion-subversive acts sponsored by the

government

S&T Intelligence

S&T intelligence studies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of new processes, equipment, and weapons systems. The subcomponents are--

• Weapons and weapon systems.

• Missile and space programs.

• Nuclear energy and weapons technology.

• NBC developments.

• Basic applied science.

• Research and development systems.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Equally important to strategic intelligence components is awareness of the strategic intelligence cycle, and the debriefer's role within that 5-step cycle. The debriefers

• Identify intelligence gaps.

• Translate these gaps into IO. • Answer those IO.

• Prepare intelligence reports.

• Prepare intelligence evaluation by the 10 originator.

These evaluations measure information and report writing quality (see Appendix E). Evaluations provide vital feedback and guidance to strategic debriefers.

Appendix F contains information on the command language program (CLP) and Appendix G, on individual and collective training.

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STANAG 2084 defines a document as any piece of recorded information, regardless of form, obtained from the enemy, which subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force. CEDs can be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs are• Typed, handwritten, printed, painted, engraved, or drawn materials.

• Sound or voice recordings.

• Imagery such as videotapes, movies, or photographs.

• Computer storage media including, but not limited to, floppy disks.

• Reproductions of any of the items listed above. CEDs are mainly acquired two ways: Some are taken from sources; most, however, are captured on the bat. tlefield from former enemy locations and enemy dead.

Documents found on EPWS or detainees or on the battlefield--which can be exploited more efficiently when combined with interrogation--are forwarded with the EPW or detainee to the next echelon in the evacuation channel.

In exceptional cases, documents may be evacuated ahead of the EPW or detainee for advance study by intelligence agencies. A notation should be made on the prisoner's captive tag (Figure 3-6), or accompanying administrative papers, about the existence of such documents and their location if they become separated from the EPW or detainee.

EPW or detainee interrogation has its disadvantages. The main disadvantage is prisoner-derived information usually has to be confirmed from other sources; for example, OB, CEDs, and other EPWs or detainees.

A prisoner may lie to further his army's cause or to Ingratiate himself with the interrogator, by telling him what the prisoner believes he wants to hear. A prisoner may lack the background knowledge needed to interpret what he has seen or to pass it on accurately. He may misunderstand or misinterpret the interrogator's question because of language barriers or fright.

An EPW or detainee may have been misinformed or misled concerning the true situation for any number of

reasons. This does not mean EPW or detainee interrogation is fruitless; however, it should not be considered absolutely reliable.

In contrast, a CED is something which the enemy has written for its own use. For this reason, CEDs are usually truthful and accurate. Spectacular cases have occurred in which falsified documents have been permitted to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception. However, these cases are exceptions and thus are usually famous. Because deceptive documents are unusual, a commander tends to believe in the authenticity of captured documents.

Information contained in CEDs can prove to be of intelligence value to commanders at all levels. CEDs are important because they provide information directly from the enemy. Only rarely will a single document or group of documents provide vital information. Usually, each document provides a small bit of a larger body of information. Each CED, much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole.

In addition to their tactical intelligence value, technical data and political indicators can be extracted from CEDs that are important to strategic and national level agencies. CEDs can be helpful in exploiting sources.

The handling methods and reporting procedures to be used by US personnel acquiring CEDs are contained in STANAG 2084. It states CEDs, except those belonging to captured enemy equipment (CEE), will be forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate captured DOCEX center (normally organic to major North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] commands). There are three types of documents:

• Official-documents of governmental or military origin (such as overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field manuals, and reports).

• Identity--personal items (such as cards or books, passport, and drivers license).

• Personal--documents of a private or commercial origin (such as letters, diaries, and photographs). The volume of CEDs in combat will overwhelm an interrogation element of the size projected for a heavy division. A flow of CEDs similar to those encountered

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in OPERATIONS URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, and DESERT STORM would supply enough targets to keep a light division's interrogators busy around-theclock screening and categorizing CEDs. Any attempt to conduct deeper exploitation would result in a tremendous evacuation delay and the end of timely reporting.

Experience shows a division involved in a HIC may have to process between 525 and 5,300 sources per week While these figures are estimates, they demonstrate the inability of a division's own interrogators to simultaneously exploit sources and CEDs.

Divisions may receive additional interrogation assets from corps, depending on their mission. Prior planning must be conducted to establish the availability of these assets and their deployment within the division.

The density of interrogation assets and command emphasis on the collection effort determine mission requirements. The feasibility of a dual collection mission may also be the result of initial IPB by the commander's intelligence staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual collection effort, EPW interrogation receives priority.

CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive; therefore, they are quickly screened for possible exploitation. Interrogators are given the CED exploitation mission because of their linguistic ability. This makes printed and typed material readily exploitable, but many handwritten documents are illegible.

Information contained in undeveloped imagery and recordings is inaccessible to most interrogation elements. The intelligence value of painted, drawn, or engraved material cannot be exploited by many elements unless it is accomplished by explanatory information in writing. An example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, registration points, or identifying terrain features.

In spite of these limitations, an estimated 90 percent of all the information contained in CEDs can be exploited.

Figure 4-1 shows a comparison along a timeline of the amounts of information available to the interrogator from the two collection targets.

The comparison assumes the CEDs and sources initially had the same amount of information, and it was of equal intelligence value. The figures used are conservative estimates, and the time between the two target types might be even greater between 24 and 72 hours.

The percentage of information available from sources drops sharply during the first 24 hours after capture. This represents the rapid loss of what sources would consider to be insignificant details. A slower drop in the percentage begins at 48 hours to represent the resurgence of established value systems. This resurgence makes it harder for interrogators to obtain what information the source still remembers.

The category assigned to each CED must be recorded as part of the Captured Document Log entry for that CED. Interrogators should also enter a brief description of that CED. This description should identify the type of document (such as sound recording, written material, painting, engraving, imagery); and what language was used in the CED.

This entry should also specify the physical construction of the CED (such as typed, printed, handwritten, tape cassette, photographs, film) and give some indication of its size (such as the number of pages, rolls of film, cassettes). The categories are discussed below.

CATEGORY A

Category A documents

Contain spot reportable information.

• Are time sensitive.

• Contain significant intelligence information.

• May be critical to successfully accomplishing friendly COAS.

Significant intelligence topics include enemy OB, new weapons or equipment on the battlefield, and may contain information that indicates a significant change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions.

When a document is identified as Category A, the document examiner immediately ceases screening operations and submits a spot report in SALUTE format of the critical information from the document. The examiner then resumes screening operations.

CATEGORY B

Category B documents contain information pertaining to enemy cryptographic or communication systems. Once a document is identified as Category B, it is clas