Interrogators are trained to exploit sources and CEDs. This allows the all-source collection manager three exploitation options for interrogation assets: They may exploit sources alone, exploit CEDs, or exploit both simultaneously.

In the past, it was assumed interrogators could accomplish the dual collection mission no matter what type of combat operations were being supported. This may no longer be true. Unit staffing, coupled with the amount of CEDs and sources, may prevent exploitation of sources and CEDs simultaneously.

The density of interrogation assets and command emphasis on the collection effort determine mission requirements. The feasibility of a dual collection mission may also be the result of initial IPB by the commander's intelligence staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual collection effort, interrogating sources receives the priority for two reasons:

• The greater intelligence potential of a source.

• The rate at which people forget detailed information.

An individual's value system is easier to bypass immediately after undergoing a significant traumatic experience. The circumstances of capture are traumatic for most sources. Many former PWs indicated extreme disorientation immediately after capture. Capture thrusts them into a foreign environment over which they have no control Their mores were of no use to them during this period. Most of them survived this phase by

clinging to very basic values (love of family and loyalty to friends or comrades).

Since humans are adaptable, this initial vulnerability passes quickly. An individual's established values begin to assert themselves again within a day or two. When this happens, much of an individual's susceptibility to interrogation is gone.

Memory stores information in two areas: short-term and long-term memory. The five senses constantly transmit information to the brain's short-term memory temporarily and then shifts to the brain's long-term memory. The time at which this transfer takes place varies, but research shows a great amount of detail is lost during that transfer. The percentage of information lost beyond recall varies from study to study, but 70 percent is a conservative estimate.

Much of the information of value to the interrogator is information the source is not aware he has. Although no research data is available in this area, it is likely this type of information will be lost quickly.

CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time-sensitive and thus are screened quickly for possible exploitation (see Chapter 4).

The supported echelon's intelligence officer determines the guidelines for priority of exploitation. The commander's intelligence needs and the J2's, G2's, or S2's estimate of the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to which these guidelines can be applied. Exploitation priorities are reviewed and changed when needed.

FM 34-52

Determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner. PREPARE TO CONDUCT SCREENINGS Screeners should obtain a copy of the element's overall objective statement from the PIR, IR, and SIR and become familiar with the intelligence indicators listed there. Screeners must use their experience and imagination to devise ways to identify EPWs and detainees who might possess information pertinent to these indicators.

For example, one group of indicators may concern new enemy units moving along a specific avenue of approach. In this case, a screener may want to concentrate first on screening EPWS and detainees captured near that location. When he questions those EPWs or detainees, the screener might try to determine what units are due to arrive in that area in the near future. The ability to recognize branch of service and rank insignia can be of great assistance to screeners.

Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWS and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings.

DOCUMENT SCREENING

If time permits, screeners should go to the holding area and examine all available documents pertaining to the EPWS and detainees. They should look for signs that certain EPWs and detainees are willing, or can be induced, to cooperate with the interrogator. Previous screening and interrogation reports and EPW personnel records are important.

Interrogation reports identify EPWs and detainees who have been cooperative in the past. Prior screening reports indicate EPWS and detainees who appear cooperative. During EPW inprocessing, MPs prepare a DA Form 4237-R, which is prescribed by AR 190-8. A sample is shown at Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R contains additional information not required by the GWS, GPW, and GC, but which the EPWS and detainees may have volunteered during inprocessing. The volunteer

ing of information is one indicator of EPW's or detainee's cooperation.

When examining documents, screeners should identify topics on which EPWS and detainees have pertinent information. Screeners should make a note of any documents captured with specific EPWs and detainees that may contain indications of pertinent knowledge and potential cooperation.

PERSONNEL SCREENING

If time permits, screeners should question holding area personnel about the EPWs and detainees. Since these personnel are in almost constant contact with the EPWs and detainees, their descriptions of specific ones can help identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.

Screeners should identify and note those EPWs and detainees whose appearance and behavior indicate they are willing to cooperate immediately or are unlikely to cooperate ever. Unless time is critically short, screeners should

• Personally observe the EPWS and detainees.

• Pay attention to rank and branch of service insignias, and condition of uniform and equipment.

• Carefully observe the behavior demonstrated by other EPWs and detainees.

• Look for things like attempts to talk to the guards, intentional placement in the wrong segregation group, or any overt signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fright.

• Note any EPW or detainee whose appearance or behavior indicates willingness to talk.

CI SCREENING

Before initiating the screening process, the interrogator establishes liaison with supporting CI agents. The CI element, through the CM&D, provides PIR of CI interest. During the screening process, interrogators identify sources of CI interest. After these sources have been interrogated for any information of immediate tactical value (as needed), they are turned over to CI. CI is interested in sources who—

• Have no identification documents.

• Have excessive or modified identification documents.

• Possess unusually large amounts of cash or valuables.

• Possess knowledge of critical interest (for example, nuclear power or chemical plant operations, weapons test and development).

• Are illegal border crossers.

Attempt to avoid checkpoints.

• Are on the black, gray, or white list (FM 34-60A(S)).

• Request to see CI or US Army Intelligence personnel.

• Have family in the denied area.

Screeners should always try to screen cooperative knowledgeable EPWs and detainees first. These include EPWs and detainees identified during the screener's review of documents, questioning of holding area personnel, and their own personal observations. Based on screener notes and recommendations, they establish the order which EPWs and detainees will be questioned. The holding area guards are then told to bring these EPWs and detainees, in order, to the screening site one at a time.

A screener must use a screening report to record information as it is obtained from the source. Figure 3-2 is a format for a screening report. All information shown is rarely obtained from any one source. The blocks save the screener as much additional writing as possible. If PIR, IR, and SIR information is obtained, it is spot reported in SALUTE format. When this type of information is obtained during screening, it must be exploited fully and reported as soon as possible.

CODE

1

2

3

ABC

FM 34-52

Source screening ends when the screener is sure he can make an accurate assessment of the source's potential cooperation and pertinent knowledge. At this time, the source is returned to the control of the guards, and the screener records his assessment on the screening report.

The assessment is recorded using a screening code. The screening code is an alphanumeric designation which reflects the level of cooperation expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. Table 3-1 shows the codes for assessing

sources.

Those sources who have been assigned to the same category may be interrogated in any order deemed appropriate by the senior interrogator. Category 1A sources normally should be the first to be interrogated; Category 1B, next; followed by those assigned to categories 2A, 1C, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are normally interrogated last.

This order ensures the highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent information within available time. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach.

Figure 3-3 shows the order in which sources will be interrogated. The term "screening category" should not be confused with the categories that are assigned to EPWs and detainees based on their intelligence value. There are five interrogation phases which take place after the screening process.

• Planning and preparation.