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FM 34-52

PREFACE

This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing employment of interrogators as human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets in support of the commander's intelligence needs. It outlines the interrogator's role within the intelligence collection effort and the supported unit's day-to-day operations. Details are presented on how interrogation assets accomplish their assigned collection mission.

Material in this manual applies to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts. Principles outlined are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.

This manual is intended for use by interrogators as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence (MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the interrogation collection effort. Unless otherwise stated, descriptions pertaining to duties, functions, and responsibilities of the G1, G2, G3, G4, and G5 apply to equivalent positions at other organizational echelons.

Interrogation is the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy personnel and documents to answer the supported specific information requirements (SIR). These SIR responses, along with those of other MI disciplines, are correlated to satisfy the force commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR).

During previous armed conflicts, interrogators contributed significantly to the overall intelligence collection effort. They revalidated and established keystone interrogation doctrine (for example, theater interrogation facility [TIF] operations) and documented valuable lessons learned. This knowledge became the genesis for evolving interrogation doctrine.

During Southwest Asia operations, interrogators organized and operated a massive document exploitation (DOCEX) effort. Interrogation units screened, interrogated, or debriefed 49,350 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and gathered enough captured enemy documents (CEDs) for DOCEX to fill 18 trailer trucks.

MI interrogation units are a proven and valued collection asset. This manual incorporates the operational experiences and lessons learned. It builds upon existing doctrine and moves interrogation into the 21st century.

These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by the following:

• The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, hereinafter referred to as GWS.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,
hereinafter referred to as GPW.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August 12, 1949, hereinafter referred to as GC.

Doctrine in this publication conforms with and supports principles contained in FM 34-1.
This publication implements the following Standardization Agreements (STANAGs):

• STANAG 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Edition 6.

⚫ STANAG 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War, Edition S.

STANAG 2084, Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents, Edition 5.

This publication also complies with STANAG 1059 and Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) 170, 523, and 528.

The use of the terms EPW, detainee, and source are interchangeable during interrogation process.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The proponent of this publication is the US Army Intelligence Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Headquarters, US Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

FM 34-52

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Battlefield operations demand seizing and maintaining the initiative. When operations are properly designed and executed, initiative accrues significant benefits from the outset of an operation to final victory. It permits attacking where, when, and what, while forcing the enemy to react and try to adapt to our operations.

To gain the initiative, the commander must-

• See the enemy early and determine the capabilities and intentions of the enemy.

• Find and track enemy follow-on echelons.

Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs), which, if successfully attacked, will contribute to the degradation of important enemy battlefield functions.

• Identify, locate, and develop the required targeting data for the attack of high-payoff targets (HPTs), which, if successfully attacked, will contribute to the success of friendly plans.

• Detect enemy weaknesses and develop the necessary data to support the exploitation of these weaknesses.

• Effectively use electronic warfare (EW) assets to support battlefield operations while protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

• Determine the enemy's capability and guard against that capability.

• Protect friendly forces and operations from enemy intelligence collection operations.

• Ensure the enemy is defeated.

• Use the weather and terrain to friendly advantage.

The commander uses defensive and offensive operations to destroy enemy first-echelon forces and deep-attack to simultaneously delay, disrupt, and manipulate enemy follow-on forces. The commander anticipates, creates, and exploits windows of opportunity, using flexible battle planning, to gain the initiative through offensive operations.

By effectively employing maneuver and fire support assets, manipulating the enemy, and expertly using the weather and the terrain, the friendly commander can successfully defeat a superior enemy force. OPERATION DESERT STORM is an example of the successful application of this doctrine.

IEW support is vital to the successful planning and execution of battlefield operations at all echelons. Latelligence support at brigade and battalion levels focuses primarily on close operations, while at division it focuses on close and deep operations. Corps is the focal point for intelligence operations that support rear and deep operations.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Intelligence operations follow a four-phase process known as the intelligence cycle, which is shown at Figure 1-1. The intelligence cycle is oriented to the

commander's mission. Supervising and planning are inherent in all phases of the cycle.

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The IEW system includes three MI disciplines: signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and HUMINT. Intelligence interrogation falls within the realm of HUMINT.

SIGINT

SIGINT is derived from the intercept, analysis, and exploitation of threat communications and noncomBunications radio-electronic emissions.

IMINT

IMINT is obtained from the analysis of radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optical imagery.

HUMINT

HUMINT is obtained from information collected from human sources and consists of the following intelligence collection operations:

• Interrogation of EPWS, civilian detainees, insurgents, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents.

• Long-range surveillance (LRS) patrols. • Strategic debriefing.

Controlled collection operations.

• Open-source exploitation, to include publications and broadcasts.

• Reports of contact from forward units.

• Observation and listening posts.

• Low-level source operations (LLSO).

. HUMINT liaison contacts.

After World War II, the US General Board on Intelligence surveyed 54 division G2s, 18 corps G2s, and 7

Army G2s. It concluded that 43 percent of all intelligence produced in the European theater of operations was from HUMINT, and 84 percent of the HUMINT was from interrogation. The majority of those surveyed agreed that interrogation was the most valuable of all collection operations.

HUMINT is vital in all combat operations, regardless of echelon or intensity of conflict. By nature, HUMINT lends itself to the collection of information about the enemy's thought processes and intentions. HUMINT can provide information on almost any topic of intel

FM 34-52

ligence interest, including order of battle (OB) factors, as well as scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence subjects. During OPERATION DESERT STORM, interrogators collected information which helped to

• Develop a plan to breach Iraqi defensive belts.

• Confirm Iraqi supply-line interdiction by coalition air strikes.

• Identify diminishing Iraqi troop morale.

• Identify a US PW captured during the battle of Kalji.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC

The intelligence cycle supports six tasks which are common to all echelons and which must be worked, at least in part, concurrently to satisfy the needs of the commander. The commander may have to prioritize these functions when resource and time constraints dictare.

INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W)

I&W identifies major shifts in enemy tactics, operations, and strategy which will set or change the terms of battle. They protect the commander from surprise and identify areas or times of risk by detecting enemy ac tions that are counter to planning assumptions.

• At the operational level, they identify potential enemy action and determine the need for a military response and the probability of hostilities.

• At the tactical level, they focus on the timing of hostilities rather than on their probability.

I&W prevent surprise and minimize risk through the early identification of enemy activities and capabilities.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLEFIELD

IPB integrates the environment with the enemy's fighting doctrine and actions. It reveals his capabilities and vulnerabilities and allows the commander to systematically predict his actions. It also allows him to understand the battlefield and how to synchronize all of his battlefield operating systems for maximum effect.

The results of IPB and staff wargaming are used to coordinate and synchronize the intelligence system regardless of the echeion at which it is performed or the intensity of conflict. IPB is more than preparation of the field of battle during hostilities. IPB considers the

WARFARE OPERATIONS

entire environment of conflict, supporting contingency as well as planning operations.

• At the strategic level, IPB focuses on all factors that contribute to military potential and includes political, economic, sociological, and S&T aspects of the enemy's ability and intent to conduct military operations.

• At the operational level, IPB identifies the enemy's political, economic or military center of gravity, the lines of operation, and the points in time and geography where the decisive engagements of a campaign will occur. It also predicts the courses of action (COAS) the enemy is likely to follow. This is done by incorporating political, economic, social, and geographical factors, as well as military factors (such as his military potential and ability to apply air, ground, and naval power).

• At the tactical level, IPB focuses on the details of the terrain, weather, and enemy. It predicts and prioritizes the enemy's COAs and synchronizes the application of combat power on identified decisive points.

In mid-intensity conflict (MIC) to high-intensity conflict (HIC), IPB focuses on the traditional aspects of terrain, weather, and enemy. Many of the factors evaluated in IPB at the strategic level are used during IPB for lowintensity conflict (LIC) at the operational and tactical levels.

Social, economic, and political factors that affect the environment of conflict are considered in IPB. The population must be examined in as much detail as the enemy and the terrain to understand what an enemy can or cannot do. Figure 1-2 shows the intelligence cycle using IPB.

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