legislation restricting the hours of labor of men, although such legislation might be of doubtful validity if the hours were limited beyond ten hours a day.

It has now come to be generally recognized in this country that a state legislature may limit the hours of labor upon public works, whether such public works are conducted by the state or by a political subdivision of the state. Such legislation was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 217 (1903). In New York, California, Ohio and other states, legislation limiting the hours of labor of men upon public works was held invalid by state courts, and such decisions have led to constitutional provisions prescribing an eight-hour day upon public works in New York, Ohio, California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.

No legislation has been expressly enacted in Illinois limiting the hours of labor upon public works, but decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois upon municipal contracts have made it clear that an Illinois court would regard such legislation as invalid. In the case of Fisk v. People, 188 Ill. 206 (1900) the Supreme Court took the view that the requirements of union labor and of an eight-hour day in municipal public works were invalid, and the attitude of the court pretty clearly indicated that it regarded such regulation as not merely beyond the power of the city but also as unconstitutional. In the case of McChesney v. People, 200 Ill. 146, the Supreme Court took the same view as to contract provisions fixing the eight-hour day and prohibiting alien labor. If it is desired to permit a statutory fixing of the hours of labor upon state and municipal public works, this would seem to require a constitutional change in this state.

(4) Legislation making exceptions in favor of union labor with respect to matters of discharge or with respect to employment is pretty clearly not permitted by the constitution of Illinois as now interpreted. In the case of Gillespie v. People, 188 III. 176 (1900), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional legislation which sought to make it a criminal offense for an employer to attempt to prevent his employes from joining labor unions, or to discharge them because of their connection with labor unions; and this view is also substantially taken by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Coppage v. Kansas (1915. Legislation of this character would probably be invalid under the constitution of the United States even though there were a state constitutional provision expressly authorizing it.

In the case of Matthews v. People, 202 Ill. 389 (1903), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Free Employment Agency Act which prohibited superintendents of agencies from furnishing workmen or lists of workmen to employers whose men were either on a strike or locked out, the court taking the view that this created an unjust and unequal classification.

In the case of Fisk v. People, 188 III. 206 (1900) the court squarely took a view against the validity of an ordinance discriminating in favor of union labor upon local public works and said: "Under our constitution and laws, any man has a right to employ a workman to perform labor for him whether such workman belongs to a labor union or not, and any workman has a right to contract for the performance of labor irrespective of the question whether he belongs to a labor union or not." The case of the City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 205 Ill. 346 (1903) should also be cited in this connection, although the matter here related to the terms of an Act prohibiting the employment of aliens upon public works.

(5) In the case of Josma v. Western Steel Car and Foundry Co., 249 Ill. 508 (1911), the Supreme Court of Illinois held invalid legislation penalizing the employment of laborers from another community by misrepresentation as to the conditions of employment or the existence of a strike, saying that there was no distinction in this matter between laborers in another community and those in the same community, and that the classification was therefore invalid. A contrary view was taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of the Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 256 (1914). If legislation of the character held unconstitutional is desired in this state, a constitutional amendment for the purpose may be proposed, although it would seem possible to draft a law in such a way as to meet the objection raised by the court. If, as is contended by those favoring such legislation, the evil aimed at exists only with respect to the deceiving of laborers in another community, no harm would result from the passage of legislation applicable to such deceit, irrespective of where the laborer might be.

(6) The subjects of old age and sickness insurance are discussed elsewhere in this bulletin. It is probable that constitutional provisions would be necessary to permit the enactment of legislation upon these subjects.

(7) Legislative power under the present constitution is pretty clearly not sufficient to authorize the state or its political subdivisions embarking upon the construction of houses or upon numerous other types of governmental enterprises. A wide expansion of authority with respect to governmental undertakings has taken place in Arizona, Oklahoma, North and South Dakota, and a constitutional amendment has recently been adopted in Massachusetts authorizing the state in times of emergency to engage in the furnishing of certain necessaries. Municipal debt limitations in the present constitution would oftentimes prevent the engaging in industrial enterprises, even if constitutional provisions were construed not to prohibit such enterprises; but if it is desired to have the state or its political subdivisions embark upon the enterprises here under discussion, constitutional changes will probably be necessary.

(8) A constitutional amendment was adopted in Massachusetts in 1918 authorizing the control of billboards and public advertising. A similar proposal was rejected by the people of Ohio in 1912. These matters are commented upon in Bulletin No. 7, upon eminent domain and excess condemnation. A constitutional change may be necessary if it is desired to regulate this matter by legislation although a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has gone far towards sustaining the regulation of billboards, and this case went to the federal Supreme Court from the state of Illinois. (Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526).

(9) Projects for the conservation of natural resources are now to a large extent within the state constitutional authority. Here again the problem is in part one of financing such projects, and this matter may require constitutional action if wider state and municipal powers are desired.

(10) The Court of Appeals of New York has sustained legislation limiting the night labor of women (People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395), and also legislation requiring a weekly day of rest in certain occupations.1

..

The labor party of Illinois desires that a new constitution "charge the legislature with the duty of providing by law for the reorganization of industries, impressing upon industries a co-operative character and providing for collective bargaining and for the election of labor members to boards of directors. It is questionable whether under the United States constitution legislation would be valid which interfered with the management of private industry and required the election of labor members to boards of directors of corporations. An economie tendency in the direction of greater co-operation between employers and employes in the management of industries is becoming apparent, and it may be that the courts will come to recognize the validity of legislation requiring such co-operation. It should of course be remarked that this matter has not been passed upon by the federal Supreme Court, and that future action in this field might be sustained, if taken. With respect to co-operative enterprises future legislation in Illinois has already done something by way of encouragement, and in the chapter of this bulletin dealing with corporations will be found a further comment upon the problem of co-operative organizations.

Certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois have been subjected to criticism, but do not prevent legislation in the field to which they apply. For example the case of Starne v. People, 222 III. 189 (1906) held invalid an act requiring washrooms in mines, but the legislation was held invalid upon the ground of an improper classification and later legislation upon the same matter has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois (People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 1914). The case of Massie v. Cessna, 239 III. 352 (1909) held unconstitutional an act regarding the assignments of wages as security for money loans, but did not prevent legislation in this field.

CHAPTER XXVII

LOCAL RURAL GOVERNMENT

166. PROCEEDINGS OF A TOWN MEETING

The town meeting, or general gathering of the adult men of the town, is the classic example of pure democracy in this country. It was in no sense a representative body but rather a primary assembly of all the men in the town. It has had its greatest use and development in New England, but has also been widely used throughout the West. The following seler tions will give some idea of the nature of the proceedings at such meetings.

a. Town Meeting in Massachusetts

[Records of the Town of Duxbury, Massachusetts, from 1642 to
1770 (Plymouth, 1893), p. 241.]

At a town meeting in Duxborrough upon the 15th day of May, Anno Domini 1735. The said town chose Capt. John Alden their representative to serve at the General Court the ensuing year, they also chose Capt. Alden moderator for the said day, and Joseph Freeman petty Juror to serve at the next Inferior Court at Plymouth. The said town also voted that Thomas Burton should keep their school the year ensuing or so much of said year as he shall tarry in said town, and not remove out of it, and also voted that said Thomas Burton should not receive pay from the town for the time he did not attend keeping the said school.

b. Town Meeting in South Dakota

[Minutes of the Proceedings of Town Meeting of Edison Township,
Minnehaha County, South Dakota (mss.).]

At the annual town meeting held in the Town of Edison in the county of Minnehaha and State of So. Dakota at the Stephenson School house on the first day of March 1892.

The meeting was called to order by C. H. Wangsness.

C. H. Wangsness, A. J. Berdahl, and W. W. Coon were then chosen Judges of Town Meeting and A. A. Grinde was then chosen to preside as Moderator of the meeting.

The Moderator at the opening of the meeting stated the busi