The Pure Food and Drug Act was sustained in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 55 L. ed. 364, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364, with the intimation that "no trade can be carried on between the states to which it [the power of Congress to regulate commerce] does not extend," 57, applies not merely to articles that the changing opinions of time condemn as intrinsically harmful, but to others innocent in themselves, simply on the ground that the order for them was induced by a preliminary fraud. Weeks v. United States, 245 U. S. 618, ante, 513, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219. It does not matter whether the supposed evil precedes or follows the transportation. It is enough that, in the opinion of Congress, the transportation encourages the evil. I may add that in the cases on the so-called White Slave Act it was established that the means adopted by Congress as convenient to the exercise of its power might have the character of police regulations. ... The notion that prohibition is any less prohibition when applied to things now thought evil I do not understand. But if there is any matter upon which civilized countries have agreed,far more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and some other matters over which this country is now emotionally aroused, it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor. I should have thought that if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where, in my opinion, they do not belong, this was pre-eminently a case for upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States. But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone, and that this court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. It is not for this court to pronounce when prohibition is necessary to regulation if it ever may be necessary, -to say that it is permissible as against strong drink, but not as against the product of ruined lives. The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the states. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer within their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress their power to cross the line would depend upon their neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the states, but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the states. Instead of being encountered by a prohibitive tariff at her boundaries, the state encounters the public policy of the United States which it is for Congress to express. The public policy of the United States is shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole. If, as has been the case within the memory of men still living, a state should take a different view of the propriety of sustaining a lottery from that which generally prevails, I cannot believe that the fact would require a different decision from that reached in Champion v. Ames. Yet in that case it would be said with quite as much force as in this that Congress was attempting to intermeddle with the state's domestic affairs. The national welfare as understood by Congress may require a different attitude within its sphere from that of some self-seeking state. It seems to me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding by all the means at its command. [Justices McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke concurred in this dissenting opinion.] ... b. Doctrine of Direct and Indirect Interference [Giovanni di Santo v. Pennsylvania (1927), U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions, Jan. 15, 1927, pp. 314-319.] ... ... ... A Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the court: The soliciting of passengers and the sale of steamship tickets and orders for passage between the United States and Europe constitute a well-recognized part of foreign commerce. state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was passed. Such legislation cannot be sustained as an exertion of the police power of the State to prevent possible fraud.. The Congress has complete and paramount authority to regulate foreign commerce and, by appropriate measures, to protect the public against the frauds of those who sell these tickets and orders. The sales here in question are related to foreign commerce as directly as are sales made in ticket offices maintained by the carriers and operated by their servants and employees. The license fee and other things imposed by the Act on plaintiff in error, who initiates for his principals a transaction in foreign commerce, constitute a direct burden on that commerce. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting: ... ... We are not here concerned with a question of taxation to which other considerations may apply, but with state regulation of what may be conceded to be an instrumentality of foreign commerce. As this Court has many times decided, the purpose of the commerce clause was not to preclude all state regulation of commerce crossing state lines, but to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers or obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate or foreign. The recognition of the power of the states to regulate commerce within certain limits is a recognition that there are matters of local concern which may properly be subject to state regulation and which, because of their local character, as well as their number and diversity, can never be adequately dealt with by Congress. Such regulation, so long as it does not impede the free flow of commerce, may properly be and for the most part has been left to the states by the decisions of this Court. In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference" with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached. It is difficult to say that such permitted interferences as those enumerated in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion are less direct than the interference prohibited here. But it seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines. I am not persuaded that the regulation here is more than local in character or that it interposes any barrier to commerce. Until Congress undertakes the protection of local communities from the dishonesty of the sellers of steamship tickets, it would seem that there is no adequate ground for holding that the regulation here involved is a prohibited interference with commerce. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis concur in this opinion. CHAPTER XIV FOREIGN AFFAIRS 87. THE MONROE DOCTRINE As a corollary to our policy of aloofness from European affairs, it seemed appropriate that European nations should be warned against interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. An opportunity for issuing such a warning presented itself after the recognition by the United States in 1822 of the independence of the former Spanish-American colonies which had revolted and set up governments that were republican in form. Several nations of Europe, calling themselves the Holy Alliance, seemed bent on restoring these new American republics to Spain. In this emergency President Monroe sent to Congress in December, 1823, a message containing the famous doctrine which bears his name. The Monroe Doctrine so enunciated has continued to be the cardinal principle of our foreign policy for more than a century, but in its application it has received various interpretations and extensions. Thus President Roosevelt, in 1904, felt compelled to intervene in Santo Domingo for the purpose of maintaining order and avoiding any excuse for European intervention. In so doing, he justified himself by an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine since known as the Roosevelt Corollary. Again, in 1912, when there were reports of a Japanese colonization scheme on Magdalena Bay in Lower California, Mexico, Senator Lodge secured the passage of a simple Senate resolution, which made a further extension of the Monroe Doctrine and is therefore commonly called the Lodge Amendment. Finally, President Wilson, in attempting to bring the warring nations together for a definition of peace terms in December, 1916, assumed that the United States would join in some concert of power for the preservation of peace. Such participation in world affairs he believed to be not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but an expansion of it to meet new conditions. His position was explained to the Senate in a notable address of January 22, 1917. a. Original Monroe Doctrine [Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. II, pp. 217-219.] It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, |