to assist in the accomplishment of the object of the visit without needless duplication of work. In all cases of collaboration, or where material supplied by one officer is utilized by another, full credit therefor shall be given. CALVIN COOLIDGE. THE WHITE HOUSE, April 4, 1924. c. Departmental Order with respect to a Foreign Service School [Lay, Foreign Service of the United States (Prentice-Hall, Inc.), pp. 425-426.] Departmental Order The Foreign Service School The President by Executive Order of June 7, 1924, having provided for the establishment of a Foreign Service School in the Department of State, the following rules and regulations are hereby made for the governance of the School: 1. The Chief Instructor shall be selected from among Foreign Service Officers of class five or over. 2. He shall have the following duties: (a) To prepare and submit to the School Board for approval a complete schedule of work to be covered during the term of instruction. (b) To select instructors in the various subjects from among the qualified officers of the Department of State, the Foreign Service, the other Executive Departments of the Government, and other available sources. (c) To instruct the School in subjects selected and approved by the Board. (d) To maintain the discipline of the School and bear responsibility therefor. (e) To keep a record of attendance and an impartial, confidential rating of each pupil with respect to his qualifications for the Foreign Service. (f) To act as a member of the School Board. (g) To make reports on the work of the School and the individual pupils at the end of the term of instruction or whenever required by the School Board or the Secretary of State. 3. Each term of instruction shall begin and end on dates to be fixed by the School Board. 4. Each foreign service pupil shall be assigned to one of the divisions or bureaus of the Department of State, where he will report for duty when not attending classes. 5. The Chiefs of the divisions or bureaus shall report to the Chief Instructor the character of the work done by the pupils assigned to them, together with any delinquencies. CHARLES E. HUGHES. Department of State, 38. PURPOSE OF VETO The veto power is given to the President, subject to certain limitations, but without any qualification as to the conditions or purposes which should govern the President in his use of this power. During the earlier years of our history, it was generally felt that he ought not to pass upon the wisdom of legislation, but should use his veto for the purpose of protecting his own independent position and prerogatives against congressional interference, and probably to secure a more genuine consideration of measures by Congress. Later, however, the Presidents have not hesitated to use the veto in order to express disapproval of the substance of legislation as well as of its constitutionality. These various uses of the veto, as well as the actual method in executive consideration, are indicated below. a. View of Hamilton [The Federalist, No. 73.] The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence. But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that body. The propriety of a negative has upon some occasions been combated by an observation that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption should be entertained it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body. But this observation, when examined, will appear rather ⚫ specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the executive, but upon the supposition that the legislative will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of the other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them. It may, perhaps, be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones, and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they may happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones. Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect or of risking the displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable that he would ultimately venture to exert his perogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the Crown has been exercised. If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican? It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary than of his using it too often or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow that because it might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents; who, though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard. b. President Wilson's Veto of Budget Bill [Congressional Record, vol. 59, pt. 8, pp. 8609-8610.] To the House of Representatives: I am returning without my signature H. R. 9783, "An act to provide a national budget system, an independent audit of Government accounts, and for other purposes." I do this with the greatest regret. I am in entire sympathy with the objects of this bill and would gladly approve it but for the fact that I regard one of the provisions contained in section 303 as unconstitutional. This is the provision to the effect that the comptroller general and the assistant comptroller general, who are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, may be removed at any time by a concurrent resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when, in their judgment, the comptroller general or assistant comptroller general is incapacitated or inefficient, or has been guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment. The effect of this is to prevent the removal of these officers for any cause except either by impeachment or a concurrent resolution of Congress. It has, I think, always been the accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this kind carries with it, as an incident, the power to remove. I am convinced that the Congress is without constitutional power to limit the appointing power and its incident, the power of removal derived from the Constitution. The section referred to not only forbids the Executive to remove these officers but undertakes to empower the Congress by a concurrent resolution to remove an officer appointed by the |