Design Alternatives for Computer Network Security, Volume 1; Volume 13The Bureau, 1978 - 159 pages |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 16
Page 1
... namely that of controlling access to the multi- resources . The next logical step in this evolution was to share such resources across two or more machines ( systems ) , which introduced yet another dimension to the security problem ...
... namely that of controlling access to the multi- resources . The next logical step in this evolution was to share such resources across two or more machines ( systems ) , which introduced yet another dimension to the security problem ...
Page 27
... namely the encryption devices , if they have sufficient " intelligence " built into them . Such features should include : Protection against spillage due to erroneous addressing information or routing ( e.g. , by having different ...
... namely the encryption devices , if they have sufficient " intelligence " built into them . Such features should include : Protection against spillage due to erroneous addressing information or routing ( e.g. , by having different ...
Page 42
... namely to control network security . The name , agency computer , might also imply that it would perform certain user - oriented services other than those of security control , ( e.g. , to provide directory services , tutorial aids ...
... namely to control network security . The name , agency computer , might also imply that it would perform certain user - oriented services other than those of security control , ( e.g. , to provide directory services , tutorial aids ...
Page 46
... namely ( 1 ) the requestor gains direct access to the resource that is to be pro- tected , ( 2 ) the initial cryptographic keying functions of the SC are lost ( they will be shown to add significant security ) , and ( 3 ) the HOST sees ...
... namely ( 1 ) the requestor gains direct access to the resource that is to be pro- tected , ( 2 ) the initial cryptographic keying functions of the SC are lost ( they will be shown to add significant security ) , and ( 3 ) the HOST sees ...
Page 51
... can have this object included in their access lists . This implicit approach has one major side - effect , namely that subjects other than persons ( e.g. , terminals ) have unnecessarily complex access table entries . Instead 51.
... can have this object included in their access lists . This implicit approach has one major side - effect , namely that subjects other than persons ( e.g. , terminals ) have unnecessarily complex access table entries . Instead 51.
Common terms and phrases
access authorization access control access control matrix access group additional addressing approach aspects audit information basic buffer capabilities checking clear text communications net communications network communications path connection creation considered control commands control information control messages crypto cryptographic devices data and control Data Encryption Standard data processing dialog distributed domain enciphered encipherment encryption devices ensure entities error control fail-secure functions gateway handled HOST computers HOST-level HOST's ICD's identification/authentication implicit initial interface involved issues matrix methods mini-HOST mode multiplexed N-th party accesses N-th party authentication network control programs Network Security Center node object one-time passwords operation pair passwords performed physical and procedural possible private key problems procedural controls processor profile information protection protocol Reference Monitor relay request requestor requirements resource SC-to-SC SC's scheme security control mechanism separate sequence numbers server structure structured programming terminal tradeoffs updates usage utilized
Popular passages
Page iv - In no case does such identification imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Bureau of Standards...