Design Alternatives for Computer Network Security, Volume 1; Volume 13The Bureau, 1978 - 159 pages |
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Page 5
... effect " ) . 5 . The problems in which one operating system ( or data base ) may become faulty in a manner that spreads to other net- work HOST's ( the network cancer problem ; either accidental or malicious ) . 6 . The potential ...
... effect " ) . 5 . The problems in which one operating system ( or data base ) may become faulty in a manner that spreads to other net- work HOST's ( the network cancer problem ; either accidental or malicious ) . 6 . The potential ...
Page 13
... effect ) . These problems are caused by the inherent weaknesses in distributed authentication checking where the authentication ( e.g. , passwords ) can be forged if known . The solution requires either centralized checking or non ...
... effect ) . These problems are caused by the inherent weaknesses in distributed authentication checking where the authentication ( e.g. , passwords ) can be forged if known . The solution requires either centralized checking or non ...
Page 40
... effect of multiplexing , so the intelligent terminal would be treated like any conventional terminal . ICD TERMINAL * See Section 4.4.3 SLAVE ICD ICD COMMUNICATIONS 40 NETWORK SECURITY MECHANISMS AT THE SECURITY CONTROLLER/ HOST LEVEL.
... effect of multiplexing , so the intelligent terminal would be treated like any conventional terminal . ICD TERMINAL * See Section 4.4.3 SLAVE ICD ICD COMMUNICATIONS 40 NETWORK SECURITY MECHANISMS AT THE SECURITY CONTROLLER/ HOST LEVEL.
Page 51
... have this object included in their access lists . This implicit approach has one major side - effect , namely that subjects other than persons ( e.g. , terminals ) have unnecessarily complex access table entries . Instead 51.
... have this object included in their access lists . This implicit approach has one major side - effect , namely that subjects other than persons ( e.g. , terminals ) have unnecessarily complex access table entries . Instead 51.
Page 57
... effect , the object information is centralized at the SC responsible for that object , while the subject information is distributed ; i.e. , the access capabilities of a given user may be scattered across two or more SC's , such that ...
... effect , the object information is centralized at the SC responsible for that object , while the subject information is distributed ; i.e. , the access capabilities of a given user may be scattered across two or more SC's , such that ...
Common terms and phrases
access authorization access control access control matrix access group additional addressing approach aspects audit information basic buffer capabilities checking clear text communications net communications network communications path connection creation considered control commands control information control messages crypto cryptographic devices data and control Data Encryption Standard data processing dialog distributed domain enciphered encipherment encryption devices ensure entities error control fail-secure functions gateway handled HOST computers HOST-level HOST's ICD's identification/authentication implicit initial interface involved issues matrix methods mini-HOST mode multiplexed N-th party accesses N-th party authentication network control programs Network Security Center node object one-time passwords operation pair passwords performed physical and procedural possible private key problems procedural controls processor profile information protection protocol Reference Monitor relay request requestor requirements resource SC-to-SC SC's scheme security control mechanism separate sequence numbers server structure structured programming terminal tradeoffs updates usage utilized
Popular passages
Page iv - In no case does such identification imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Bureau of Standards...